bme680 added

34 files changed, 0 insertions, 15292 deletions

diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/RTE_Device.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/RTE_Device.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 8dc751d..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/RTE_Device.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2021 - 2022 Nordic Semiconductor ASA
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-Nordic-5-Clause
- */
-
-#ifndef __RTE_DEVICE_H
-#define __RTE_DEVICE_H
-
-#include <autoconf.h>
-
-/* ARRAY_SIZE causes a conflict as it is defined both by TF-M and indirectly by devicetree.h */
-#undef ARRAY_SIZE
-#include <zephyr/devicetree.h>
-
-#include <nrf-pinctrl.h>
-
-#include <nrf.h>
-
-#define UART_PIN_INIT(node_id, prop, idx) DT_PROP_BY_IDX(node_id, prop, idx),
-
-#define RTE_USART_PINS(idx)                                                                        \
-	{                                                                                          \
-		DT_FOREACH_CHILD_VARGS(DT_PINCTRL_BY_NAME(DT_NODELABEL(uart##idx), default, 0),    \
-				       DT_FOREACH_PROP_ELEM, psels, UART_PIN_INIT)                 \
-	}
-
-#define RTE_FLASH0 1
-
-#if DOMAIN_NS == 1U
-
-#ifdef NRF_UARTE0_S
-
-#define RTE_USART0 1
-
-#else /* NRF_UARTE0_S - 54L15 devices*/
-
-/* Only UART20 and UART30 are supported for TF-M tests, which are the
- * Non-secure applications build via the TF-M build system
- */
-#if defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART30)
-#define RTE_USART20 1
-#else
-#define RTE_USART30 1
-#endif
-
-#endif /* NRF_UARTE0_S */
-
-#endif /* DOMAIN_NS == 1U */
-
-/*
- * The defines RTE_USART0, RTE_USART1, etc. determine if
- * Driver_USART.c instantiates UART instance 0, 1, etc..
- */
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART0)
-#define RTE_USART0 1
-#endif
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART1)
-#define RTE_USART1 1
-#endif
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART00)
-#define RTE_USART00 1
-#endif
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART20)
-#define RTE_USART20 1
-#endif
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART21)
-#define RTE_USART21 1
-#endif
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART22)
-#define RTE_USART22 1
-#endif
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART30)
-#define RTE_USART30 1
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Note that the defines RTE_USART0_PINS, RTE_USART1_PINS, etc. are
- * used by Driver_USART.c, but only when RTE_USART0, RTE_USART1
- * etc. are defined to 1.
- */
-#define RTE_USART0_PINS RTE_USART_PINS(0)
-#define RTE_USART1_PINS RTE_USART_PINS(1)
-
-#define RTE_USART00_PINS RTE_USART_PINS(00)
-#define RTE_USART20_PINS RTE_USART_PINS(20)
-#define RTE_USART21_PINS RTE_USART_PINS(21)
-#define RTE_USART22_PINS RTE_USART_PINS(22)
-#define RTE_USART30_PINS RTE_USART_PINS(30)
-
-#endif /* __RTE_DEVICE_H */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/config_base.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/config_base.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 62f25b1..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/config_base.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,271 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2023 Cypress Semiconductor Corporation (an Infineon
- * company) or an affiliate of Cypress Semiconductor Corporation. All rights
- * reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef __CONFIG_BASE_H__
-#define __CONFIG_BASE_H__
-
-/* Platform Partition Configs */
-
-/* Size of input buffer in platform service */
-#ifndef PLATFORM_SERVICE_INPUT_BUFFER_SIZE
-#define PLATFORM_SERVICE_INPUT_BUFFER_SIZE     64
-#endif
-
-/* Size of output buffer in platform service */
-#ifndef PLATFORM_SERVICE_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE
-#define PLATFORM_SERVICE_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE    64
-#endif
-
-/* The stack size of the Platform Secure Partition */
-#ifndef PLATFORM_SP_STACK_SIZE
-#define PLATFORM_SP_STACK_SIZE                 0x500
-#endif
-
-/* Disable Non-volatile counter module */
-#ifndef PLATFORM_NV_COUNTER_MODULE_DISABLED
-#define PLATFORM_NV_COUNTER_MODULE_DISABLED    0
-#endif
-
-/* Crypto Partition Configs */
-
-/*
- * Heap size for the crypto backend
- * CRYPTO_ENGINE_BUF_SIZE needs to be >8KB for EC signing by attest module.
- */
-#ifndef CRYPTO_ENGINE_BUF_SIZE
-#define CRYPTO_ENGINE_BUF_SIZE                 0x2080
-#endif
-
-/* The max number of concurrent operations that can be active (allocated) at any time in Crypto */
-#ifndef CRYPTO_CONC_OPER_NUM
-#define CRYPTO_CONC_OPER_NUM                   8
-#endif
-
-/* Enable PSA Crypto random number generator module */
-#ifndef CRYPTO_RNG_MODULE_ENABLED
-#define CRYPTO_RNG_MODULE_ENABLED              1
-#endif
-
-/* Enable PSA Crypto Key module */
-#ifndef CRYPTO_KEY_MODULE_ENABLED
-#define CRYPTO_KEY_MODULE_ENABLED              1
-#endif
-
-/* Enable PSA Crypto AEAD module */
-#ifndef CRYPTO_AEAD_MODULE_ENABLED
-#define CRYPTO_AEAD_MODULE_ENABLED             1
-#endif
-
-/* Enable PSA Crypto MAC module */
-#ifndef CRYPTO_MAC_MODULE_ENABLED
-#define CRYPTO_MAC_MODULE_ENABLED              1
-#endif
-
-/* Enable PSA Crypto Hash module */
-#ifndef CRYPTO_HASH_MODULE_ENABLED
-#define CRYPTO_HASH_MODULE_ENABLED             1
-#endif
-
-/* Enable PSA Crypto Cipher module */
-#ifndef CRYPTO_CIPHER_MODULE_ENABLED
-#define CRYPTO_CIPHER_MODULE_ENABLED           1
-#endif
-
-/* Enable PSA Crypto asymmetric key signature module */
-#ifndef CRYPTO_ASYM_SIGN_MODULE_ENABLED
-#define CRYPTO_ASYM_SIGN_MODULE_ENABLED        1
-#endif
-
-/* Enable PSA Crypto asymmetric key encryption module */
-#ifndef CRYPTO_ASYM_ENCRYPT_MODULE_ENABLED
-#define CRYPTO_ASYM_ENCRYPT_MODULE_ENABLED     1
-#endif
-
-/* Enable PSA Crypto key derivation module */
-#ifndef CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_MODULE_ENABLED
-#define CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_MODULE_ENABLED   1
-#endif
-
-/* Default size of the internal scratch buffer used for PSA FF IOVec allocations */
-#ifndef CRYPTO_IOVEC_BUFFER_SIZE
-#define CRYPTO_IOVEC_BUFFER_SIZE               5120
-#endif
-
-/* Use stored NV seed to provide entropy */
-#ifndef CRYPTO_NV_SEED
-#define CRYPTO_NV_SEED                         1
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Only enable multi-part operations in Hash, MAC, AEAD and symmetric ciphers,
- * to optimize memory footprint in resource-constrained devices.
- */
-#ifndef CRYPTO_SINGLE_PART_FUNCS_DISABLED
-#define CRYPTO_SINGLE_PART_FUNCS_DISABLED      0
-#endif
-
-/* The stack size of the Crypto Secure Partition */
-#ifndef CRYPTO_STACK_SIZE
-#define CRYPTO_STACK_SIZE                      0x1B00
-#endif
-
-/* FWU Partition Configs */
-
-/* Size of the FWU internal data transfer buffer */
-#ifndef TFM_FWU_BUF_SIZE
-#define TFM_FWU_BUF_SIZE                       PSA_FWU_MAX_WRITE_SIZE
-#endif
-
-/* The stack size of the Firmware Update Secure Partition */
-#ifndef FWU_STACK_SIZE
-#define FWU_STACK_SIZE                         0x600
-#endif
-
-/* Attest Partition Configs */
-
-/* Include optional claims in initial attestation token */
-#ifndef ATTEST_INCLUDE_OPTIONAL_CLAIMS
-#define ATTEST_INCLUDE_OPTIONAL_CLAIMS         1
-#endif
-
-/* Include COSE key-id in initial attestation token */
-#ifndef ATTEST_INCLUDE_COSE_KEY_ID
-#define ATTEST_INCLUDE_COSE_KEY_ID             0
-#endif
-
-/* The stack size of the Initial Attestation Secure Partition */
-#ifndef ATTEST_STACK_SIZE
-#define ATTEST_STACK_SIZE                      0x700
-#endif
-
-/* Set the initial attestation token profile */
-#if (!ATTEST_TOKEN_PROFILE_PSA_IOT_1) && \
-    (!ATTEST_TOKEN_PROFILE_PSA_2_0_0) && \
-    (!ATTEST_TOKEN_PROFILE_ARM_CCA)
-#define ATTEST_TOKEN_PROFILE_PSA_IOT_1         1
-#endif
-
-/* ITS Partition Configs */
-
-/* Create flash FS if it doesn't exist for Internal Trusted Storage partition */
-#ifndef ITS_CREATE_FLASH_LAYOUT
-#define ITS_CREATE_FLASH_LAYOUT                1
-#endif
-
-/* Enable emulated RAM FS for platforms that don't have flash for Internal Trusted Storage partition */
-#ifndef ITS_RAM_FS
-#define ITS_RAM_FS                             0
-#endif
-
-/* Validate filesystem metadata every time it is read from flash */
-#ifndef ITS_VALIDATE_METADATA_FROM_FLASH
-#define ITS_VALIDATE_METADATA_FROM_FLASH       1
-#endif
-
-/* The maximum asset size to be stored in the Internal Trusted Storage */
-#ifndef ITS_MAX_ASSET_SIZE
-#define ITS_MAX_ASSET_SIZE                     512
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Size of the ITS internal data transfer buffer
- * (Default to the max asset size so that all requests can be handled in one iteration.)
- */
-#ifndef ITS_BUF_SIZE
-#define ITS_BUF_SIZE                           ITS_MAX_ASSET_SIZE
-#endif
-
-/* The maximum number of assets to be stored in the Internal Trusted Storage */
-#ifndef ITS_NUM_ASSETS
-#define ITS_NUM_ASSETS                         10
-#endif
-
-/* The stack size of the Internal Trusted Storage Secure Partition */
-#ifndef ITS_STACK_SIZE
-#define ITS_STACK_SIZE                         0x720
-#endif
-
-/* The size of the authentication tag used when authentication/encryption of ITS files is enabled */
-#ifndef TFM_ITS_AUTH_TAG_LENGTH
-#define TFM_ITS_AUTH_TAG_LENGTH                16
-#endif
-
-/* The size of the nonce used when ITS file encryption is enabled */
-#ifndef TFM_ITS_ENC_NONCE_LENGTH
-#define TFM_ITS_ENC_NONCE_LENGTH               12
-#endif
-
-/* PS Partition Configs */
-
-/* Create flash FS if it doesn't exist for Protected Storage partition */
-#ifndef PS_CREATE_FLASH_LAYOUT
-#define PS_CREATE_FLASH_LAYOUT                 1
-#endif
-
-/* Enable emulated RAM FS for platforms that don't have flash for Protected Storage partition */
-#ifndef PS_RAM_FS
-#define PS_RAM_FS                              0
-#endif
-
-/* Enable rollback protection for Protected Storage partition */
-#ifndef PS_ROLLBACK_PROTECTION
-#define PS_ROLLBACK_PROTECTION                 1
-#endif
-
-/* Validate filesystem metadata every time it is read from flash */
-#ifndef PS_VALIDATE_METADATA_FROM_FLASH
-#define PS_VALIDATE_METADATA_FROM_FLASH        1
-#endif
-
-/* The maximum asset size to be stored in the Protected Storage */
-#ifndef PS_MAX_ASSET_SIZE
-#define PS_MAX_ASSET_SIZE                      2048
-#endif
-
-/* The maximum number of assets to be stored in the Protected Storage */
-#ifndef PS_NUM_ASSETS
-#define PS_NUM_ASSETS                          10
-#endif
-
-/* The stack size of the Protected Storage Secure Partition */
-#ifndef PS_STACK_SIZE
-#define PS_STACK_SIZE                          0x700
-#endif
-
-/* The stack size of the NS Agent Mailbox Secure Partition */
-#ifndef NS_AGENT_MAILBOX_STACK_SIZE
-#define NS_AGENT_MAILBOX_STACK_SIZE            0x800
-#endif
-
-/* SPM Partition Configs */
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_TFM_CONNECTION_POOL_ENABLE
-/* The maximal number of secure services that are connected or requested at the same time */
-#ifndef CONFIG_TFM_CONN_HANDLE_MAX_NUM
-#define CONFIG_TFM_CONN_HANDLE_MAX_NUM          8
-#endif
-#endif
-
-/* Disable the doorbell APIs */
-#ifndef CONFIG_TFM_DOORBELL_API
-#define CONFIG_TFM_DOORBELL_API                 0
-#endif
-
-/* Do not run the scheduler after handling a secure interrupt if the NSPE was pre-empted */
-#ifndef CONFIG_TFM_SCHEDULE_WHEN_NS_INTERRUPTED
-#define CONFIG_TFM_SCHEDULE_WHEN_NS_INTERRUPTED 0
-#endif
-
-/* Enable OTP/NV_COUNTERS emulation in RAM */
-#ifndef OTP_NV_COUNTERS_RAM_EMULATION
-#define OTP_NV_COUNTERS_RAM_EMULATION           0
-#endif
-
-#endif /* __CONFIG_BASE_H__ */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/config_impl.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/config_impl.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 27b86ea..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/config_impl.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2021-2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-/***********  WARNING: This is an auto-generated file. Do not edit!  ***********/
-
-#ifndef __CONFIG_IMPL_H__
-#define __CONFIG_IMPL_H__
-
-#include "config_tfm.h"
-
-/* Backends */
-#define CONFIG_TFM_SPM_BACKEND_IPC                               0
-#define CONFIG_TFM_SPM_BACKEND_SFN                               1
-
-#define CONFIG_TFM_CONNECTION_BASED_SERVICE_API                  0
-#define CONFIG_TFM_MMIO_REGION_ENABLE                            0
-#define CONFIG_TFM_FLIH_API                                      0
-#define CONFIG_TFM_SLIH_API                                      0
-
-#if CONFIG_TFM_SPM_BACKEND_IPC == 1
-/* Trustzone NS agent working stack size. */
-#if defined(TFM_FIH_PROFILE_ON) && TFM_ISOLATION_LEVEL == 1
-#define CONFIG_TFM_NS_AGENT_TZ_STACK_SIZE                        1256
-#else
-#define CONFIG_TFM_NS_AGENT_TZ_STACK_SIZE                        1024
-#endif
-
-/* SPM re-uses Trustzone NS agent stack. */
-#define CONFIG_TFM_SPM_THREAD_STACK_SIZE                             \
-            CONFIG_TFM_NS_AGENT_TZ_STACK_SIZE                       
-
-#elif CONFIG_TFM_SPM_BACKEND_SFN == 1
-/*
- * In isolation level 1 SFN model, all subsequent components work on NS agent
- * stack. It is observed that half of the sum of all partition stack sizes is
- * enough for working. Define a divisor factor
- * CONFIG_TFM_NS_AGENT_TZ_STK_SIZE_SHIFT_FACTOR for reference, and allow
- * modification of the factor based on application situation. The stack size
- * value is aligned to 8 bytes.
- * The minimum value is 0x400 to satisfy the SPM functional requirement.
- * Manifest tool will assure this.
- */
-#define CONFIG_TFM_TOTAL_STACK_SIZE                              (0 + CRYPTO_STACK_SIZE + PLATFORM_SP_STACK_SIZE)
-#if (CONFIG_TFM_TOTAL_STACK_SIZE < 2048)
-#undef CONFIG_TFM_TOTAL_STACK_SIZE                             
-#define CONFIG_TFM_TOTAL_STACK_SIZE                              2048
-#endif
-
-#define CONFIG_TFM_NS_AGENT_TZ_STK_SIZE_SHIFT_FACTOR             1
-#define CONFIG_TFM_NS_AGENT_TZ_STACK_SIZE                         \
-    (((CONFIG_TFM_TOTAL_STACK_SIZE >> CONFIG_TFM_NS_AGENT_TZ_STK_SIZE_SHIFT_FACTOR) + 0x7) & (~0x7))
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_TFM_SPM_BACKEND_IPC == 1 */
-
-#endif /* __CONFIG_IMPL_H__ */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/config_tfm.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/config_tfm.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 392069b..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/config_tfm.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2022-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef __CONFIG_TFM_H__
-#define __CONFIG_TFM_H__
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Platform defined header file for TF-M configs.
- * Path: ${TARGET_PLATFORM_PATH}/config_tfm_target.h
- */
-#ifdef TARGET_CONFIG_HEADER_FILE
-#include TARGET_CONFIG_HEADER_FILE
-#endif
-
-#ifdef PROJECT_CONFIG_HEADER_FILE
-#include PROJECT_CONFIG_HEADER_FILE
-#endif
-
-#include "config_base.h"
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* __CONFIG_TFM_H__ */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/device_cfg.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/device_cfg.h
deleted file mode 100644
index ef2bfba..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/device_cfg.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2022 Nordic Semiconductor ASA
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-Nordic-5-Clause
- */
-
-#ifndef DEVICE_CFG_H__
-#define DEVICE_CFG_H__
-
-#include <autoconf.h>
-
-/* ARRAY_SIZE causes a conflict as it is defined both by TF-M and indirectly by devicetree.h */
-#undef ARRAY_SIZE
-#include <zephyr/devicetree.h>
-
-#if !defined(NRF54L15_ENGA_XXAA)
-#if defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART0) || DOMAIN_NS == 1U
-#define TFM_UART uart0
-#endif /* defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART0) || DOMAIN_NS == 1U */
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART1) && DOMAIN_NS != 1U
-#define TFM_UART uart1
-#endif /* defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART1) */
-
-#else /* NRF54L15_ENGA_XXAA */
-#if defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART00) && DOMAIN_NS != 1U
-#define TFM_UART uart00
-#endif /* defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART00) */
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART20) && DOMAIN_NS != 1U
-#define TFM_UART uart20
-#endif /* defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART20) */
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART21) && DOMAIN_NS != 1U
-#define TFM_UART uart21
-#endif /* defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART21) */
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART22) && DOMAIN_NS != 1U
-#define TFM_UART uart22
-#endif /* defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART22) */
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART30) && DOMAIN_NS != 1U
-#define TFM_UART uart30
-#endif /* defined(CONFIG_TFM_SECURE_UART30) */
-#endif /* NRF54L15_ENGA_XXAA */
-
-#define DEFAULT_UART_BAUDRATE DT_PROP_OR(DT_NODELABEL(TFM_UART), current_speed, 115200)
-
-#if DT_PROP(DT_NODELABEL(TFM_UART), hw_flow_control)
-#define DEFAULT_UART_CONTROL ARM_USART_FLOW_CONTROL_RTS_CTS
-#else
-#define DEFAULT_UART_CONTROL 0
-#endif
-
-#endif /* DEVICE_CFG_H__ */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/os_wrapper/common.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/os_wrapper/common.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 6494723..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/os_wrapper/common.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2017-2019, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef __OS_WRAPPER_COMMON_H__
-#define __OS_WRAPPER_COMMON_H__
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-#include <stdint.h>
-
-#define OS_WRAPPER_SUCCESS            (0x0)
-#define OS_WRAPPER_ERROR              (0xFFFFFFFFU)
-#define OS_WRAPPER_WAIT_FOREVER       (0xFFFFFFFFU)
-#define OS_WRAPPER_DEFAULT_STACK_SIZE (-1)
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* __OS_WRAPPER_COMMON_H__ */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/os_wrapper/mutex.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/os_wrapper/mutex.h
deleted file mode 100644
index ffdf92c..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/os_wrapper/mutex.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2017-2019, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2023 Cypress Semiconductor Corporation (an Infineon company)
- * or an affiliate of Cypress Semiconductor Corporation. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef __OS_WRAPPER_MUTEX_H__
-#define __OS_WRAPPER_MUTEX_H__
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-#include "os_wrapper/common.h"
-
-/**
- * \brief Creates a mutex for mutual exclusion of resources
- *
- * \return The handle of the created mutex on success or NULL on error
- */
-void *os_wrapper_mutex_create(void);
-
-/**
- * \brief Acquires a mutex that is created by \ref os_wrapper_mutex_create()
- *
- * \param[in] handle   The handle of the mutex to acquire. Should be one of the
- *                     handles returned by \ref os_wrapper_mutex_create()
- * \param[in] timeout  The maximum amount of time(in tick periods) for the
- *                     thread to wait for the mutex to be available.
- *                     If timeout is zero, the function will return immediately.
- *                     Setting timeout to \ref OS_WRAPPER_WAIT_FOREVER will
- *                     cause the thread to wait indefinitely
- *
- * \return \ref OS_WRAPPER_SUCCESS on success or \ref OS_WRAPPER_ERROR on error
- *              or timeout
- */
-uint32_t os_wrapper_mutex_acquire(void *handle, uint32_t timeout);
-
-/**
- * \brief Releases the mutex acquired previously
- *
-
- * \param[in] handle The handle of the mutex that has been acquired
- *
- * \return \ref OS_WRAPPER_SUCCESS on success or \ref OS_WRAPPER_ERROR on error
- */
-uint32_t os_wrapper_mutex_release(void *handle);
-
-/**
- * \brief Deletes a mutex that is created by \ref os_wrapper_mutex_create()
- *
- * \param[in] handle The handle of the mutex to be deleted
- *
- * \return \ref OS_WRAPPER_SUCCESS on success or \ref OS_WRAPPER_ERROR on error
- */
-uint32_t os_wrapper_mutex_delete(void *handle);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* __OS_WRAPPER_MUTEX_H__ */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/client.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/client.h
deleted file mode 100644
index b4e8b09..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/client.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,197 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2018-2021, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef __PSA_CLIENT_H__
-#define __PSA_CLIENT_H__
-
-#include <stddef.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-
-#include "psa/error.h"
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-#ifndef IOVEC_LEN
-#define IOVEC_LEN(arr) ((uint32_t)(sizeof(arr)/sizeof(arr[0])))
-#endif
-
-/*********************** PSA Client Macros and Types *************************/
-
-/**
- * The version of the PSA Framework API that is being used to build the calling
- * firmware. Only part of features of FF-M v1.1 have been implemented. FF-M v1.1
- * is compatible with v1.0.
- */
-#define PSA_FRAMEWORK_VERSION       (0x0101u)
-
-/**
- * Return value from psa_version() if the requested RoT Service is not present
- * in the system.
- */
-#define PSA_VERSION_NONE            (0u)
-
-/**
- * The zero-value null handle can be assigned to variables used in clients and
- * RoT Services, indicating that there is no current connection or message.
- */
-#define PSA_NULL_HANDLE             ((psa_handle_t)0)
-
-/**
- * Tests whether a handle value returned by psa_connect() is valid.
- */
-#define PSA_HANDLE_IS_VALID(handle) ((psa_handle_t)(handle) > 0)
-
-/**
- * Converts the handle value returned from a failed call psa_connect() into
- * an error code.
- */
-#define PSA_HANDLE_TO_ERROR(handle) ((psa_status_t)(handle))
-
-/**
- * Maximum number of input and output vectors for a request to psa_call().
- */
-#define PSA_MAX_IOVEC               (4u)
-
-
-/**
- * The minimum and maximum value in THIS implementation that can be passed
- * as the type parameter in a call to psa_call().
- */
-
-#define PSA_CALL_TYPE_MIN           (0)
-#define PSA_CALL_TYPE_MAX           (INT16_MAX)
-
-/**
- * An IPC message type that indicates a generic client request.
- */
-#define PSA_IPC_CALL                (0)
-
-typedef int32_t psa_handle_t;
-
-/**
- * A read-only input memory region provided to an RoT Service.
- */
-typedef struct psa_invec {
-    const void *base;           /*!< the start address of the memory buffer */
-    size_t len;                 /*!< the size in bytes                      */
-} psa_invec;
-
-/**
- * A writable output memory region provided to an RoT Service.
- */
-typedef struct psa_outvec {
-    void *base;                 /*!< the start address of the memory buffer */
-    size_t len;                 /*!< the size in bytes                      */
-} psa_outvec;
-
-/*************************** PSA Client API **********************************/
-
-/**
- * \brief Retrieve the version of the PSA Framework API that is implemented.
- *
- * \return version              The version of the PSA Framework implementation
- *                              that is providing the runtime services to the
- *                              caller. The major and minor version are encoded
- *                              as follows:
- * \arg                           version[15:8] -- major version number.
- * \arg                           version[7:0]  -- minor version number.
- */
-uint32_t psa_framework_version(void);
-
-/**
- * \brief Retrieve the version of an RoT Service or indicate that it is not
- *        present on this system.
- *
- * \param[in] sid               ID of the RoT Service to query.
- *
- * \retval PSA_VERSION_NONE     The RoT Service is not implemented, or the
- *                              caller is not permitted to access the service.
- * \retval > 0                  The version of the implemented RoT Service.
- */
-uint32_t psa_version(uint32_t sid);
-
-/**
- * \brief Connect to an RoT Service by its SID.
- *
- * \param[in] sid               ID of the RoT Service to connect to.
- * \param[in] version           Requested version of the RoT Service.
- *
- * \retval > 0                  A handle for the connection.
- * \retval PSA_ERROR_CONNECTION_REFUSED The SPM or RoT Service has refused the
- *                              connection.
- * \retval PSA_ERROR_CONNECTION_BUSY The SPM or RoT Service cannot make the
- *                              connection at the moment.
- * \retval "PROGRAMMER ERROR"   The call is a PROGRAMMER ERROR if one or more
- *                              of the following are true:
- * \arg                           The RoT Service ID is not present.
- * \arg                           The RoT Service version is not supported.
- * \arg                           The caller is not allowed to access the RoT
- *                                service.
- */
-psa_handle_t psa_connect(uint32_t sid, uint32_t version);
-
-/**
- * \brief Call an RoT Service on an established connection.
- *
- * \note  FF-M 1.0 proposes 6 parameters for psa_call but the secure gateway ABI
- *        support at most 4 parameters. TF-M chooses to encode 'in_len',
- *        'out_len', and 'type' into a 32-bit integer to improve efficiency.
- *        Compared with struct-based encoding, this method saves extra memory
- *        check and memory copy operation. The disadvantage is that the 'type'
- *        range has to be reduced into a 16-bit integer. So with this encoding,
- *        the valid range for 'type' is 0-32767.
- *
- * \param[in] handle            A handle to an established connection.
- * \param[in] type              The request type.
- *                              Must be zero( \ref PSA_IPC_CALL) or positive.
- * \param[in] in_vec            Array of input \ref psa_invec structures.
- * \param[in] in_len            Number of input \ref psa_invec structures.
- * \param[in,out] out_vec       Array of output \ref psa_outvec structures.
- * \param[in] out_len           Number of output \ref psa_outvec structures.
- *
- * \retval >=0                  RoT Service-specific status value.
- * \retval <0                   RoT Service-specific error code.
- * \retval PSA_ERROR_PROGRAMMER_ERROR The connection has been terminated by the
- *                              RoT Service. The call is a PROGRAMMER ERROR if
- *                              one or more of the following are true:
- * \arg                           An invalid handle was passed.
- * \arg                           The connection is already handling a request.
- * \arg                           type < 0.
- * \arg                           An invalid memory reference was provided.
- * \arg                           in_len + out_len > PSA_MAX_IOVEC.
- * \arg                           The message is unrecognized by the RoT
- *                                Service or incorrectly formatted.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_call(psa_handle_t handle, int32_t type,
-                      const psa_invec *in_vec,
-                      size_t in_len,
-                      psa_outvec *out_vec,
-                      size_t out_len);
-
-/**
- * \brief Close a connection to an RoT Service.
- *
- * \param[in] handle            A handle to an established connection, or the
- *                              null handle.
- *
- * \retval void                 Success.
- * \retval "PROGRAMMER ERROR"   The call is a PROGRAMMER ERROR if one or more
- *                              of the following are true:
- * \arg                           An invalid handle was provided that is not
- *                                the null handle.
- * \arg                           The connection is currently handling a
- *                                request.
- */
-void psa_close(psa_handle_t handle);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* __PSA_CLIENT_H__ */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 10480fa..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4698 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2018-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-/**
- * \file psa/crypto.h
- * \brief Platform Security Architecture cryptography module
- */
-
-#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_H
-#define PSA_CRYPTO_H
-
-/* In Mbed TLS, we would query the current config through inclusion of
- * mbedtls/build_info.h, but in TF-M, we don't rely on build_info.h
- * hence we just include the current configuration if it has been passed
- * through command line. These config defines are required in crypto_sizes.h
- * to compute macros that define sizes which depend on algorithms supported
- * by the implementation
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE)
-#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE)
-#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE
-#else
-#include "crypto_platform.h"
-#endif
-
-#include <stddef.h>
-
-#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__
-/* This __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ block contains mock definitions for things that
- * must be defined in the crypto_platform.h header. These mock definitions
- * are present in this file as a convenience to generate pretty-printed
- * documentation that includes those definitions. */
-
-/** \defgroup platform Implementation-specific definitions
- * @{
- */
-
-/**@}*/
-#endif /* __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ */
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/* The file "crypto_types.h" declares types that encode errors,
- * algorithms, key types, policies, etc. */
-#include "crypto_types.h"
-
-/** \defgroup version API version
- * @{
- */
-
-/**
- * The major version of this implementation of the PSA Crypto API
- */
-#define PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MAJOR 1
-
-/**
- * The minor version of this implementation of the PSA Crypto API
- */
-#define PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MINOR 0
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/* The file "crypto_values.h" declares macros to build and analyze values
- * of integral types defined in "crypto_types.h". */
-#include "crypto_values.h"
-
-/** \defgroup initialization Library initialization
- * @{
- */
-
-/**
- * \brief Library initialization.
- *
- * Applications must call this function before calling any other
- * function in this module.
- *
- * Applications may call this function more than once. Once a call
- * succeeds, subsequent calls are guaranteed to succeed.
- *
- * If the application calls other functions before calling psa_crypto_init(),
- * the behavior is undefined. Implementations are encouraged to either perform
- * the operation as if the library had been initialized or to return
- * #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE or some other applicable error. In particular,
- * implementations should not return a success status if the lack of
- * initialization may have security implications, for example due to improper
- * seeding of the random number generator.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
- */
-psa_status_t psa_crypto_init(void);
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \addtogroup attributes
- * @{
- */
-
-/** \def PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT
- *
- * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a key attribute structure
- * of type #psa_key_attributes_t.
- */
-
-/** Return an initial value for a key attributes structure.
- */
-static psa_key_attributes_t psa_key_attributes_init(void);
-
-/** Declare a key as persistent and set its key identifier.
- *
- * If the attribute structure currently declares the key as volatile (which
- * is the default content of an attribute structure), this function sets
- * the lifetime attribute to #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT.
- *
- * This function does not access storage, it merely stores the given
- * value in the structure.
- * The persistent key will be written to storage when the attribute
- * structure is passed to a key creation function such as
- * psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(),
- * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key().
- *
- * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
- * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
- * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once.
- *
- * \param[out] attributes  The attribute structure to write to.
- * \param key              The persistent identifier for the key.
- */
-static void psa_set_key_id(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                           mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key);
-
-#ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
-/** Set the owner identifier of a key.
- *
- * When key identifiers encode key owner identifiers, psa_set_key_id() does
- * not allow to define in key attributes the owner of volatile keys as
- * psa_set_key_id() enforces the key to be persistent.
- *
- * This function allows to set in key attributes the owner identifier of a
- * key. It is intended to be used for volatile keys. For persistent keys,
- * it is recommended to use the PSA Cryptography API psa_set_key_id() to define
- * the owner of a key.
- *
- * \param[out] attributes  The attribute structure to write to.
- * \param owner            The key owner identifier.
- */
-static void mbedtls_set_key_owner_id(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                                     mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner);
-#endif
-
-/** Set the location of a persistent key.
- *
- * To make a key persistent, you must give it a persistent key identifier
- * with psa_set_key_id(). By default, a key that has a persistent identifier
- * is stored in the default storage area identifier by
- * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. Call this function to choose a storage
- * area, or to explicitly declare the key as volatile.
- *
- * This function does not access storage, it merely stores the given
- * value in the structure.
- * The persistent key will be written to storage when the attribute
- * structure is passed to a key creation function such as
- * psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(),
- * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key().
- *
- * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
- * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
- * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once.
- *
- * \param[out] attributes       The attribute structure to write to.
- * \param lifetime              The lifetime for the key.
- *                              If this is #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE, the
- *                              key will be volatile, and the key identifier
- *                              attribute is reset to 0.
- */
-static void psa_set_key_lifetime(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                                 psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime);
-
-/** Retrieve the key identifier from key attributes.
- *
- * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
- * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
- * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once.
- *
- * \param[in] attributes        The key attribute structure to query.
- *
- * \return The persistent identifier stored in the attribute structure.
- *         This value is unspecified if the attribute structure declares
- *         the key as volatile.
- */
-static mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_get_key_id(
-    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
-
-/** Retrieve the lifetime from key attributes.
- *
- * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
- * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
- * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once.
- *
- * \param[in] attributes        The key attribute structure to query.
- *
- * \return The lifetime value stored in the attribute structure.
- */
-static psa_key_lifetime_t psa_get_key_lifetime(
-    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
-
-/** Declare usage flags for a key.
- *
- * Usage flags are part of a key's usage policy. They encode what
- * kind of operations are permitted on the key. For more details,
- * refer to the documentation of the type #psa_key_usage_t.
- *
- * This function overwrites any usage flags
- * previously set in \p attributes.
- *
- * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
- * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
- * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once.
- *
- * \param[out] attributes       The attribute structure to write to.
- * \param usage_flags           The usage flags to write.
- */
-static void psa_set_key_usage_flags(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                                    psa_key_usage_t usage_flags);
-
-/** Retrieve the usage flags from key attributes.
- *
- * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
- * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
- * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once.
- *
- * \param[in] attributes        The key attribute structure to query.
- *
- * \return The usage flags stored in the attribute structure.
- */
-static psa_key_usage_t psa_get_key_usage_flags(
-    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
-
-/** Declare the permitted algorithm policy for a key.
- *
- * The permitted algorithm policy of a key encodes which algorithm or
- * algorithms are permitted to be used with this key. The following
- * algorithm policies are supported:
- * - 0 does not allow any cryptographic operation with the key. The key
- *   may be used for non-cryptographic actions such as exporting (if
- *   permitted by the usage flags).
- * - An algorithm value permits this particular algorithm.
- * - An algorithm wildcard built from #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH allows the specified
- *   signature scheme with any hash algorithm.
- * - An algorithm built from #PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC allows
- *   any MAC algorithm from the same base class (e.g. CMAC) which
- *   generates/verifies a MAC length greater than or equal to the length
- *   encoded in the wildcard algorithm.
- * - An algorithm built from #PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG
- *   allows any AEAD algorithm from the same base class (e.g. CCM) which
- *   generates/verifies a tag length greater than or equal to the length
- *   encoded in the wildcard algorithm.
- *
- * This function overwrites any algorithm policy
- * previously set in \p attributes.
- *
- * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
- * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
- * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once.
- *
- * \param[out] attributes       The attribute structure to write to.
- * \param alg                   The permitted algorithm policy to write.
- */
-static void psa_set_key_algorithm(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                                  psa_algorithm_t alg);
-
-
-/** Retrieve the algorithm policy from key attributes.
- *
- * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
- * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
- * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once.
- *
- * \param[in] attributes        The key attribute structure to query.
- *
- * \return The algorithm stored in the attribute structure.
- */
-static psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_algorithm(
-    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
-
-/** Declare the type of a key.
- *
- * This function overwrites any key type
- * previously set in \p attributes.
- *
- * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
- * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
- * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once.
- *
- * \param[out] attributes       The attribute structure to write to.
- * \param type                  The key type to write.
- *                              If this is 0, the key type in \p attributes
- *                              becomes unspecified.
- */
-static void psa_set_key_type(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                             psa_key_type_t type);
-
-
-/** Declare the size of a key.
- *
- * This function overwrites any key size previously set in \p attributes.
- *
- * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
- * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
- * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once.
- *
- * \param[out] attributes       The attribute structure to write to.
- * \param bits                  The key size in bits.
- *                              If this is 0, the key size in \p attributes
- *                              becomes unspecified. Keys of size 0 are
- *                              not supported.
- */
-static void psa_set_key_bits(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                             size_t bits);
-
-/** Retrieve the key type from key attributes.
- *
- * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
- * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
- * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once.
- *
- * \param[in] attributes        The key attribute structure to query.
- *
- * \return The key type stored in the attribute structure.
- */
-static psa_key_type_t psa_get_key_type(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
-
-/** Retrieve the key size from key attributes.
- *
- * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
- * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
- * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once.
- *
- * \param[in] attributes        The key attribute structure to query.
- *
- * \return The key size stored in the attribute structure, in bits.
- */
-static size_t psa_get_key_bits(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
-
-/** Retrieve the attributes of a key.
- *
- * This function first resets the attribute structure as with
- * psa_reset_key_attributes(). It then copies the attributes of
- * the given key into the given attribute structure.
- *
- * \note This function may allocate memory or other resources.
- *       Once you have called this function on an attribute structure,
- *       you must call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free these resources.
- *
- * \param[in] key               Identifier of the key to query.
- * \param[in,out] attributes    On success, the attributes of the key.
- *                              On failure, equivalent to a
- *                              freshly-initialized structure.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                                    psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
-
-/** Reset a key attribute structure to a freshly initialized state.
- *
- * You must initialize the attribute structure as described in the
- * documentation of the type #psa_key_attributes_t before calling this
- * function. Once the structure has been initialized, you may call this
- * function at any time.
- *
- * This function frees any auxiliary resources that the structure
- * may contain.
- *
- * \param[in,out] attributes    The attribute structure to reset.
- */
-void psa_reset_key_attributes(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup key_management Key management
- * @{
- */
-
-/** Remove non-essential copies of key material from memory.
- *
- * If the key identifier designates a volatile key, this functions does not do
- * anything and returns successfully.
- *
- * If the key identifier designates a persistent key, then this function will
- * free all resources associated with the key in volatile memory. The key
- * data in persistent storage is not affected and the key can still be used.
- *
- * \param key Identifier of the key to purge.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         The key material will have been removed from memory if it is not
- *         currently required.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p key is not a valid key identifier.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key);
-
-/** Make a copy of a key.
- *
- * Copy key material from one location to another.
- *
- * This function is primarily useful to copy a key from one location
- * to another, since it populates a key using the material from
- * another key which may have a different lifetime.
- *
- * This function may be used to share a key with a different party,
- * subject to implementation-defined restrictions on key sharing.
- *
- * The policy on the source key must have the usage flag
- * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY set.
- * This flag is sufficient to permit the copy if the key has the lifetime
- * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT.
- * Some secure elements do not provide a way to copy a key without
- * making it extractable from the secure element. If a key is located
- * in such a secure element, then the key must have both usage flags
- * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY and #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT in order to make
- * a copy of the key outside the secure element.
- *
- * The resulting key may only be used in a way that conforms to
- * both the policy of the original key and the policy specified in
- * the \p attributes parameter:
- * - The usage flags on the resulting key are the bitwise-and of the
- *   usage flags on the source policy and the usage flags in \p attributes.
- * - If both allow the same algorithm or wildcard-based
- *   algorithm policy, the resulting key has the same algorithm policy.
- * - If either of the policies allows an algorithm and the other policy
- *   allows a wildcard-based algorithm policy that includes this algorithm,
- *   the resulting key allows the same algorithm.
- * - If the policies do not allow any algorithm in common, this function
- *   fails with the status #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT.
- *
- * The effect of this function on implementation-defined attributes is
- * implementation-defined.
- *
- * \param source_key        The key to copy. It must allow the usage
- *                          #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY. If a private or secret key is
- *                          being copied outside of a secure element it must
- *                          also allow #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT.
- * \param[in] attributes    The attributes for the new key.
- *                          They are used as follows:
- *                          - The key type and size may be 0. If either is
- *                            nonzero, it must match the corresponding
- *                            attribute of the source key.
- *                          - The key location (the lifetime and, for
- *                            persistent keys, the key identifier) is
- *                            used directly.
- *                          - The policy constraints (usage flags and
- *                            algorithm policy) are combined from
- *                            the source key and \p attributes so that
- *                            both sets of restrictions apply, as
- *                            described in the documentation of this function.
- * \param[out] target_key   On success, an identifier for the newly created
- *                          key. For persistent keys, this is the key
- *                          identifier defined in \p attributes.
- *                          \c 0 on failure.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- *         \p source_key is invalid.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
- *         This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is
- *         already a persistent key with the given identifier.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         The lifetime or identifier in \p attributes are invalid, or
- *         the policy constraints on the source and specified in
- *         \p attributes are incompatible, or
- *         \p attributes specifies a key type or key size
- *         which does not match the attributes of the source key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
- *         The source key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY usage flag, or
- *         the source key is not exportable and its lifetime does not
- *         allow copying it to the target's lifetime.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_copy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key,
-                          const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                          mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *target_key);
-
-
-/**
- * \brief Destroy a key.
- *
- * This function destroys a key from both volatile
- * memory and, if applicable, non-volatile storage. Implementations shall
- * make a best effort to ensure that the key material cannot be recovered.
- *
- * This function also erases any metadata such as policies and frees
- * resources associated with the key.
- *
- * If a key is currently in use in a multipart operation, then destroying the
- * key will cause the multipart operation to fail.
- *
- * \param key  Identifier of the key to erase. If this is \c 0, do nothing and
- *             return #PSA_SUCCESS.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         \p key was a valid identifier and the key material that it
- *         referred to has been erased. Alternatively, \p key is \c 0.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
- *         The key cannot be erased because it is
- *         read-only, either due to a policy or due to physical restrictions.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- *         \p key is not a valid identifier nor \c 0.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- *         There was a failure in communication with the cryptoprocessor.
- *         The key material may still be present in the cryptoprocessor.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
- *         This error is typically a result of either storage corruption on a
- *         cleartext storage backend, or an attempt to read data that was
- *         written by an incompatible version of the library.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- *         The storage is corrupted. Implementations shall make a best effort
- *         to erase key material even in this stage, however applications
- *         should be aware that it may be impossible to guarantee that the
- *         key material is not recoverable in such cases.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- *         An unexpected condition which is not a storage corruption or
- *         a communication failure occurred. The cryptoprocessor may have
- *         been compromised.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key);
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup import_export Key import and export
- * @{
- */
-
-/**
- * \brief Import a key in binary format.
- *
- * This function supports any output from psa_export_key(). Refer to the
- * documentation of psa_export_public_key() for the format of public keys
- * and to the documentation of psa_export_key() for the format for
- * other key types.
- *
- * The key data determines the key size. The attributes may optionally
- * specify a key size; in this case it must match the size determined
- * from the key data. A key size of 0 in \p attributes indicates that
- * the key size is solely determined by the key data.
- *
- * Implementations must reject an attempt to import a key of size 0.
- *
- * This specification supports a single format for each key type.
- * Implementations may support other formats as long as the standard
- * format is supported. Implementations that support other formats
- * should ensure that the formats are clearly unambiguous so as to
- * minimize the risk that an invalid input is accidentally interpreted
- * according to a different format.
- *
- * \param[in] attributes    The attributes for the new key.
- *                          The key size is always determined from the
- *                          \p data buffer.
- *                          If the key size in \p attributes is nonzero,
- *                          it must be equal to the size from \p data.
- * \param[out] key          On success, an identifier to the newly created key.
- *                          For persistent keys, this is the key identifier
- *                          defined in \p attributes.
- *                          \c 0 on failure.
- * \param[in] data    Buffer containing the key data. The content of this
- *                    buffer is interpreted according to the type declared
- *                    in \p attributes.
- *                    All implementations must support at least the format
- *                    described in the documentation
- *                    of psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key() for
- *                    the chosen type. Implementations may allow other
- *                    formats, but should be conservative: implementations
- *                    should err on the side of rejecting content if it
- *                    may be erroneous (e.g. wrong type or truncated data).
- * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- *         If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata
- *         have been saved to persistent storage.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
- *         This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is
- *         already a persistent key with the given identifier.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         The key type or key size is not supported, either by the
- *         implementation in general or in this particular persistent location.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         The key attributes, as a whole, are invalid, or
- *         the key data is not correctly formatted, or
- *         the size in \p attributes is nonzero and does not match the size
- *         of the key data.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                            const uint8_t *data,
-                            size_t data_length,
-                            mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key);
-
-
-
-/**
- * \brief Export a key in binary format.
- *
- * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to
- * create an equivalent object.
- *
- * If the implementation of psa_import_key() supports other formats
- * beyond the format specified here, the output from psa_export_key()
- * must use the representation specified here, not the original
- * representation.
- *
- * For standard key types, the output format is as follows:
- *
- * - For symmetric keys (including MAC keys), the format is the
- *   raw bytes of the key.
- * - For DES, the key data consists of 8 bytes. The parity bits must be
- *   correct.
- * - For Triple-DES, the format is the concatenation of the
- *   two or three DES keys.
- * - For RSA key pairs (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR), the format
- *   is the non-encrypted DER encoding of the representation defined by
- *   PKCS\#1 (RFC 8017) as `RSAPrivateKey`, version 0.
- *   ```
- *   RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
- *       version             INTEGER,  -- must be 0
- *       modulus             INTEGER,  -- n
- *       publicExponent      INTEGER,  -- e
- *       privateExponent     INTEGER,  -- d
- *       prime1              INTEGER,  -- p
- *       prime2              INTEGER,  -- q
- *       exponent1           INTEGER,  -- d mod (p-1)
- *       exponent2           INTEGER,  -- d mod (q-1)
- *       coefficient         INTEGER,  -- (inverse of q) mod p
- *   }
- *   ```
- * - For elliptic curve key pairs (key types for which
- *   #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR is true), the format is
- *   a representation of the private value as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string
- *   where `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size
- *   of the order of the curve's coordinate field. This byte string is
- *   in little-endian order for Montgomery curves (curve types
- *   `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_CURVEXXX`), and in big-endian order for Weierstrass
- *   curves (curve types `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECTXXX`, `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECPXXX`
- *   and `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`).
- *   For Weierstrass curves, this is the content of the `privateKey` field of
- *   the `ECPrivateKey` format defined by RFC 5915.  For Montgomery curves,
- *   the format is defined by RFC 7748, and output is masked according to §5.
- *   For twisted Edwards curves, the private key is as defined by RFC 8032
- *   (a 32-byte string for Edwards25519, a 57-byte string for Edwards448).
- * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange key pairs (key types for which
- *   #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR is true), the
- *   format is the representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte
- *   string. The length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes
- *   (leading zeroes are not stripped).
- * - For public keys (key types for which #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY is
- *   true), the format is the same as for psa_export_public_key().
- *
- * The policy on the key must have the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT set.
- *
- * \param key               Identifier of the key to export. It must allow the
- *                          usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT, unless it is a public
- *                          key.
- * \param[out] data         Buffer where the key data is to be written.
- * \param data_size         Size of the \p data buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] data_length  On success, the number of bytes
- *                          that make up the key data.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
- *         The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT flag.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         The size of the \p data buffer is too small. You can determine a
- *         sufficient buffer size by calling
- *         #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c type, \c bits)
- *         where \c type is the key type
- *         and \c bits is the key size in bits.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_export_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                            uint8_t *data,
-                            size_t data_size,
-                            size_t *data_length);
-
-/**
- * \brief Export a public key or the public part of a key pair in binary format.
- *
- * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to
- * create an object that is equivalent to the public key.
- *
- * This specification supports a single format for each key type.
- * Implementations may support other formats as long as the standard
- * format is supported. Implementations that support other formats
- * should ensure that the formats are clearly unambiguous so as to
- * minimize the risk that an invalid input is accidentally interpreted
- * according to a different format.
- *
- * For standard key types, the output format is as follows:
- * - For RSA public keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY), the DER encoding of
- *   the representation defined by RFC 3279 &sect;2.3.1 as `RSAPublicKey`.
- *   ```
- *   RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
- *      modulus            INTEGER,    -- n
- *      publicExponent     INTEGER  }  -- e
- *   ```
- * - For elliptic curve keys on a twisted Edwards curve (key types for which
- *   #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY is true and #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY
- *   returns #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS), the public key is as defined
- *   by RFC 8032
- *   (a 32-byte string for Edwards25519, a 57-byte string for Edwards448).
- * - For other elliptic curve public keys (key types for which
- *   #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY is true), the format is the uncompressed
- *   representation defined by SEC1 &sect;2.3.3 as the content of an ECPoint.
- *   Let `m` be the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of
- *   `q` for a curve over `F_q`. The representation consists of:
- *      - The byte 0x04;
- *      - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian;
- *      - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian.
- * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange public keys (key types for which
- *   #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY is true),
- *   the format is the representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a
- *   big-endian byte string. The length of the byte string is the length of the
- *   base prime `p` in bytes.
- *
- * Exporting a public key object or the public part of a key pair is
- * always permitted, regardless of the key's usage flags.
- *
- * \param key               Identifier of the key to export.
- * \param[out] data         Buffer where the key data is to be written.
- * \param data_size         Size of the \p data buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] data_length  On success, the number of bytes
- *                          that make up the key data.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         The key is neither a public key nor a key pair.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         The size of the \p data buffer is too small. You can determine a
- *         sufficient buffer size by calling
- *         #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(#PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(\c type), \c bits)
- *         where \c type is the key type
- *         and \c bits is the key size in bits.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                                   uint8_t *data,
-                                   size_t data_size,
-                                   size_t *data_length);
-
-
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup hash Message digests
- * @{
- */
-
-/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message.
- *
- * \note To verify the hash of a message against an
- *       expected value, use psa_hash_compare() instead.
- *
- * \param alg               The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
- *                          such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true).
- * \param[in] input         Buffer containing the message to hash.
- * \param input_length      Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] hash         Buffer where the hash is to be written.
- * \param hash_size         Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] hash_length  On success, the number of bytes
- *                          that make up the hash value. This is always
- *                          #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\p alg).
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         \p hash_size is too small
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                              const uint8_t *input,
-                              size_t input_length,
-                              uint8_t *hash,
-                              size_t hash_size,
-                              size_t *hash_length);
-
-/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message and compare it with a
- * reference value.
- *
- * \param alg               The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
- *                          such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true).
- * \param[in] input         Buffer containing the message to hash.
- * \param input_length      Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] hash         Buffer containing the expected hash value.
- * \param hash_length       Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the input.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
- *         The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it
- *         differs from the expected hash.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p input_length or \p hash_length do not match the hash size for \p alg
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_hash_compare(psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                              const uint8_t *input,
-                              size_t input_length,
-                              const uint8_t *hash,
-                              size_t hash_length);
-
-/** The type of the state data structure for multipart hash operations.
- *
- * Before calling any function on a hash operation object, the application must
- * initialize it by any of the following means:
- * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_hash_operation_t operation;
- *   memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
- *   \endcode
- * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_hash_operation_t operation = {0};
- *   \endcode
- * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT,
- *   for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
- *   \endcode
- * - Assign the result of the function psa_hash_operation_init()
- *   to the structure, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_hash_operation_t operation;
- *   operation = psa_hash_operation_init();
- *   \endcode
- *
- * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
- * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
- * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */
-typedef struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_t;
-
-/** \def PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT
- *
- * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a hash operation object
- * of type #psa_hash_operation_t.
- */
-
-/** Return an initial value for a hash operation object.
- */
-static psa_hash_operation_t psa_hash_operation_init(void);
-
-/** Set up a multipart hash operation.
- *
- * The sequence of operations to calculate a hash (message digest)
- * is as follows:
- * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
- *    listed here.
- * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
- *    documentation for #psa_hash_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT.
- * -# Call psa_hash_setup() to specify the algorithm.
- * -# Call psa_hash_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
- *    of the message each time. The hash that is calculated is the hash
- *    of the concatenation of these messages in order.
- * -# To calculate the hash, call psa_hash_finish().
- *    To compare the hash with an expected value, call psa_hash_verify().
- *
- * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_hash_setup(), the
- * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_hash_abort(). The
- * application may call psa_hash_abort() at any time after the operation
- * has been initialized.
- *
- * After a successful call to psa_hash_setup(), the application must
- * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
- * operation:
- * - A successful call to psa_hash_finish() or psa_hash_verify().
- * - A call to psa_hash_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have
- *                          been initialized as per the documentation for
- *                          #psa_hash_operation_t and not yet in use.
- * \param alg               The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
- *                          such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true).
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \p alg is not a supported hash algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p alg is not a hash algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
- *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_hash_setup(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
-                            psa_algorithm_t alg);
-
-/** Add a message fragment to a multipart hash operation.
- *
- * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function.
- *
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation.
- * \param[in] input         Buffer containing the message fragment to hash.
- * \param input_length      Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
- *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_hash_update(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
-                             const uint8_t *input,
-                             size_t input_length);
-
-/** Finish the calculation of the hash of a message.
- *
- * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function.
- * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating
- * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update().
- *
- * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort().
- *
- * \warning Applications should not call this function if they expect
- *          a specific value for the hash. Call psa_hash_verify() instead.
- *          Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as
- *          hash values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky
- *          because the time taken by the comparison may leak information
- *          about the hashed data which could allow an attacker to guess
- *          a valid hash and thereby bypass security controls.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     Active hash operation.
- * \param[out] hash             Buffer where the hash is to be written.
- * \param hash_size             Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] hash_length      On success, the number of bytes
- *                              that make up the hash value. This is always
- *                              #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where \c alg is the
- *                              hash algorithm that is calculated.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         The size of the \p hash buffer is too small. You can determine a
- *         sufficient buffer size by calling #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg)
- *         where \c alg is the hash algorithm that is calculated.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
- *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_hash_finish(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
-                             uint8_t *hash,
-                             size_t hash_size,
-                             size_t *hash_length);
-
-/** Finish the calculation of the hash of a message and compare it with
- * an expected value.
- *
- * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function.
- * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating
- * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update(). It then
- * compares the calculated hash with the expected hash passed as a
- * parameter to this function.
- *
- * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort().
- *
- * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the
- * comparison between the actual hash and the expected hash is performed
- * in constant time.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     Active hash operation.
- * \param[in] hash              Buffer containing the expected hash value.
- * \param hash_length           Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the message.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
- *         The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it
- *         differs from the expected hash.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
- *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_hash_verify(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
-                             const uint8_t *hash,
-                             size_t hash_length);
-
-/** Abort a hash operation.
- *
- * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the
- * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object
- * can be reused for another operation by calling
- * psa_hash_setup() again.
- *
- * You may call this function any time after the operation object has
- * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_hash_operation_t.
- *
- * In particular, calling psa_hash_abort() after the operation has been
- * terminated by a call to psa_hash_abort(), psa_hash_finish() or
- * psa_hash_verify() is safe and has no effect.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     Initialized hash operation.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_hash_abort(psa_hash_operation_t *operation);
-
-/** Clone a hash operation.
- *
- * This function copies the state of an ongoing hash operation to
- * a new operation object. In other words, this function is equivalent
- * to calling psa_hash_setup() on \p target_operation with the same
- * algorithm that \p source_operation was set up for, then
- * psa_hash_update() on \p target_operation with the same input that
- * that was passed to \p source_operation. After this function returns, the
- * two objects are independent, i.e. subsequent calls involving one of
- * the objects do not affect the other object.
- *
- * \param[in] source_operation      The active hash operation to clone.
- * \param[in,out] target_operation  The operation object to set up.
- *                                  It must be initialized but not active.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The \p source_operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
- *         the \p target_operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
- *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_hash_clone(const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation,
-                            psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation);
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup MAC Message authentication codes
- * @{
- */
-
-/** Calculate the MAC (message authentication code) of a message.
- *
- * \note To verify the MAC of a message against an
- *       expected value, use psa_mac_verify() instead.
- *       Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as
- *       MAC values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky
- *       because the time taken by the comparison may leak information
- *       about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess
- *       a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls.
- *
- * \param key               Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It
- *                          must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE.
- * \param alg               The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
- *                          such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
- * \param[in] input         Buffer containing the input message.
- * \param input_length      Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] mac          Buffer where the MAC value is to be written.
- * \param mac_size          Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] mac_length   On success, the number of bytes
- *                          that make up the MAC value.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         \p mac_size is too small
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- *         The key could not be retrieved from storage.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_mac_compute(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                             psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                             const uint8_t *input,
-                             size_t input_length,
-                             uint8_t *mac,
-                             size_t mac_size,
-                             size_t *mac_length);
-
-/** Calculate the MAC of a message and compare it with a reference value.
- *
- * \param key               Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It
- *                          must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE.
- * \param alg               The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
- *                          such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
- * \param[in] input         Buffer containing the input message.
- * \param input_length      Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] mac          Buffer containing the expected MAC value.
- * \param mac_length        Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the input.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
- *         The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it
- *         differs from the expected value.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- *         The key could not be retrieved from storage.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                            psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                            const uint8_t *input,
-                            size_t input_length,
-                            const uint8_t *mac,
-                            size_t mac_length);
-
-/** The type of the state data structure for multipart MAC operations.
- *
- * Before calling any function on a MAC operation object, the application must
- * initialize it by any of the following means:
- * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_mac_operation_t operation;
- *   memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
- *   \endcode
- * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_mac_operation_t operation = {0};
- *   \endcode
- * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT,
- *   for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
- *   \endcode
- * - Assign the result of the function psa_mac_operation_init()
- *   to the structure, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_mac_operation_t operation;
- *   operation = psa_mac_operation_init();
- *   \endcode
- *
- *
- * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
- * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
- * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */
-typedef struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_t;
-
-/** \def PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT
- *
- * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a MAC operation object of type
- * #psa_mac_operation_t.
- */
-
-/** Return an initial value for a MAC operation object.
- */
-static psa_mac_operation_t psa_mac_operation_init(void);
-
-/** Set up a multipart MAC calculation operation.
- *
- * This function sets up the calculation of the MAC
- * (message authentication code) of a byte string.
- * To verify the MAC of a message against an
- * expected value, use psa_mac_verify_setup() instead.
- *
- * The sequence of operations to calculate a MAC is as follows:
- * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
- *    listed here.
- * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
- *    documentation for #psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT.
- * -# Call psa_mac_sign_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
- *    of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC
- *    of the concatenation of these messages in order.
- * -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_sign_finish() to finish
- *    calculating the MAC value and retrieve it.
- *
- * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the
- * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_mac_abort(). The
- * application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation
- * has been initialized.
- *
- * After a successful call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the application must
- * eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods:
- * - A successful call to psa_mac_sign_finish().
- * - A call to psa_mac_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have
- *                          been initialized as per the documentation for
- *                          #psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use.
- * \param key               Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It
- *                          must remain valid until the operation terminates.
- *                          It must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE.
- * \param alg               The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
- *                          such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- *         The key could not be retrieved from storage.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
- *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
-                                mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                                psa_algorithm_t alg);
-
-/** Set up a multipart MAC verification operation.
- *
- * This function sets up the verification of the MAC
- * (message authentication code) of a byte string against an expected value.
- *
- * The sequence of operations to verify a MAC is as follows:
- * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
- *    listed here.
- * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
- *    documentation for #psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT.
- * -# Call psa_mac_verify_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
- *    of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC
- *    of the concatenation of these messages in order.
- * -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_verify_finish() to finish
- *    calculating the actual MAC of the message and verify it against
- *    the expected value.
- *
- * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the
- * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_mac_abort(). The
- * application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation
- * has been initialized.
- *
- * After a successful call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the application must
- * eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods:
- * - A successful call to psa_mac_verify_finish().
- * - A call to psa_mac_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have
- *                          been initialized as per the documentation for
- *                          #psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use.
- * \param key               Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It
- *                          must remain valid until the operation terminates.
- *                          It must allow the usage
- *                          PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE.
- * \param alg               The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
- *                          such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \c key is not compatible with \c alg.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \c alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- *         The key could not be retrieved from storage.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
- *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
-                                  mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                                  psa_algorithm_t alg);
-
-/** Add a message fragment to a multipart MAC operation.
- *
- * The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup()
- * before calling this function.
- *
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation.
- * \param[in] input         Buffer containing the message fragment to add to
- *                          the MAC calculation.
- * \param input_length      Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
- *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_mac_update(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
-                            const uint8_t *input,
-                            size_t input_length);
-
-/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message.
- *
- * The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() before calling this function.
- * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating
- * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update().
- *
- * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort().
- *
- * \warning Applications should not call this function if they expect
- *          a specific value for the MAC. Call psa_mac_verify_finish() instead.
- *          Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as
- *          MAC values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky
- *          because the time taken by the comparison may leak information
- *          about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess
- *          a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation.
- * \param[out] mac          Buffer where the MAC value is to be written.
- * \param mac_size          Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] mac_length   On success, the number of bytes
- *                          that make up the MAC value. This is always
- *                          #PSA_MAC_LENGTH(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg)
- *                          where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and
- *                          bit-size respectively of the key and \c alg is the
- *                          MAC algorithm that is calculated.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. You can determine a
- *         sufficient buffer size by calling PSA_MAC_LENGTH().
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac sign
- *         operation), or the library has not been previously initialized
- *         by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
-                                 uint8_t *mac,
-                                 size_t mac_size,
-                                 size_t *mac_length);
-
-/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message and compare it with
- * an expected value.
- *
- * The application must call psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this function.
- * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating
- * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update(). It then
- * compares the calculated MAC with the expected MAC passed as a
- * parameter to this function.
- *
- * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort().
- *
- * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the
- * comparison between the actual MAC and the expected MAC is performed
- * in constant time.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation.
- * \param[in] mac           Buffer containing the expected MAC value.
- * \param mac_length        Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the message.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
- *         The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it
- *         differs from the expected MAC.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac verify
- *         operation), or the library has not been previously initialized
- *         by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
-                                   const uint8_t *mac,
-                                   size_t mac_length);
-
-/** Abort a MAC operation.
- *
- * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the
- * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object
- * can be reused for another operation by calling
- * psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup() again.
- *
- * You may call this function any time after the operation object has
- * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_mac_operation_t.
- *
- * In particular, calling psa_mac_abort() after the operation has been
- * terminated by a call to psa_mac_abort(), psa_mac_sign_finish() or
- * psa_mac_verify_finish() is safe and has no effect.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation Initialized MAC operation.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_mac_abort(psa_mac_operation_t *operation);
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup cipher Symmetric ciphers
- * @{
- */
-
-/** Encrypt a message using a symmetric cipher.
- *
- * This function encrypts a message with a random IV (initialization
- * vector). Use the multipart operation interface with a
- * #psa_cipher_operation_t object to provide other forms of IV.
- *
- * \param key                   Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
- *                              It must allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT.
- * \param alg                   The cipher algorithm to compute
- *                              (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                              #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
- * \param[in] input             Buffer containing the message to encrypt.
- * \param input_length          Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] output           Buffer where the output is to be written.
- *                              The output contains the IV followed by
- *                              the ciphertext proper.
- * \param output_size           Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] output_length    On success, the number of bytes
- *                              that make up the output.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                                psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                const uint8_t *input,
-                                size_t input_length,
-                                uint8_t *output,
-                                size_t output_size,
-                                size_t *output_length);
-
-/** Decrypt a message using a symmetric cipher.
- *
- * This function decrypts a message encrypted with a symmetric cipher.
- *
- * \param key                   Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
- *                              It must remain valid until the operation
- *                              terminates. It must allow the usage
- *                              #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT.
- * \param alg                   The cipher algorithm to compute
- *                              (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                              #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
- * \param[in] input             Buffer containing the message to decrypt.
- *                              This consists of the IV followed by the
- *                              ciphertext proper.
- * \param input_length          Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] output           Buffer where the plaintext is to be written.
- * \param output_size           Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] output_length    On success, the number of bytes
- *                              that make up the output.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                                psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                const uint8_t *input,
-                                size_t input_length,
-                                uint8_t *output,
-                                size_t output_size,
-                                size_t *output_length);
-
-/** The type of the state data structure for multipart cipher operations.
- *
- * Before calling any function on a cipher operation object, the application
- * must initialize it by any of the following means:
- * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_cipher_operation_t operation;
- *   memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
- *   \endcode
- * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_cipher_operation_t operation = {0};
- *   \endcode
- * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT,
- *   for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT;
- *   \endcode
- * - Assign the result of the function psa_cipher_operation_init()
- *   to the structure, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_cipher_operation_t operation;
- *   operation = psa_cipher_operation_init();
- *   \endcode
- *
- * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
- * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
- * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */
-typedef struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_t;
-
-/** \def PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT
- *
- * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a cipher operation object of
- * type #psa_cipher_operation_t.
- */
-
-/** Return an initial value for a cipher operation object.
- */
-static psa_cipher_operation_t psa_cipher_operation_init(void);
-
-/** Set the key for a multipart symmetric encryption operation.
- *
- * The sequence of operations to encrypt a message with a symmetric cipher
- * is as follows:
- * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
- *    listed here.
- * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
- *    documentation for #psa_cipher_operation_t, e.g.
- *    #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT.
- * -# Call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- * -# Call either psa_cipher_generate_iv() or psa_cipher_set_iv() to
- *    generate or set the IV (initialization vector). You should use
- *    psa_cipher_generate_iv() unless the protocol you are implementing
- *    requires a specific IV value.
- * -# Call psa_cipher_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
- *    of the message each time.
- * -# Call psa_cipher_finish().
- *
- * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(),
- * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_cipher_abort(). The
- * application may call psa_cipher_abort() at any time after the operation
- * has been initialized.
- *
- * After a successful call to psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(), the application must
- * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
- * operation:
- * - A successful call to psa_cipher_finish().
- * - A call to psa_cipher_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to set up. It must have
- *                              been initialized as per the documentation for
- *                              #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use.
- * \param key                   Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
- *                              It must remain valid until the operation
- *                              terminates. It must allow the usage
- *                              #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT.
- * \param alg                   The cipher algorithm to compute
- *                              (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                              #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
- *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
-                                      mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                                      psa_algorithm_t alg);
-
-/** Set the key for a multipart symmetric decryption operation.
- *
- * The sequence of operations to decrypt a message with a symmetric cipher
- * is as follows:
- * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
- *    listed here.
- * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
- *    documentation for #psa_cipher_operation_t, e.g.
- *    #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT.
- * -# Call psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- * -# Call psa_cipher_set_iv() with the IV (initialization vector) for the
- *    decryption. If the IV is prepended to the ciphertext, you can call
- *    psa_cipher_update() on a buffer containing the IV followed by the
- *    beginning of the message.
- * -# Call psa_cipher_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
- *    of the message each time.
- * -# Call psa_cipher_finish().
- *
- * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(),
- * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_cipher_abort(). The
- * application may call psa_cipher_abort() at any time after the operation
- * has been initialized.
- *
- * After a successful call to psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(), the application must
- * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
- * operation:
- * - A successful call to psa_cipher_finish().
- * - A call to psa_cipher_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to set up. It must have
- *                              been initialized as per the documentation for
- *                              #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use.
- * \param key                   Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
- *                              It must remain valid until the operation
- *                              terminates. It must allow the usage
- *                              #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT.
- * \param alg                   The cipher algorithm to compute
- *                              (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                              #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
- *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
-                                      mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                                      psa_algorithm_t alg);
-
-/** Generate an IV for a symmetric encryption operation.
- *
- * This function generates a random IV (initialization vector), nonce
- * or initial counter value for the encryption operation as appropriate
- * for the chosen algorithm, key type and key size.
- *
- * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() before
- * calling this function.
- *
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     Active cipher operation.
- * \param[out] iv               Buffer where the generated IV is to be written.
- * \param iv_size               Size of the \p iv buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] iv_length        On success, the number of bytes of the
- *                              generated IV.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         The size of the \p iv buffer is too small.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with no IV set),
- *         or the library has not been previously initialized
- *         by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
-                                    uint8_t *iv,
-                                    size_t iv_size,
-                                    size_t *iv_length);
-
-/** Set the IV for a symmetric encryption or decryption operation.
- *
- * This function sets the IV (initialization vector), nonce
- * or initial counter value for the encryption or decryption operation.
- *
- * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() before
- * calling this function.
- *
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort().
- *
- * \note When encrypting, applications should use psa_cipher_generate_iv()
- * instead of this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires
- * a non-random IV.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     Active cipher operation.
- * \param[in] iv                Buffer containing the IV to use.
- * \param iv_length             Size of the IV in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm,
- *         or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be an active cipher
- *         encrypt operation, with no IV set), or the library has not been
- *         previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
-                               const uint8_t *iv,
-                               size_t iv_length);
-
-/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active cipher operation.
- *
- * Before calling this function, you must:
- * 1. Call either psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup().
- *    The choice of setup function determines whether this function
- *    encrypts or decrypts its input.
- * 2. If the algorithm requires an IV, call psa_cipher_generate_iv()
- *    (recommended when encrypting) or psa_cipher_set_iv().
- *
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     Active cipher operation.
- * \param[in] input             Buffer containing the message fragment to
- *                              encrypt or decrypt.
- * \param input_length          Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] output           Buffer where the output is to be written.
- * \param output_size           Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] output_length    On success, the number of bytes
- *                              that make up the returned output.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with an IV set
- *         if required for the algorithm), or the library has not been
- *         previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_cipher_update(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
-                               const uint8_t *input,
-                               size_t input_length,
-                               uint8_t *output,
-                               size_t output_size,
-                               size_t *output_length);
-
-/** Finish encrypting or decrypting a message in a cipher operation.
- *
- * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or
- * psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() before calling this function. The choice
- * of setup function determines whether this function encrypts or
- * decrypts its input.
- *
- * This function finishes the encryption or decryption of the message
- * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to
- * psa_cipher_update().
- *
- * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     Active cipher operation.
- * \param[out] output           Buffer where the output is to be written.
- * \param output_size           Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] output_length    On success, the number of bytes
- *                              that make up the returned output.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for
- *         this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based
- *         on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the
- *         total input size is not a multiple of the block size.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING
- *         This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes
- *         padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with an IV set
- *         if required for the algorithm), or the library has not been
- *         previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_cipher_finish(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
-                               uint8_t *output,
-                               size_t output_size,
-                               size_t *output_length);
-
-/** Abort a cipher operation.
- *
- * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the
- * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object
- * can be reused for another operation by calling
- * psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() again.
- *
- * You may call this function any time after the operation object has
- * been initialized as described in #psa_cipher_operation_t.
- *
- * In particular, calling psa_cipher_abort() after the operation has been
- * terminated by a call to psa_cipher_abort() or psa_cipher_finish()
- * is safe and has no effect.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     Initialized cipher operation.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_cipher_abort(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation);
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup aead Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD)
- * @{
- */
-
-/** Process an authenticated encryption operation.
- *
- * \param key                     Identifier of the key to use for the
- *                                operation. It must allow the usage
- *                                #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT.
- * \param alg                     The AEAD algorithm to compute
- *                                (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                                #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
- * \param[in] nonce               Nonce or IV to use.
- * \param nonce_length            Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes.
- * \param[in] additional_data     Additional data that will be authenticated
- *                                but not encrypted.
- * \param additional_data_length  Size of \p additional_data in bytes.
- * \param[in] plaintext           Data that will be authenticated and
- *                                encrypted.
- * \param plaintext_length        Size of \p plaintext in bytes.
- * \param[out] ciphertext         Output buffer for the authenticated and
- *                                encrypted data. The additional data is not
- *                                part of this output. For algorithms where the
- *                                encrypted data and the authentication tag
- *                                are defined as separate outputs, the
- *                                authentication tag is appended to the
- *                                encrypted data.
- * \param ciphertext_size         Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes.
- *                                This must be appropriate for the selected
- *                                algorithm and key:
- *                                - A sufficient output size is
- *                                  #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type,
- *                                  \p alg, \p plaintext_length) where
- *                                  \c key_type is the type of \p key.
- *                                - #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p
- *                                  plaintext_length) evaluates to the maximum
- *                                  ciphertext size of any supported AEAD
- *                                  encryption.
- * \param[out] ciphertext_length  On success, the size of the output
- *                                in the \p ciphertext buffer.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         \p ciphertext_size is too small.
- *         #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \p alg,
- *         \p plaintext_length) or
- *         #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p plaintext_length) can be used to
- *         determine the required buffer size.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                              psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                              const uint8_t *nonce,
-                              size_t nonce_length,
-                              const uint8_t *additional_data,
-                              size_t additional_data_length,
-                              const uint8_t *plaintext,
-                              size_t plaintext_length,
-                              uint8_t *ciphertext,
-                              size_t ciphertext_size,
-                              size_t *ciphertext_length);
-
-/** Process an authenticated decryption operation.
- *
- * \param key                     Identifier of the key to use for the
- *                                operation. It must allow the usage
- *                                #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT.
- * \param alg                     The AEAD algorithm to compute
- *                                (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                                #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
- * \param[in] nonce               Nonce or IV to use.
- * \param nonce_length            Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes.
- * \param[in] additional_data     Additional data that has been authenticated
- *                                but not encrypted.
- * \param additional_data_length  Size of \p additional_data in bytes.
- * \param[in] ciphertext          Data that has been authenticated and
- *                                encrypted. For algorithms where the
- *                                encrypted data and the authentication tag
- *                                are defined as separate inputs, the buffer
- *                                must contain the encrypted data followed
- *                                by the authentication tag.
- * \param ciphertext_length       Size of \p ciphertext in bytes.
- * \param[out] plaintext          Output buffer for the decrypted data.
- * \param plaintext_size          Size of the \p plaintext buffer in bytes.
- *                                This must be appropriate for the selected
- *                                algorithm and key:
- *                                - A sufficient output size is
- *                                  #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type,
- *                                  \p alg, \p ciphertext_length) where
- *                                  \c key_type is the type of \p key.
- *                                - #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p
- *                                  ciphertext_length) evaluates to the maximum
- *                                  plaintext size of any supported AEAD
- *                                  decryption.
- * \param[out] plaintext_length   On success, the size of the output
- *                                in the \p plaintext buffer.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
- *         The ciphertext is not authentic.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         \p plaintext_size is too small.
- *         #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \p alg,
- *         \p ciphertext_length) or
- *         #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p ciphertext_length) can be used
- *         to determine the required buffer size.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                              psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                              const uint8_t *nonce,
-                              size_t nonce_length,
-                              const uint8_t *additional_data,
-                              size_t additional_data_length,
-                              const uint8_t *ciphertext,
-                              size_t ciphertext_length,
-                              uint8_t *plaintext,
-                              size_t plaintext_size,
-                              size_t *plaintext_length);
-
-/** The type of the state data structure for multipart AEAD operations.
- *
- * Before calling any function on an AEAD operation object, the application
- * must initialize it by any of the following means:
- * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_aead_operation_t operation;
- *   memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
- *   \endcode
- * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_aead_operation_t operation = {0};
- *   \endcode
- * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT,
- *   for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_aead_operation_t operation = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
- *   \endcode
- * - Assign the result of the function psa_aead_operation_init()
- *   to the structure, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_aead_operation_t operation;
- *   operation = psa_aead_operation_init();
- *   \endcode
- *
- * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
- * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
- * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */
-typedef struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_t;
-
-/** \def PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT
- *
- * This macro returns a suitable initializer for an AEAD operation object of
- * type #psa_aead_operation_t.
- */
-
-/** Return an initial value for an AEAD operation object.
- */
-static psa_aead_operation_t psa_aead_operation_init(void);
-
-/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated encryption operation.
- *
- * The sequence of operations to encrypt a message with authentication
- * is as follows:
- * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
- *    listed here.
- * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
- *    documentation for #psa_aead_operation_t, e.g.
- *    #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT.
- * -# Call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- * -# If needed, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the
- *    inputs to the subsequent calls to psa_aead_update_ad() and
- *    psa_aead_update(). See the documentation of psa_aead_set_lengths()
- *    for details.
- * -# Call either psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce() to
- *    generate or set the nonce. You should use
- *    psa_aead_generate_nonce() unless the protocol you are implementing
- *    requires a specific nonce value.
- * -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
- *    of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time.
- * -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
- *    of the message to encrypt each time.
- * -# Call psa_aead_finish().
- *
- * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_aead_encrypt_setup(),
- * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_aead_abort(). The
- * application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation
- * has been initialized.
- *
- * After a successful call to psa_aead_encrypt_setup(), the application must
- * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
- * operation:
- * - A successful call to psa_aead_finish().
- * - A call to psa_aead_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to set up. It must have
- *                              been initialized as per the documentation for
- *                              #psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in use.
- * \param key                   Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
- *                              It must remain valid until the operation
- *                              terminates. It must allow the usage
- *                              #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT.
- * \param alg                   The AEAD algorithm to compute
- *                              (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                              #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
- *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
-                                    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                                    psa_algorithm_t alg);
-
-/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated decryption operation.
- *
- * The sequence of operations to decrypt a message with authentication
- * is as follows:
- * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
- *    listed here.
- * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
- *    documentation for #psa_aead_operation_t, e.g.
- *    #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT.
- * -# Call psa_aead_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- * -# If needed, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the
- *    inputs to the subsequent calls to psa_aead_update_ad() and
- *    psa_aead_update(). See the documentation of psa_aead_set_lengths()
- *    for details.
- * -# Call psa_aead_set_nonce() with the nonce for the decryption.
- * -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
- *    of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time.
- * -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
- *    of the ciphertext to decrypt each time.
- * -# Call psa_aead_verify().
- *
- * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_aead_decrypt_setup(),
- * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_aead_abort(). The
- * application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation
- * has been initialized.
- *
- * After a successful call to psa_aead_decrypt_setup(), the application must
- * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
- * operation:
- * - A successful call to psa_aead_verify().
- * - A call to psa_aead_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to set up. It must have
- *                              been initialized as per the documentation for
- *                              #psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in use.
- * \param key                   Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
- *                              It must remain valid until the operation
- *                              terminates. It must allow the usage
- *                              #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT.
- * \param alg                   The AEAD algorithm to compute
- *                              (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                              #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or the
- *         library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
-                                    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                                    psa_algorithm_t alg);
-
-/** Generate a random nonce for an authenticated encryption operation.
- *
- * This function generates a random nonce for the authenticated encryption
- * operation with an appropriate size for the chosen algorithm, key type
- * and key size.
- *
- * The application must call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() before
- * calling this function.
- *
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
- * \param[out] nonce            Buffer where the generated nonce is to be
- *                              written.
- * \param nonce_size            Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] nonce_length     On success, the number of bytes of the
- *                              generated nonce.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         The size of the \p nonce buffer is too small.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be an active aead encrypt
- *         operation, with no nonce set), or the library has not been
- *         previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_aead_generate_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
-                                     uint8_t *nonce,
-                                     size_t nonce_size,
-                                     size_t *nonce_length);
-
-/** Set the nonce for an authenticated encryption or decryption operation.
- *
- * This function sets the nonce for the authenticated
- * encryption or decryption operation.
- *
- * The application must call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or
- * psa_aead_decrypt_setup() before calling this function.
- *
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().
- *
- * \note When encrypting, applications should use psa_aead_generate_nonce()
- * instead of this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires
- * a non-random IV.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
- * \param[in] nonce             Buffer containing the nonce to use.
- * \param nonce_length          Size of the nonce in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         The size of \p nonce is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with no nonce
- *         set), or the library has not been previously initialized
- *         by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_aead_set_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
-                                const uint8_t *nonce,
-                                size_t nonce_length);
-
-/** Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for AEAD.
- *
- * The application must call this function before calling
- * psa_aead_update_ad() or psa_aead_update() if the algorithm for
- * the operation requires it. If the algorithm does not require it,
- * calling this function is optional, but if this function is called
- * then the implementation must enforce the lengths.
- *
- * You may call this function before or after setting the nonce with
- * psa_aead_set_nonce() or psa_aead_generate_nonce().
- *
- * - For #PSA_ALG_CCM, calling this function is required.
- * - For the other AEAD algorithms defined in this specification, calling
- *   this function is not required.
- * - For vendor-defined algorithm, refer to the vendor documentation.
- *
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
- * \param ad_length             Size of the non-encrypted additional
- *                              authenticated data in bytes.
- * \param plaintext_length      Size of the plaintext to encrypt in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         At least one of the lengths is not acceptable for the chosen
- *         algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and
- *         psa_aead_update_ad() and psa_aead_update() must not have been
- *         called yet), or the library has not been previously initialized
- *         by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_aead_set_lengths(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
-                                  size_t ad_length,
-                                  size_t plaintext_length);
-
-/** Pass additional data to an active AEAD operation.
- *
- * Additional data is authenticated, but not encrypted.
- *
- * You may call this function multiple times to pass successive fragments
- * of the additional data. You may not call this function after passing
- * data to encrypt or decrypt with psa_aead_update().
- *
- * Before calling this function, you must:
- * 1. Call either psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup().
- * 2. Set the nonce with psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce().
- *
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().
- *
- * \warning When decrypting, until psa_aead_verify() has returned #PSA_SUCCESS,
- *          there is no guarantee that the input is valid. Therefore, until
- *          you have called psa_aead_verify() and it has returned #PSA_SUCCESS,
- *          treat the input as untrusted and prepare to undo any action that
- *          depends on the input if psa_aead_verify() returns an error status.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
- * \param[in] input             Buffer containing the fragment of
- *                              additional data.
- * \param input_length          Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         The total input length overflows the additional data length that
- *         was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, have a nonce
- *         set, have lengths set if required by the algorithm, and
- *         psa_aead_update() must not have been called yet), or the library
- *         has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_aead_update_ad(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
-                                const uint8_t *input,
-                                size_t input_length);
-
-/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active AEAD operation.
- *
- * Before calling this function, you must:
- * 1. Call either psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup().
- *    The choice of setup function determines whether this function
- *    encrypts or decrypts its input.
- * 2. Set the nonce with psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce().
- * 3. Call psa_aead_update_ad() to pass all the additional data.
- *
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().
- *
- * \warning When decrypting, until psa_aead_verify() has returned #PSA_SUCCESS,
- *          there is no guarantee that the input is valid. Therefore, until
- *          you have called psa_aead_verify() and it has returned #PSA_SUCCESS:
- *          - Do not use the output in any way other than storing it in a
- *            confidential location. If you take any action that depends
- *            on the tentative decrypted data, this action will need to be
- *            undone if the input turns out not to be valid. Furthermore,
- *            if an adversary can observe that this action took place
- *            (for example through timing), they may be able to use this
- *            fact as an oracle to decrypt any message encrypted with the
- *            same key.
- *          - In particular, do not copy the output anywhere but to a
- *            memory or storage space that you have exclusive access to.
- *
- * This function does not require the input to be aligned to any
- * particular block boundary. If the implementation can only process
- * a whole block at a time, it must consume all the input provided, but
- * it may delay the end of the corresponding output until a subsequent
- * call to psa_aead_update(), psa_aead_finish() or psa_aead_verify()
- * provides sufficient input. The amount of data that can be delayed
- * in this way is bounded by #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
- * \param[in] input             Buffer containing the message fragment to
- *                              encrypt or decrypt.
- * \param input_length          Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] output           Buffer where the output is to be written.
- * \param output_size           Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
- *                              This must be appropriate for the selected
- *                                algorithm and key:
- *                                - A sufficient output size is
- *                                  #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type,
- *                                  \c alg, \p input_length) where
- *                                  \c key_type is the type of key and \c alg is
- *                                  the algorithm that were used to set up the
- *                                  operation.
- *                                - #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p
- *                                  input_length) evaluates to the maximum
- *                                  output size of any supported AEAD
- *                                  algorithm.
- * \param[out] output_length    On success, the number of bytes
- *                              that make up the returned output.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
- *         #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg, \p input_length) or
- *         #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length) can be used to
- *         determine the required buffer size.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is
- *         less than the additional data length that was previously
- *         specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(), or
- *         the total input length overflows the plaintext length that
- *         was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, have a nonce
- *         set, and have lengths set if required by the algorithm), or the
- *         library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_aead_update(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
-                             const uint8_t *input,
-                             size_t input_length,
-                             uint8_t *output,
-                             size_t output_size,
-                             size_t *output_length);
-
-/** Finish encrypting a message in an AEAD operation.
- *
- * The operation must have been set up with psa_aead_encrypt_setup().
- *
- * This function finishes the authentication of the additional data
- * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to
- * psa_aead_update_ad() with the plaintext formed by concatenating the
- * inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update().
- *
- * This function has two output buffers:
- * - \p ciphertext contains trailing ciphertext that was buffered from
- *   preceding calls to psa_aead_update().
- * - \p tag contains the authentication tag.
- *
- * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
- * \param[out] ciphertext       Buffer where the last part of the ciphertext
- *                              is to be written.
- * \param ciphertext_size       Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes.
- *                              This must be appropriate for the selected
- *                              algorithm and key:
- *                              - A sufficient output size is
- *                                #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type,
- *                                \c alg) where \c key_type is the type of key
- *                                and \c alg is the algorithm that were used to
- *                                set up the operation.
- *                              - #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to
- *                                the maximum output size of any supported AEAD
- *                                algorithm.
- * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the number of bytes of
- *                              returned ciphertext.
- * \param[out] tag              Buffer where the authentication tag is
- *                              to be written.
- * \param tag_size              Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes.
- *                              This must be appropriate for the selected
- *                              algorithm and key:
- *                              - The exact tag size is #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c
- *                                key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg) where
- *                                \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and
- *                                bit-size of the key, and \c alg is the
- *                                algorithm that were used in the call to
- *                                psa_aead_encrypt_setup().
- *                              - #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the
- *                                maximum tag size of any supported AEAD
- *                                algorithm.
- * \param[out] tag_length       On success, the number of bytes
- *                              that make up the returned tag.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         The size of the \p ciphertext or \p tag buffer is too small.
- *         #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg) or
- *         #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the
- *         required \p ciphertext buffer size. #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c key_type,
- *         \c key_bits, \c alg) or #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE can be used to
- *         determine the required \p tag buffer size.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is
- *         less than the additional data length that was previously
- *         specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(), or
- *         the total length of input to psa_aead_update() so far is
- *         less than the plaintext length that was previously
- *         specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be an active encryption
- *         operation with a nonce set), or the library has not been previously
- *         initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_aead_finish(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
-                             uint8_t *ciphertext,
-                             size_t ciphertext_size,
-                             size_t *ciphertext_length,
-                             uint8_t *tag,
-                             size_t tag_size,
-                             size_t *tag_length);
-
-/** Finish authenticating and decrypting a message in an AEAD operation.
- *
- * The operation must have been set up with psa_aead_decrypt_setup().
- *
- * This function finishes the authenticated decryption of the message
- * components:
- *
- * -  The additional data consisting of the concatenation of the inputs
- *    passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update_ad().
- * -  The ciphertext consisting of the concatenation of the inputs passed to
- *    preceding calls to psa_aead_update().
- * -  The tag passed to this function call.
- *
- * If the authentication tag is correct, this function outputs any remaining
- * plaintext and reports success. If the authentication tag is not correct,
- * this function returns #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE.
- *
- * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().
- *
- * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the
- * comparison between the actual tag and the expected tag is performed
- * in constant time.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     Active AEAD operation.
- * \param[out] plaintext        Buffer where the last part of the plaintext
- *                              is to be written. This is the remaining data
- *                              from previous calls to psa_aead_update()
- *                              that could not be processed until the end
- *                              of the input.
- * \param plaintext_size        Size of the \p plaintext buffer in bytes.
- *                              This must be appropriate for the selected algorithm and key:
- *                              - A sufficient output size is
- *                                #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type,
- *                                \c alg) where \c key_type is the type of key
- *                                and \c alg is the algorithm that were used to
- *                                set up the operation.
- *                              - #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to
- *                                the maximum output size of any supported AEAD
- *                                algorithm.
- * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the number of bytes of
- *                              returned plaintext.
- * \param[in] tag               Buffer containing the authentication tag.
- * \param tag_length            Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
- *         The calculations were successful, but the authentication tag is
- *         not correct.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         The size of the \p plaintext buffer is too small.
- *         #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg) or
- *         #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the
- *         required buffer size.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is
- *         less than the additional data length that was previously
- *         specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(), or
- *         the total length of input to psa_aead_update() so far is
- *         less than the plaintext length that was previously
- *         specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be an active decryption
- *         operation with a nonce set), or the library has not been previously
- *         initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_aead_verify(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
-                             uint8_t *plaintext,
-                             size_t plaintext_size,
-                             size_t *plaintext_length,
-                             const uint8_t *tag,
-                             size_t tag_length);
-
-/** Abort an AEAD operation.
- *
- * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the
- * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object
- * can be reused for another operation by calling
- * psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup() again.
- *
- * You may call this function any time after the operation object has
- * been initialized as described in #psa_aead_operation_t.
- *
- * In particular, calling psa_aead_abort() after the operation has been
- * terminated by a call to psa_aead_abort(), psa_aead_finish() or
- * psa_aead_verify() is safe and has no effect.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     Initialized AEAD operation.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_aead_abort(psa_aead_operation_t *operation);
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup asymmetric Asymmetric cryptography
- * @{
- */
-
-/**
- * \brief Sign a message with a private key. For hash-and-sign algorithms,
- *        this includes the hashing step.
- *
- * \note To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature algorithm, first use
- *       a multi-part hash operation and then pass the resulting hash to
- *       psa_sign_hash(). PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the
- *       hash algorithm to use.
- *
- * \param[in]  key              Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
- *                              It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must
- *                              allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE.
- * \param[in]  alg              An asymmetric signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX
- *                              value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(\p alg)
- *                              is true), that is compatible with the type of
- *                              \p key.
- * \param[in]  input            The input message to sign.
- * \param[in]  input_length     Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] signature        Buffer where the signature is to be written.
- * \param[in]  signature_size   Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. This
- *                              must be appropriate for the selected
- *                              algorithm and key:
- *                              - The required signature size is
- *                                #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
- *                                where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and
- *                                bit-size respectively of key.
- *                              - #PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the
- *                                maximum signature size of any supported
- *                                signature algorithm.
- * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes that make up
- *                              the returned signature value.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
- *         The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag,
- *         or it does not permit the requested algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
- *         determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
- *         #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
- *         where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
- *         respectively of \p key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_sign_message(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                              psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                              const uint8_t *input,
-                              size_t input_length,
-                              uint8_t *signature,
-                              size_t signature_size,
-                              size_t *signature_length);
-
-/** \brief Verify the signature of a message with a public key, using
- *         a hash-and-sign verification algorithm.
- *
- * \note To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature verification
- *       algorithm, first use a multi-part hash operation to hash the message
- *       and then pass the resulting hash to psa_verify_hash().
- *       PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the hash algorithm
- *       to use.
- *
- * \param[in]  key              Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
- *                              It must be a public key or an asymmetric key
- *                              pair. The key must allow the usage
- *                              #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE.
- * \param[in]  alg              An asymmetric signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX
- *                              value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(\p alg)
- *                              is true), that is compatible with the type of
- *                              \p key.
- * \param[in]  input            The message whose signature is to be verified.
- * \param[in]  input_length     Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] signature        Buffer containing the signature to verify.
- * \param[in]  signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
- *         The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag,
- *         or it does not permit the requested algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
- *         The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed signature
- *         is not a valid signature.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_verify_message(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                                psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                const uint8_t *input,
-                                size_t input_length,
-                                const uint8_t *signature,
-                                size_t signature_length);
-
-/**
- * \brief Sign a hash or short message with a private key.
- *
- * Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must
- * first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update()
- * and psa_hash_finish(), or alternatively by calling psa_hash_compute().
- * Then pass the resulting hash as the \p hash
- * parameter to this function. You can use #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg)
- * to determine the hash algorithm to use.
- *
- * \param key                   Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
- *                              It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must
- *                              allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH.
- * \param alg                   A signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX
- *                              value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg)
- *                              is true), that is compatible with
- *                              the type of \p key.
- * \param[in] hash              The hash or message to sign.
- * \param hash_length           Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] signature        Buffer where the signature is to be written.
- * \param signature_size        Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes
- *                              that make up the returned signature value.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
- *         determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
- *         #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
- *         where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
- *         respectively of \p key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_sign_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                           psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                           const uint8_t *hash,
-                           size_t hash_length,
-                           uint8_t *signature,
-                           size_t signature_size,
-                           size_t *signature_length);
-
-/**
- * \brief Verify the signature of a hash or short message using a public key.
- *
- * Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must
- * first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update()
- * and psa_hash_finish(), or alternatively by calling psa_hash_compute().
- * Then pass the resulting hash as the \p hash
- * parameter to this function. You can use #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg)
- * to determine the hash algorithm to use.
- *
- * \param key               Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It
- *                          must be a public key or an asymmetric key pair. The
- *                          key must allow the usage
- *                          #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH.
- * \param alg               A signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX
- *                          value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg)
- *                          is true), that is compatible with
- *                          the type of \p key.
- * \param[in] hash          The hash or message whose signature is to be
- *                          verified.
- * \param hash_length       Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
- * \param[in] signature     Buffer containing the signature to verify.
- * \param signature_length  Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         The signature is valid.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
- *         The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed
- *         signature is not a valid signature.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_verify_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                             psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                             const uint8_t *hash,
-                             size_t hash_length,
-                             const uint8_t *signature,
-                             size_t signature_length);
-
-/**
- * \brief Encrypt a short message with a public key.
- *
- * \param key                   Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
- *                              It must be a public key or an asymmetric key
- *                              pair. It must allow the usage
- *                              #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT.
- * \param alg                   An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is
- *                              compatible with the type of \p key.
- * \param[in] input             The message to encrypt.
- * \param input_length          Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
- * \param[in] salt              A salt or label, if supported by the
- *                              encryption algorithm.
- *                              If the algorithm does not support a
- *                              salt, pass \c NULL.
- *                              If the algorithm supports an optional
- *                              salt and you do not want to pass a salt,
- *                              pass \c NULL.
- *
- *                              - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is
- *                                supported.
- * \param salt_length           Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes.
- *                              If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0.
- * \param[out] output           Buffer where the encrypted message is to
- *                              be written.
- * \param output_size           Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] output_length    On success, the number of bytes
- *                              that make up the returned output.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can
- *         determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
- *         #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
- *         where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
- *         respectively of \p key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                                    psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                    const uint8_t *input,
-                                    size_t input_length,
-                                    const uint8_t *salt,
-                                    size_t salt_length,
-                                    uint8_t *output,
-                                    size_t output_size,
-                                    size_t *output_length);
-
-/**
- * \brief Decrypt a short message with a private key.
- *
- * \param key                   Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
- *                              It must be an asymmetric key pair. It must
- *                              allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT.
- * \param alg                   An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is
- *                              compatible with the type of \p key.
- * \param[in] input             The message to decrypt.
- * \param input_length          Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
- * \param[in] salt              A salt or label, if supported by the
- *                              encryption algorithm.
- *                              If the algorithm does not support a
- *                              salt, pass \c NULL.
- *                              If the algorithm supports an optional
- *                              salt and you do not want to pass a salt,
- *                              pass \c NULL.
- *
- *                              - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is
- *                                supported.
- * \param salt_length           Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes.
- *                              If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0.
- * \param[out] output           Buffer where the decrypted message is to
- *                              be written.
- * \param output_size           Size of the \c output buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] output_length    On success, the number of bytes
- *                              that make up the returned output.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can
- *         determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
- *         #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
- *         where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
- *         respectively of \p key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                                    psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                    const uint8_t *input,
-                                    size_t input_length,
-                                    const uint8_t *salt,
-                                    size_t salt_length,
-                                    uint8_t *output,
-                                    size_t output_size,
-                                    size_t *output_length);
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup key_derivation Key derivation and pseudorandom generation
- * @{
- */
-
-/** The type of the state data structure for key derivation operations.
- *
- * Before calling any function on a key derivation operation object, the
- * application must initialize it by any of the following means:
- * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation;
- *   memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
- *   \endcode
- * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = {0};
- *   \endcode
- * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT,
- *   for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
- *   \endcode
- * - Assign the result of the function psa_key_derivation_operation_init()
- *   to the structure, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation;
- *   operation = psa_key_derivation_operation_init();
- *   \endcode
- *
- * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
- * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
- * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice.
- */
-typedef struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_t;
-
-/** \def PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT
- *
- * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a key derivation operation
- * object of type #psa_key_derivation_operation_t.
- */
-
-/** Return an initial value for a key derivation operation object.
- */
-static psa_key_derivation_operation_t psa_key_derivation_operation_init(void);
-
-/** Set up a key derivation operation.
- *
- * A key derivation algorithm takes some inputs and uses them to generate
- * a byte stream in a deterministic way.
- * This byte stream can be used to produce keys and other
- * cryptographic material.
- *
- * To derive a key:
- * -# Start with an initialized object of type #psa_key_derivation_operation_t.
- * -# Call psa_key_derivation_setup() to select the algorithm.
- * -# Provide the inputs for the key derivation by calling
- *    psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_input_key()
- *    as appropriate. Which inputs are needed, in what order, and whether
- *    they may be keys and if so of what type depends on the algorithm.
- * -# Optionally set the operation's maximum capacity with
- *    psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(). You may do this before, in the middle
- *    of or after providing inputs. For some algorithms, this step is mandatory
- *    because the output depends on the maximum capacity.
- * -# To derive a key, call psa_key_derivation_output_key().
- *    To derive a byte string for a different purpose, call
- *    psa_key_derivation_output_bytes().
- *    Successive calls to these functions use successive output bytes
- *    calculated by the key derivation algorithm.
- * -# Clean up the key derivation operation object with
- *    psa_key_derivation_abort().
- *
- * If this function returns an error, the key derivation operation object is
- * not changed.
- *
- * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_key_derivation_setup(),
- * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_key_derivation_abort().
- *
- * Implementations must reject an attempt to derive a key of size 0.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation       The key derivation operation object
- *                                to set up. It must
- *                                have been initialized but not set up yet.
- * \param alg                     The key derivation algorithm to compute
- *                                (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                                #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p alg) is true).
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \c alg is not a key derivation algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
- *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup(
-    psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-    psa_algorithm_t alg);
-
-/** Retrieve the current capacity of a key derivation operation.
- *
- * The capacity of a key derivation is the maximum number of bytes that it can
- * return. When you get *N* bytes of output from a key derivation operation,
- * this reduces its capacity by *N*.
- *
- * \param[in] operation     The operation to query.
- * \param[out] capacity     On success, the capacity of the operation.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
- *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_get_capacity(
-    const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-    size_t *capacity);
-
-/** Set the maximum capacity of a key derivation operation.
- *
- * The capacity of a key derivation operation is the maximum number of bytes
- * that the key derivation operation can return from this point onwards.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to modify.
- * \param capacity          The new capacity of the operation.
- *                          It must be less or equal to the operation's
- *                          current capacity.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p capacity is larger than the operation's current capacity.
- *         In this case, the operation object remains valid and its capacity
- *         remains unchanged.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or the
- *         library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(
-    psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-    size_t capacity);
-
-/** Use the maximum possible capacity for a key derivation operation.
- *
- * Use this value as the capacity argument when setting up a key derivation
- * to indicate that the operation should have the maximum possible capacity.
- * The value of the maximum possible capacity depends on the key derivation
- * algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_UNLIMITED_CAPACITY ((size_t) (-1))
-
-/** Provide an input for key derivation or key agreement.
- *
- * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm.
- * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement
- * algorithm for information.
- *
- * This function passes direct inputs, which is usually correct for
- * non-secret inputs. To pass a secret input, which should be in a key
- * object, call psa_key_derivation_input_key() instead of this function.
- * Refer to the documentation of individual step types
- * (`PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx` values of type ::psa_key_derivation_step_t)
- * for more information.
- *
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation       The key derivation operation object to use.
- *                                It must have been set up with
- *                                psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not
- *                                have produced any output yet.
- * \param step                    Which step the input data is for.
- * \param[in] data                Input data to use.
- * \param data_length             Size of the \p data buffer in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or
- *         \c step does not allow direct inputs.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid for this input \p step, or
- *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(
-    psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-    psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
-    const uint8_t *data,
-    size_t data_length);
-
-/** Provide a numeric input for key derivation or key agreement.
- *
- * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm.
- * However, when an algorithm requires a particular order, numeric inputs
- * usually come first as they tend to be configuration parameters.
- * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement
- * algorithm for information.
- *
- * This function is used for inputs which are fixed-size non-negative
- * integers.
- *
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation       The key derivation operation object to use.
- *                                It must have been set up with
- *                                psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not
- *                                have produced any output yet.
- * \param step                    Which step the input data is for.
- * \param[in] value               The value of the numeric input.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or
- *         \c step does not allow numeric inputs.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid for this input \p step, or
- *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_integer(
-    psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-    psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
-    uint64_t value);
-
-/** Provide an input for key derivation in the form of a key.
- *
- * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm.
- * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement
- * algorithm for information.
- *
- * This function obtains input from a key object, which is usually correct for
- * secret inputs or for non-secret personalization strings kept in the key
- * store. To pass a non-secret parameter which is not in the key store,
- * call psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() instead of this function.
- * Refer to the documentation of individual step types
- * (`PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx` values of type ::psa_key_derivation_step_t)
- * for more information.
- *
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation       The key derivation operation object to use.
- *                                It must have been set up with
- *                                psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not
- *                                have produced any output yet.
- * \param step                    Which step the input data is for.
- * \param key                     Identifier of the key. It must have an
- *                                appropriate type for step and must allow the
- *                                usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE or
- *                                #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION (see note)
- *                                and the algorithm used by the operation.
- *
- * \note Once all inputs steps are completed, the operations will allow:
- * - psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() if each input was either a direct input
- *   or  a key with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE set;
- * - psa_key_derivation_output_key() if the input for step
- *   #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD
- *   was from a key slot with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE and each other input was
- *   either a direct input or a key with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE set;
- * - psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() if each input was either a direct input
- *   or  a key with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION set;
- * - psa_key_derivation_verify_key() under the same conditions as
- *   psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes().
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
- *         The key allows neither #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE nor
- *         #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION, or it doesn't allow this
- *         algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or
- *         \c step does not allow key inputs of the given type
- *         or does not allow key inputs at all.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid for this input \p step, or
- *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key(
-    psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-    psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
-    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key);
-
-/** Perform a key agreement and use the shared secret as input to a key
- * derivation.
- *
- * A key agreement algorithm takes two inputs: a private key \p private_key
- * a public key \p peer_key.
- * The result of this function is passed as input to a key derivation.
- * The output of this key derivation can be extracted by reading from the
- * resulting operation to produce keys and other cryptographic material.
- *
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation       The key derivation operation object to use.
- *                                It must have been set up with
- *                                psa_key_derivation_setup() with a
- *                                key agreement and derivation algorithm
- *                                \c alg (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                                #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\c alg) is true
- *                                and #PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(\c alg)
- *                                is false).
- *                                The operation must be ready for an
- *                                input of the type given by \p step.
- * \param step                    Which step the input data is for.
- * \param private_key             Identifier of the private key to use. It must
- *                                allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
- * \param[in] peer_key      Public key of the peer. The peer key must be in the
- *                          same format that psa_import_key() accepts for the
- *                          public key type corresponding to the type of
- *                          private_key. That is, this function performs the
- *                          equivalent of
- *                          #psa_import_key(...,
- *                          `peer_key`, `peer_key_length`) where
- *                          with key attributes indicating the public key
- *                          type corresponding to the type of `private_key`.
- *                          For example, for EC keys, this means that peer_key
- *                          is interpreted as a point on the curve that the
- *                          private key is on. The standard formats for public
- *                          keys are documented in the documentation of
- *                          psa_export_public_key().
- * \param peer_key_length         Size of \p peer_key in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \c private_key is not compatible with \c alg,
- *         or \p peer_key is not valid for \c alg or not compatible with
- *         \c private_key, or \c step does not allow an input resulting
- *         from a key agreement.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid for this key agreement \p step,
- *         or the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(
-    psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-    psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
-    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key,
-    const uint8_t *peer_key,
-    size_t peer_key_length);
-
-/** Read some data from a key derivation operation.
- *
- * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and
- * return those bytes.
- * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this
- * function destructively reads the requested number of bytes from the
- * stream.
- * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read.
- *
- * If this function returns an error status other than
- * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from.
- * \param[out] output       Buffer where the output will be written.
- * \param output_length     Number of bytes to output.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
- *         One of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow
- *         #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA
- *                          The operation's capacity was less than
- *                          \p output_length bytes. Note that in this case,
- *                          no output is written to the output buffer.
- *                          The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus
- *                          subsequent calls to this function will not
- *                          succeed, even with a smaller output buffer.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed
- *         all required input steps), or the library has not been previously
- *         initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(
-    psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-    uint8_t *output,
-    size_t output_length);
-
-/** Derive a key from an ongoing key derivation operation.
- *
- * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm
- * and uses those bytes to generate a key deterministically.
- * The key's location, usage policy, type and size are taken from
- * \p attributes.
- *
- * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this
- * function destructively reads as many bytes as required from the
- * stream.
- * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read.
- *
- * If this function returns an error status other than
- * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().
- *
- * How much output is produced and consumed from the operation, and how
- * the key is derived, depends on the key type and on the key size
- * (denoted \c bits below):
- *
- * - For key types for which the key is an arbitrary sequence of bytes
- *   of a given size, this function is functionally equivalent to
- *   calling #psa_key_derivation_output_bytes
- *   and passing the resulting output to #psa_import_key.
- *   However, this function has a security benefit:
- *   if the implementation provides an isolation boundary then
- *   the key material is not exposed outside the isolation boundary.
- *   As a consequence, for these key types, this function always consumes
- *   exactly (\c bits / 8) bytes from the operation.
- *   The following key types defined in this specification follow this scheme:
- *
- *     - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES;
- *     - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA;
- *     - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA;
- *     - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE;
- *     - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC;
- *     - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH.
- *
- * - For ECC keys on a Montgomery elliptic curve
- *   (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(\c curve) where \c curve designates a
- *   Montgomery curve), this function always draws a byte string whose
- *   length is determined by the curve, and sets the mandatory bits
- *   accordingly. That is:
- *
- *     - Curve25519 (#PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 255 bits): draw a 32-byte
- *       string and process it as specified in RFC 7748 &sect;5.
- *     - Curve448 (#PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 448 bits): draw a 56-byte
- *       string and process it as specified in RFC 7748 &sect;5.
- *
- * - For key types for which the key is represented by a single sequence of
- *   \c bits bits with constraints as to which bit sequences are acceptable,
- *   this function draws a byte string of length (\c bits / 8) bytes rounded
- *   up to the nearest whole number of bytes. If the resulting byte string
- *   is acceptable, it becomes the key, otherwise the drawn bytes are discarded.
- *   This process is repeated until an acceptable byte string is drawn.
- *   The byte string drawn from the operation is interpreted as specified
- *   for the output produced by psa_export_key().
- *   The following key types defined in this specification follow this scheme:
- *
- *     - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES.
- *       Force-set the parity bits, but discard forbidden weak keys.
- *       For 2-key and 3-key triple-DES, the three keys are generated
- *       successively (for example, for 3-key triple-DES,
- *       if the first 8 bytes specify a weak key and the next 8 bytes do not,
- *       discard the first 8 bytes, use the next 8 bytes as the first key,
- *       and continue reading output from the operation to derive the other
- *       two keys).
- *     - Finite-field Diffie-Hellman keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(\c group)
- *       where \c group designates any Diffie-Hellman group) and
- *       ECC keys on a Weierstrass elliptic curve
- *       (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(\c curve) where \c curve designates a
- *       Weierstrass curve).
- *       For these key types, interpret the byte string as integer
- *       in big-endian order. Discard it if it is not in the range
- *       [0, *N* - 2] where *N* is the boundary of the private key domain
- *       (the prime *p* for Diffie-Hellman, the subprime *q* for DSA,
- *       or the order of the curve's base point for ECC).
- *       Add 1 to the resulting integer and use this as the private key *x*.
- *       This method allows compliance to NIST standards, specifically
- *       the methods titled "key-pair generation by testing candidates"
- *       in NIST SP 800-56A &sect;5.6.1.1.4 for Diffie-Hellman,
- *       in FIPS 186-4 &sect;B.1.2 for DSA, and
- *       in NIST SP 800-56A &sect;5.6.1.2.2 or
- *       FIPS 186-4 &sect;B.4.2 for elliptic curve keys.
- *
- * - For other key types, including #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR,
- *   the way in which the operation output is consumed is
- *   implementation-defined.
- *
- * In all cases, the data that is read is discarded from the operation.
- * The operation's capacity is decreased by the number of bytes read.
- *
- * For algorithms that take an input step #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
- * the input to that step must be provided with psa_key_derivation_input_key().
- * Future versions of this specification may include additional restrictions
- * on the derived key based on the attributes and strength of the secret key.
- *
- * \param[in] attributes    The attributes for the new key.
- *                          If the key type to be created is
- *                          #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH then the algorithm in
- *                          the policy must be the same as in the current
- *                          operation.
- * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from.
- * \param[out] key          On success, an identifier for the newly created
- *                          key. For persistent keys, this is the key
- *                          identifier defined in \p attributes.
- *                          \c 0 on failure.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- *         If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata
- *         have been saved to persistent storage.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
- *         This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is
- *         already a persistent key with the given identifier.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA
- *         There was not enough data to create the desired key.
- *         Note that in this case, no output is written to the output buffer.
- *         The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus subsequent calls to
- *         this function will not succeed, even with a smaller output buffer.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         The key type or key size is not supported, either by the
- *         implementation in general or in this particular location.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         The provided key attributes are not valid for the operation.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
- *         The #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or
- *         #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input was not provided through a
- *         key; or one of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow
- *         #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed
- *         all required input steps), or the library has not been previously
- *         initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key(
-    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-    psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key);
-
-/** Compare output data from a key derivation operation to an expected value.
- *
- * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and
- * compares those bytes to an expected value in constant time.
- * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this
- * function destructively reads the expected number of bytes from the
- * stream before comparing them.
- * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read.
- *
- * This is functionally equivalent to the following code:
- * \code
- * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(operation, tmp, output_length);
- * if (memcmp(output, tmp, output_length) != 0)
- *     return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
- * \endcode
- * except (1) it works even if the key's policy does not allow outputting the
- * bytes, and (2) the comparison will be done in constant time.
- *
- * If this function returns an error status other than
- * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE,
- * the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling
- * psa_key_derivation_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from.
- * \param[in] expected_output Buffer containing the expected derivation output.
- * \param output_length     Length of the expected output; this is also the
- *                          number of bytes that will be read.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
- *         The output was read successfully, but it differs from the expected
- *         output.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
- *         One of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow
- *         #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA
- *                          The operation's capacity was less than
- *                          \p output_length bytes. Note that in this case,
- *                          the operation's capacity is set to 0, thus
- *                          subsequent calls to this function will not
- *                          succeed, even with a smaller expected output.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed
- *         all required input steps), or the library has not been previously
- *         initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(
-    psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-    const uint8_t *expected_output,
-    size_t output_length);
-
-/** Compare output data from a key derivation operation to an expected value
- * stored in a key object.
- *
- * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and
- * compares those bytes to an expected value, provided as key of type
- * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH.
- * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this
- * function destructively reads the number of bytes corresponding to the
- * length of the expected value from the stream before comparing them.
- * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read.
- *
- * This is functionally equivalent to exporting the key and calling
- * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() on the result, except that it
- * works even if the key cannot be exported.
- *
- * If this function returns an error status other than
- * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE,
- * the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling
- * psa_key_derivation_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from.
- * \param[in] expected      A key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH
- *                          containing the expected output. Its policy must
- *                          include the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION flag
- *                          and the permitted algorithm must match the
- *                          operation. The value of this key was likely
- *                          computed by a previous call to
- *                          psa_key_derivation_output_key().
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
- *         The output was read successfully, but if differs from the expected
- *         output.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- *         The key passed as the expected value does not exist.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         The key passed as the expected value has an invalid type.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
- *         The key passed as the expected value does not allow this usage or
- *         this algorithm; or one of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't
- *         allow #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA
- *                          The operation's capacity was less than
- *                          the length of the expected value. In this case,
- *                          the operation's capacity is set to 0, thus
- *                          subsequent calls to this function will not
- *                          succeed, even with a smaller expected output.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed
- *         all required input steps), or the library has not been previously
- *         initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_verify_key(
-    psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t expected);
-
-/** Abort a key derivation operation.
- *
- * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the \c
- * operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused
- * for another operation by calling psa_key_derivation_setup() again.
- *
- * This function may be called at any time after the operation
- * object has been initialized as described in #psa_key_derivation_operation_t.
- *
- * In particular, it is valid to call psa_key_derivation_abort() twice, or to
- * call psa_key_derivation_abort() on an operation that has not been set up.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation    The operation to abort.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort(
-    psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation);
-
-/** Perform a key agreement and return the raw shared secret.
- *
- * \warning The raw result of a key agreement algorithm such as finite-field
- * Diffie-Hellman or elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman has biases and should
- * not be used directly as key material. It should instead be passed as
- * input to a key derivation algorithm. To chain a key agreement with
- * a key derivation, use psa_key_derivation_key_agreement() and other
- * functions from the key derivation interface.
- *
- * \param alg                     The key agreement algorithm to compute
- *                                (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                                #PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p alg)
- *                                is true).
- * \param private_key             Identifier of the private key to use. It must
- *                                allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
- * \param[in] peer_key            Public key of the peer. It must be
- *                                in the same format that psa_import_key()
- *                                accepts. The standard formats for public
- *                                keys are documented in the documentation
- *                                of psa_export_public_key().
- * \param peer_key_length         Size of \p peer_key in bytes.
- * \param[out] output             Buffer where the decrypted message is to
- *                                be written.
- * \param output_size             Size of the \c output buffer in bytes.
- * \param[out] output_length      On success, the number of bytes
- *                                that make up the returned output.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm, or
- *         \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg,
- *         or \p peer_key is not valid for \p alg or not compatible with
- *         \p private_key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         \p output_size is too small
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_raw_key_agreement(psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                   mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key,
-                                   const uint8_t *peer_key,
-                                   size_t peer_key_length,
-                                   uint8_t *output,
-                                   size_t output_size,
-                                   size_t *output_length);
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup random Random generation
- * @{
- */
-
-/**
- * \brief Generate random bytes.
- *
- * \warning This function **can** fail! Callers MUST check the return status
- *          and MUST NOT use the content of the output buffer if the return
- *          status is not #PSA_SUCCESS.
- *
- * \note    To generate a key, use psa_generate_key() instead.
- *
- * \param[out] output       Output buffer for the generated data.
- * \param output_size       Number of bytes to generate and output.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_generate_random(uint8_t *output,
-                                 size_t output_size);
-
-/**
- * \brief Generate a key or key pair.
- *
- * The key is generated randomly.
- * Its location, usage policy, type and size are taken from \p attributes.
- *
- * Implementations must reject an attempt to generate a key of size 0.
- *
- * The following type-specific considerations apply:
- * - For RSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR),
- *   the public exponent is 65537.
- *   The modulus is a product of two probabilistic primes
- *   between 2^{n-1} and 2^n where n is the bit size specified in the
- *   attributes.
- *
- * \param[in] attributes    The attributes for the new key.
- * \param[out] key          On success, an identifier for the newly created
- *                          key. For persistent keys, this is the key
- *                          identifier defined in \p attributes.
- *                          \c 0 on failure.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- *         If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata
- *         have been saved to persistent storage.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
- *         This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is
- *         already a persistent key with the given identifier.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_generate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                              mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key);
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup interruptible_hash Interruptible sign/verify hash
- * @{
- */
-
-/** The type of the state data structure for interruptible hash
- *  signing operations.
- *
- * Before calling any function on a sign hash operation object, the
- * application must initialize it by any of the following means:
- * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation;
- *   memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
- *   \endcode
- * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation = {0};
- *   \endcode
- * - Initialize the structure to the initializer
- *   #PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation =
- *   PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT;
- *   \endcode
- * - Assign the result of the function
- *   psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_init() to the structure, for
- *   example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation;
- *   operation = psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_init();
- *   \endcode
- *
- * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
- * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
- * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */
-typedef struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t;
-
-/** The type of the state data structure for interruptible hash
- *  verification operations.
- *
- * Before calling any function on a sign hash operation object, the
- * application must initialize it by any of the following means:
- * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation;
- *   memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
- *   \endcode
- * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation = {0};
- *   \endcode
- * - Initialize the structure to the initializer
- *   #PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation =
- *   PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT;
- *   \endcode
- * - Assign the result of the function
- *   psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_init() to the structure, for
- *   example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation;
- *   operation = psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_init();
- *   \endcode
- *
- * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
- * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
- * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */
-typedef struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t;
-
-/**
- * \brief                       Set the maximum number of ops allowed to be
- *                              executed by an interruptible function in a
- *                              single call.
- *
- * \warning                     This is a beta API, and thus subject to change
- *                              at any point. It is not bound by the usual
- *                              interface stability promises.
- *
- * \note                        The time taken to execute a single op is
- *                              implementation specific and depends on
- *                              software, hardware, the algorithm, key type and
- *                              curve chosen. Even within a single operation,
- *                              successive ops can take differing amounts of
- *                              time. The only guarantee is that lower values
- *                              for \p max_ops means functions will block for a
- *                              lesser maximum amount of time. The functions
- *                              \c psa_sign_interruptible_get_num_ops() and
- *                              \c psa_verify_interruptible_get_num_ops() are
- *                              provided to help with tuning this value.
- *
- * \note                        This value defaults to
- *                              #PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED, which
- *                              means the whole operation will be done in one
- *                              go, regardless of the number of ops required.
- *
- * \note                        If more ops are needed to complete a
- *                              computation, #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE will be
- *                              returned by the function performing the
- *                              computation. It is then the caller's
- *                              responsibility to either call again with the
- *                              same operation context until it returns 0 or an
- *                              error code; or to call the relevant abort
- *                              function if the answer is no longer required.
- *
- * \note                        The interpretation of \p max_ops is also
- *                              implementation defined. On a hard real time
- *                              system, this can indicate a hard deadline, as a
- *                              real-time system needs a guarantee of not
- *                              spending more than X time, however care must be
- *                              taken in such an implementation to avoid the
- *                              situation whereby calls just return, not being
- *                              able to do any actual work within the allotted
- *                              time.  On a non-real-time system, the
- *                              implementation can be more relaxed, but again
- *                              whether this number should be interpreted as as
- *                              hard or soft limit or even whether a less than
- *                              or equals as regards to ops executed in a
- *                              single call is implementation defined.
- *
- * \note                        For keys in local storage when no accelerator
- *                              driver applies, please see also the
- *                              documentation for \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(),
- *                              which is the internal implementation in these
- *                              cases.
- *
- * \warning                     With implementations that interpret this number
- *                              as a hard limit, setting this number too small
- *                              may result in an infinite loop, whereby each
- *                              call results in immediate return with no ops
- *                              done (as there is not enough time to execute
- *                              any), and thus no result will ever be achieved.
- *
- * \note                        This only applies to functions whose
- *                              documentation mentions they may return
- *                              #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE.
- *
- * \param max_ops               The maximum number of ops to be executed in a
- *                              single call. This can be a number from 0 to
- *                              #PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED, where 0
- *                              is the least amount of work done per call.
- */
-void psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(uint32_t max_ops);
-
-/**
- * \brief                       Get the maximum number of ops allowed to be
- *                              executed by an interruptible function in a
- *                              single call. This will return the last
- *                              value set by
- *                              \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() or
- *                              #PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED if
- *                              that function has never been called.
- *
- * \warning                     This is a beta API, and thus subject to change
- *                              at any point. It is not bound by the usual
- *                              interface stability promises.
- *
- * \return                      Maximum number of ops allowed to be
- *                              executed by an interruptible function in a
- *                              single call.
- */
-uint32_t psa_interruptible_get_max_ops(void);
-
-/**
- * \brief                       Get the number of ops that a hash signing
- *                              operation has taken so far. If the operation
- *                              has completed, then this will represent the
- *                              number of ops required for the entire
- *                              operation. After initialization or calling
- *                              \c psa_sign_hash_interruptible_abort() on
- *                              the operation, a value of 0 will be returned.
- *
- * \note                        This interface is guaranteed re-entrant and
- *                              thus may be called from driver code.
- *
- * \warning                     This is a beta API, and thus subject to change
- *                              at any point. It is not bound by the usual
- *                              interface stability promises.
- *
- *                              This is a helper provided to help you tune the
- *                              value passed to \c
- *                              psa_interruptible_set_max_ops().
- *
- * \param operation             The \c psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t
- *                              to use. This must be initialized first.
- *
- * \return                      Number of ops that the operation has taken so
- *                              far.
- */
-uint32_t psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops(
-    const psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation);
-
-/**
- * \brief                       Get the number of ops that a hash verification
- *                              operation has taken so far. If the operation
- *                              has completed, then this will represent the
- *                              number of ops required for the entire
- *                              operation. After initialization or calling \c
- *                              psa_verify_hash_interruptible_abort() on the
- *                              operation, a value of 0 will be returned.
- *
- * \warning                     This is a beta API, and thus subject to change
- *                              at any point. It is not bound by the usual
- *                              interface stability promises.
- *
- *                              This is a helper provided to help you tune the
- *                              value passed to \c
- *                              psa_interruptible_set_max_ops().
- *
- * \param operation             The \c
- *                              psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t to
- *                              use. This must be initialized first.
- *
- * \return                      Number of ops that the operation has taken so
- *                              far.
- */
-uint32_t psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops(
-    const psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation);
-
-/**
- * \brief                       Start signing a hash or short message with a
- *                              private key, in an interruptible manner.
- *
- * \see                         \c psa_sign_hash_complete()
- *
- * \warning                     This is a beta API, and thus subject to change
- *                              at any point. It is not bound by the usual
- *                              interface stability promises.
- *
- * \note                        This function combined with \c
- *                              psa_sign_hash_complete() is equivalent to
- *                              \c psa_sign_hash() but
- *                              \c psa_sign_hash_complete() can return early and
- *                              resume according to the limit set with \c
- *                              psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to reduce the
- *                              maximum time spent in a function call.
- *
- * \note                        Users should call \c psa_sign_hash_complete()
- *                              repeatedly on the same context after a
- *                              successful call to this function until \c
- *                              psa_sign_hash_complete() either returns 0 or an
- *                              error. \c psa_sign_hash_complete() will return
- *                              #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE if there is more work
- *                              to do. Alternatively users can call
- *                              \c psa_sign_hash_abort() at any point if they no
- *                              longer want the result.
- *
- * \note                        If this function returns an error status, the
- *                              operation enters an error state and must be
- *                              aborted by calling \c psa_sign_hash_abort().
- *
- * \param[in, out] operation    The \c psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t
- *                              to use. This must be initialized first.
- *
- * \param key                   Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
- *                              It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must
- *                              allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH.
- * \param alg                   A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX
- *                              value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg)
- *                              is true), that is compatible with
- *                              the type of \p key.
- * \param[in] hash              The hash or message to sign.
- * \param hash_length           Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         The operation started successfully - call \c psa_sign_hash_complete()
- *         with the same context to complete the operation
- *
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
- *         The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH flag, or it does
- *         not permit the requested algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         An operation has previously been started on this context, and is
- *         still in progress.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_start(
-    psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation,
-    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg,
-    const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length);
-
-/**
- * \brief                       Continue and eventually complete the action of
- *                              signing a hash or short message with a private
- *                              key, in an interruptible manner.
- *
- * \see                         \c psa_sign_hash_start()
- *
- * \warning                     This is a beta API, and thus subject to change
- *                              at any point. It is not bound by the usual
- *                              interface stability promises.
- *
- * \note                        This function combined with \c
- *                              psa_sign_hash_start() is equivalent to
- *                              \c psa_sign_hash() but this function can return
- *                              early and resume according to the limit set with
- *                              \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to reduce the
- *                              maximum time spent in a function call.
- *
- * \note                        Users should call this function on the same
- *                              operation object repeatedly until it either
- *                              returns 0 or an error. This function will return
- *                              #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE if there is more work
- *                              to do. Alternatively users can call
- *                              \c psa_sign_hash_abort() at any point if they no
- *                              longer want the result.
- *
- * \note                        When this function returns successfully, the
- *                              operation becomes inactive. If this function
- *                              returns an error status, the operation enters an
- *                              error state and must be aborted by calling
- *                              \c psa_sign_hash_abort().
- *
- * \param[in, out] operation    The \c psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t
- *                              to use. This must be initialized first, and have
- *                              had \c psa_sign_hash_start() called with it
- *                              first.
- *
- * \param[out] signature        Buffer where the signature is to be written.
- * \param signature_size        Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. This
- *                              must be appropriate for the selected
- *                              algorithm and key:
- *                              - The required signature size is
- *                                #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c
- *                                key_bits, \c alg) where \c key_type and \c
- *                                key_bits are the type and bit-size
- *                                respectively of key.
- *                              - #PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the
- *                                maximum signature size of any supported
- *                                signature algorithm.
- * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes that make up
- *                              the returned signature value.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Operation completed successfully
- *
- * \retval #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE
- *         Operation was interrupted due to the setting of \c
- *         psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(). There is still work to be done.
- *         Call this function again with the same operation object.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
- *         determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
- *         #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
- *         where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
- *         respectively of \p key.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         An operation was not previously started on this context via
- *         \c psa_sign_hash_start().
- *
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has either not been previously initialized by
- *         psa_crypto_init() or you did not previously call
- *         psa_sign_hash_start() with this operation object. It is
- *         implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize results in
- *         this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_complete(
-    psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation,
-    uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size,
-    size_t *signature_length);
-
-/**
- * \brief                       Abort a sign hash operation.
- *
- * \warning                     This is a beta API, and thus subject to change
- *                              at any point. It is not bound by the usual
- *                              interface stability promises.
- *
- * \note                        This function is the only function that clears
- *                              the number of ops completed as part of the
- *                              operation. Please ensure you copy this value via
- *                              \c psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops() if required
- *                              before calling.
- *
- * \note                        Aborting an operation frees all associated
- *                              resources except for the \p operation structure
- *                              itself. Once aborted, the operation object can
- *                              be reused for another operation by calling \c
- *                              psa_sign_hash_start() again.
- *
- * \note                        You may call this function any time after the
- *                              operation object has been initialized. In
- *                              particular, calling \c psa_sign_hash_abort()
- *                              after the operation has already been terminated
- *                              by a call to \c psa_sign_hash_abort() or
- *                              psa_sign_hash_complete() is safe.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     Initialized sign hash operation.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         The operation was aborted successfully.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_abort(
-    psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation);
-
-/**
- * \brief                       Start reading and verifying a hash or short
- *                              message, in an interruptible manner.
- *
- * \see                         \c psa_verify_hash_complete()
- *
- * \warning                     This is a beta API, and thus subject to change
- *                              at any point. It is not bound by the usual
- *                              interface stability promises.
- *
- * \note                        This function combined with \c
- *                              psa_verify_hash_complete() is equivalent to
- *                              \c psa_verify_hash() but \c
- *                              psa_verify_hash_complete() can return early and
- *                              resume according to the limit set with \c
- *                              psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to reduce the
- *                              maximum time spent in a function.
- *
- * \note                        Users should call \c psa_verify_hash_complete()
- *                              repeatedly on the same operation object after a
- *                              successful call to this function until \c
- *                              psa_verify_hash_complete() either returns 0 or
- *                              an error. \c psa_verify_hash_complete() will
- *                              return #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE if there is
- *                              more work to do. Alternatively users can call
- *                              \c psa_verify_hash_abort() at any point if they
- *                              no longer want the result.
- *
- * \note                        If this function returns an error status, the
- *                              operation enters an error state and must be
- *                              aborted by calling \c psa_verify_hash_abort().
- *
- * \param[in, out] operation    The \c psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t
- *                              to use. This must be initialized first.
- *
- * \param key                   Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
- *                              The key must allow the usage
- *                              #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH.
- * \param alg                   A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX
- *                              value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg)
- *                              is true), that is compatible with
- *                              the type of \p key.
- * \param[in] hash              The hash whose signature is to be verified.
- * \param hash_length           Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
- * \param[in] signature         Buffer containing the signature to verify.
- * \param signature_length      Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         The operation started successfully - please call \c
- *         psa_verify_hash_complete() with the same context to complete the
- *         operation.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         Another operation has already been started on this context, and is
- *         still in progress.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
- *         The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH flag, or it does
- *         not permit the requested algorithm.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
- * \retval PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_start(
-    psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation,
-    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg,
-    const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
-    const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length);
-
-/**
- * \brief                       Continue and eventually complete the action of
- *                              reading and verifying a hash or short message
- *                              signed with a private key, in an interruptible
- *                              manner.
- *
- * \see                         \c psa_verify_hash_start()
- *
- * \warning                     This is a beta API, and thus subject to change
- *                              at any point. It is not bound by the usual
- *                              interface stability promises.
- *
- * \note                        This function combined with \c
- *                              psa_verify_hash_start() is equivalent to
- *                              \c psa_verify_hash() but this function can
- *                              return early and resume according to the limit
- *                              set with \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to
- *                              reduce the maximum time spent in a function
- *                              call.
- *
- * \note                        Users should call this function on the same
- *                              operation object repeatedly until it either
- *                              returns 0 or an error. This function will return
- *                              #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE if there is more work
- *                              to do. Alternatively users can call
- *                              \c psa_verify_hash_abort() at any point if they
- *                              no longer want the result.
- *
- * \note                        When this function returns successfully, the
- *                              operation becomes inactive. If this function
- *                              returns an error status, the operation enters an
- *                              error state and must be aborted by calling
- *                              \c psa_verify_hash_abort().
- *
- * \param[in, out] operation    The \c psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t
- *                              to use. This must be initialized first, and have
- *                              had \c psa_verify_hash_start() called with it
- *                              first.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Operation completed successfully, and the passed signature is valid.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE
- *         Operation was interrupted due to the setting of \c
- *         psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(). There is still work to be done.
- *         Call this function again with the same operation object.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
- *         The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed
- *         signature is not a valid signature.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         An operation was not previously started on this context via
- *         \c psa_verify_hash_start().
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has either not been previously initialized by
- *         psa_crypto_init() or you did not previously call
- *         psa_verify_hash_start() on this object. It is
- *         implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize results in
- *         this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_complete(
-    psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation);
-
-/**
- * \brief                     Abort a verify hash operation.
- *
- * \warning                   This is a beta API, and thus subject to change at
- *                            any point. It is not bound by the usual interface
- *                            stability promises.
- *
- * \note                      This function is the only function that clears the
- *                            number of ops completed as part of the operation.
- *                            Please ensure you copy this value via
- *                            \c psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops() if required
- *                            before calling.
- *
- * \note                      Aborting an operation frees all associated
- *                            resources except for the operation structure
- *                            itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be
- *                            reused for another operation by calling \c
- *                            psa_verify_hash_start() again.
- *
- * \note                      You may call this function any time after the
- *                            operation object has been initialized.
- *                            In particular, calling \c psa_verify_hash_abort()
- *                            after the operation has already been terminated by
- *                            a call to \c psa_verify_hash_abort() or
- *                            psa_verify_hash_complete() is safe.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation   Initialized verify hash operation.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         The operation was aborted successfully.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_abort(
-    psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation);
-
-
-/**@}*/
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-/* The file "crypto_sizes.h" contains definitions for size calculation
- * macros whose definitions are implementation-specific. */
-#include "crypto_sizes.h"
-
-/* The file "crypto_struct.h" contains definitions for
- * implementation-specific structs that are declared above. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_FILE)
-#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_FILE
-#else
-#include "crypto_struct.h"
-#endif
-
-/* The file "crypto_extra.h" contains vendor-specific definitions. This
- * can include vendor-defined algorithms, extra functions, etc. */
-#include "crypto_extra.h"
-
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_H */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_client_struct.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_client_struct.h
deleted file mode 100644
index bf95c98..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_client_struct.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2020-2021, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-/**
- * \file psa/crypto_client_struct.h
- *
- * \brief PSA cryptography client key attribute definitions
- *
- * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
- * include psa/crypto.h.
- *
- * This file contains the definitions of some data structures with
- * PSA crypto client specific definitions. This is for implementations
- * with isolation between the Client applications and the Crypto
- * Server module, it is expected that the front-end and the back-end
- * would have different versions of the data structure.
- */
-#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT_STRUCT_H
-#define PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT_STRUCT_H
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/* This is the client view of the `key_attributes` structure. Only
- * fields which need to be set by the PSA crypto client are present.
- * The PSA crypto service will maintain a different version of the
- * data structure internally. */
-struct psa_client_key_attributes_s
-{
-    uint16_t type;
-    uint16_t bits;
-    uint32_t lifetime;
-    psa_key_id_t id;
-    uint32_t usage;
-    uint32_t alg;
-};
-
-#define PSA_CLIENT_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT_STRUCT_H */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_compat.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_compat.h
deleted file mode 100644
index c21649d..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_compat.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2019-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-/**
- * \file psa/crypto_compat.h
- *
- * \brief PSA cryptography module: Backward compatibility aliases
- *
- * This header declares alternative names for macro and functions.
- * New application code should not use these names.
- * These names may be removed in a future version of Mbed Crypto.
- *
- * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
- * include psa/crypto.h.
- */
-
-#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H
-#define PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/*
- * To support both openless APIs and psa_open_key() temporarily, define
- * psa_key_handle_t to be equal to mbedtls_svc_key_id_t. Do not mark the
- * type and its utility macros and functions deprecated yet. This will be done
- * in a subsequent phase.
- */
-typedef mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_handle_t;
-
-#define PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT
-
-/** Check whether a handle is null.
- *
- * \param handle  Handle
- *
- * \return Non-zero if the handle is null, zero otherwise.
- */
-static inline int psa_key_handle_is_null(psa_key_handle_t handle)
-{
-    return mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(handle);
-}
-
-/** Open a handle to an existing persistent key.
- *
- * Open a handle to a persistent key. A key is persistent if it was created
- * with a lifetime other than #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. A persistent key
- * always has a nonzero key identifier, set with psa_set_key_id() when
- * creating the key. Implementations may provide additional pre-provisioned
- * keys that can be opened with psa_open_key(). Such keys have an application
- * key identifier in the vendor range, as documented in the description of
- * #psa_key_id_t.
- *
- * The application must eventually close the handle with psa_close_key() or
- * psa_destroy_key() to release associated resources. If the application dies
- * without calling one of these functions, the implementation should perform
- * the equivalent of a call to psa_close_key().
- *
- * Some implementations permit an application to open the same key multiple
- * times. If this is successful, each call to psa_open_key() will return a
- * different key handle.
- *
- * \note This API is not part of the PSA Cryptography API Release 1.0.0
- * specification. It was defined in the 1.0 Beta 3 version of the
- * specification but was removed in the 1.0.0 released version. This API is
- * kept for the time being to not break applications relying on it. It is not
- * deprecated yet but will be in the near future.
- *
- * \note Applications that rely on opening a key multiple times will not be
- * portable to implementations that only permit a single key handle to be
- * opened. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`.
- *
- *
- * \param key           The persistent identifier of the key.
- * \param[out] handle   On success, a handle to the key.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success. The application can now use the value of `*handle`
- *         to access the key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
- *         The implementation does not have sufficient resources to open the
- *         key. This can be due to reaching an implementation limit on the
- *         number of open keys, the number of open key handles, or available
- *         memory.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
- *         There is no persistent key with key identifier \p key.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p key is not a valid persistent key identifier.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
- *         The specified key exists, but the application does not have the
- *         permission to access it. Note that this specification does not
- *         define any way to create such a key, but it may be possible
- *         through implementation-specific means.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_open_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
-                          psa_key_handle_t *handle);
-
-/** Close a key handle.
- *
- * If the handle designates a volatile key, this will destroy the key material
- * and free all associated resources, just like psa_destroy_key().
- *
- * If this is the last open handle to a persistent key, then closing the handle
- * will free all resources associated with the key in volatile memory. The key
- * data in persistent storage is not affected and can be opened again later
- * with a call to psa_open_key().
- *
- * Closing the key handle makes the handle invalid, and the key handle
- * must not be used again by the application.
- *
- * \note This API is not part of the PSA Cryptography API Release 1.0.0
- * specification. It was defined in the 1.0 Beta 3 version of the
- * specification but was removed in the 1.0.0 released version. This API is
- * kept for the time being to not break applications relying on it. It is not
- * deprecated yet but will be in the near future.
- *
- * \note If the key handle was used to set up an active
- * :ref:\`multipart operation <multipart-operations>\`, then closing the
- * key handle can cause the multipart operation to fail. Applications should
- * maintain the key handle until after the multipart operation has finished.
- *
- * \param handle        The key handle to close.
- *                      If this is \c 0, do nothing and return \c PSA_SUCCESS.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         \p handle was a valid handle or \c 0. It is now closed.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- *         \p handle is not a valid handle nor \c 0.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_extra.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 6709b7b..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1495 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2018-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-/**
- * \file psa/crypto_extra.h
- *
- * \brief PSA cryptography module: vendor extensions
- *
- * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
- * include psa/crypto.h.
- *
- * This file is reserved for vendor-specific definitions.
- */
-
-#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H
-#define PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H
-
-#include "crypto_types.h"
-#include "crypto_compat.h"
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/** \addtogroup crypto_types
- * @{
- */
-
-/** DSA public key.
- *
- * The import and export format is the
- * representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a big-endian byte
- * string. The length of the byte string is the length of the base prime `p`
- * in bytes.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY                 ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4002)
-
-/** DSA key pair (private and public key).
- *
- * The import and export format is the
- * representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte string. The
- * length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes (leading zeroes
- * are not stripped).
- *
- * Deterministic DSA key derivation with psa_generate_derived_key follows
- * FIPS 186-4 &sect;B.1.2: interpret the byte string as integer
- * in big-endian order. Discard it if it is not in the range
- * [0, *N* - 2] where *N* is the boundary of the private key domain
- * (the prime *p* for Diffie-Hellman, the subprime *q* for DSA,
- * or the order of the curve's base point for ECC).
- * Add 1 to the resulting integer and use this as the private key *x*.
- *
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR                    ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7002)
-
-/** Whether a key type is a DSA key (pair or public-only). */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA(type)                                       \
-    (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE                        ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000400)
-/** DSA signature with hashing.
- *
- * This is the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4,
- * with a random per-message secret number (*k*).
- *
- * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
- *                      This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
- *                      when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
- *
- * \return              The corresponding DSA signature algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
- *                      hash algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_DSA(hash_alg)                             \
-    (PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE          ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000500)
-#define PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG
-/** Deterministic DSA signature with hashing.
- *
- * This is the deterministic variant defined by RFC 6979 of
- * the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4.
- *
- * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
- *                      This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
- *                      when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
- *
- * \return              The corresponding DSA signature algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
- *                      hash algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(hash_alg)                             \
-    (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg)                                             \
-    (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) ==  \
-     PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE)
-#define PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)               \
-    (((alg) & PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0)
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(alg)                       \
-    (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg))
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA(alg)                          \
-    (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg))
-
-
-/* We need to expand the sample definition of this macro from
- * the API definition. */
-#undef PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg)    \
-    PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg)
-
-/* Workaround for build warnings when MBed TLS has enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
- *
- * Mbed TLS is not compatible with TF-Ms PSA API headers.
- *
- * In order to prevent build warnings for the follow functions we add the
- * prototypes for them here.
- * If the application tries to link with these functions it will get a link-time
- * error. This use-case is not supported by TF-M.
- */
-void psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm(
-    psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-    psa_algorithm_t alg2);
-psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm(
-    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
-
-
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR_BASE          ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7400)
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE        ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4400)
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_CURVE_MASK             ((psa_key_type_t) 0x00ff)
-
- /** SPAKE2+ key pair. Both the prover and verifier key.
- *
- * The size of a SPAKE2+ key is the size associated with the elliptic curve
- * group. See the documentation of each elliptic curve family for details.
- * To construct a SPAKE2+ key pair, it must be output from a key derivation
- * operation.
- * The corresponding public key can be exported using psa_export_public_key().
- * See also #PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY().
- *
- * \param curve A value of type psa_ecc_family_t that identifies the elliptic
- *              curve family to be used.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR(curve) \
-    ((psa_key_type_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (curve)))
-
- /** SPAKE2+ public key. The verifier key.
- *
- * The size of an SPAKE2+ public key is the same as the corresponding private
- * key. See #PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR() and the documentation of each
- * elliptic curve family for details.
- * To construct a SPAKE2+ public key, it must be imported.
- *
- * \param curve A value of type psa_ecc_family_t that identifies the elliptic
- *              curve family to be used.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY(curve) \
-    ((psa_key_type_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (curve)))
-
- /** Whether a key type is a SPAKE2+ key (pair or public-only). */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P(type)                                 \
-    ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) &                     \
-      ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_CURVE_MASK) ==                            \
-      PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
- /** Whether a key type is a SPAKE2+ key pair. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR(type)                        \
-    (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_CURVE_MASK) ==                   \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR_BASE)
- /** Whether a key type is a SPAKE2+ public key. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY(type)                      \
-    (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_CURVE_MASK) ==                   \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
- /** Extract the curve from a SPAKE2+ key type. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_GET_FAMILY(type)                         \
-    ((psa_ecc_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P(type) ?              \
-                         ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_CURVE_MASK) : \
-                         0))
-
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_KEY_PAIR_BASE          ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7700)
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE        ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4700)
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_GROUP_MASK             ((psa_key_type_t) 0x00ff)
-
- /** SRP key pair. Both the client and server key.
- *
- * The size of a SRP key is the size associated with the Diffie-Hellman
- * group. See the documentation of each Diffie-Hellman group for details.
- * To construct a SRP key pair, the password hash must be imported.
- * The corresponding public key (password verifier) can be exported using
- * psa_export_public_key(). See also #PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY().
- *
- * \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the
- *              Diffie-Hellman group to be used.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_KEY_PAIR(group) \
-    ((psa_key_type_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (group)))
-
- /** SRP public key. The server key (password verifier).
- *
- * The size of an SRP public key is the same as the corresponding private
- * key. See #PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_KEY_PAIR() and the documentation of each
- * Diffie-Hellman group for details.
- * To construct a SRP public key, it must be imported. The key size
- * in attributes must not be zero.
- *
- * \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the
- *              Diffie-Hellman group to be used.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY(group) \
-    ((psa_key_type_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (group)))
-
- /** Whether a key type is a SRP key (pair or public-only). */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SRP(type)                                 \
-    ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) &                 \
-      ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_GROUP_MASK) ==                            \
-      PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
- /** Whether a key type is a SRP key pair. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SRP_KEY_PAIR(type)                        \
-    (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_GROUP_MASK) ==                   \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_KEY_PAIR_BASE)
- /** Whether a key type is a SRP public key. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY(type)                      \
-    (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_GROUP_MASK) ==                   \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
- /** Extract the curve from a SRP key type. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_GET_FAMILY(type)                         \
-    ((psa_ecc_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SRP(type) ?              \
-                         ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_GROUP_MASK) : \
-                         0))
-
-#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE                   ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000000)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is a password-authenticated key exchange.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \p alg is a password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE)
- *         algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
- *         algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(alg)                                        \
-    (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE)
-
-/** The Password-authenticated key exchange by juggling (J-PAKE) algorithm.
- *
- * This is J-PAKE as defined by RFC 8236, instantiated with the following
- * parameters:
- *
- * - The group can be either an elliptic curve or defined over a finite field.
- * - Schnorr NIZK proof as defined by RFC 8235 and using the same group as the
- *   J-PAKE algorithm.
- * - A cryptographic hash function.
- *
- * To select these parameters and set up the cipher suite, call these functions
- * in any order:
- *
- * \code
- * psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_JPAKE(hash));
- * psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(cipher_suite,
- *                           PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(type, family, bits));
- * \endcode
- *
- * For more information on how to set a specific curve or field, refer to the
- * documentation of the individual \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants.
- *
- * After initializing a J-PAKE operation, call
- *
- * \code
- * psa_pake_setup(operation, key, cipher_suite);
- * psa_pake_set_user(operation, ...);
- * psa_pake_set_peer(operation, ...);
- * \endcode
- *
- * The password is provided as a key. This can be the password text itself,
- * in an agreed character encoding, or some value derived from the password
- * as required by a higher level protocol.
- *
- * (The implementation converts the key material to a number as described in
- * Section 2.3.8 of _SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography_
- * (https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf), before reducing it modulo \c q. Here
- * \c q is order of the group defined by the primitive set in the cipher suite.
- * The \c psa_pake_setup() function returns an error if the result of the
- * reduction is 0.)
- *
- * The key exchange flow for J-PAKE is as follows:
- * -# To get the first round data that needs to be sent to the peer, call
- *    \code
- *    // Get g1
- *    psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
- *    // Get the ZKP public key for x1
- *    psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
- *    // Get the ZKP proof for x1
- *    psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
- *    // Get g2
- *    psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
- *    // Get the ZKP public key for x2
- *    psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
- *    // Get the ZKP proof for x2
- *    psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
- *    \endcode
- * -# To provide the first round data received from the peer to the operation,
- *    call
- *    \code
- *    // Set g3
- *    psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
- *    // Set the ZKP public key for x3
- *    psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
- *    // Set the ZKP proof for x3
- *    psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
- *    // Set g4
- *    psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
- *    // Set the ZKP public key for x4
- *    psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
- *    // Set the ZKP proof for x4
- *    psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
- *    \endcode
- * -# To get the second round data that needs to be sent to the peer, call
- *    \code
- *    // Get A
- *    psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
- *    // Get ZKP public key for x2*s
- *    psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
- *    // Get ZKP proof for x2*s
- *    psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
- *    \endcode
- * -# To provide the second round data received from the peer to the operation,
- *    call
- *    \code
- *    // Set B
- *    psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
- *    // Set ZKP public key for x4*s
- *    psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
- *    // Set ZKP proof for x4*s
- *    psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
- *    \endcode
- * -# To access the shared secret call
- *    \code
- *    // Get Ka=Kb=K
- *    psa_pake_get_shared_key()
- *    \endcode
- *
- * For more information consult the documentation of the individual
- * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants.
- *
- * At this point there is a cryptographic guarantee that only the authenticated
- * party who used the same password is able to compute the key. But there is no
- * guarantee that the peer is the party it claims to be and was able to do so.
- *
- * That is, the authentication is only implicit (the peer is not authenticated
- * at this point, and no action should be taken that assume that they are - like
- * for example accessing restricted files).
- *
- * To make the authentication explicit there are various methods, see Section 5
- * of RFC 8236 for two examples.
- *
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_JPAKE_BASE                      ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000100)
-#define PSA_ALG_JPAKE(hash_alg) (PSA_ALG_JPAKE_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_JPAKE(alg) (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_JPAKE_BASE)
-
- /** The SPAKE2+ algorithm.
- *
- * SPAKE2+ is the augmented password-authenticated key exchange protocol,
- * defined by RFC9383. SPAKE2+ includes confirmation of the shared secret
- * key that results from the key exchange.
- * SPAKE2+ is required by Matter Specification, Version 1.2, as MATTER_PAKE.
- * Matter uses an earlier draft of the SPAKE2+ protocol: "SPAKE2+, an
- * Augmented PAKE (Draft 02)".
- * Although the operation of the PAKE is similar for both of these variants,
- * they have different key schedules for the derivation of the shared secret.
- *
- * When setting up a PAKE cipher suite to use the SPAKE2+ protocol defined
- * in RFC9383:
- * - For cipher-suites that use HMAC for key confirmation, use the
- *   PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_HMAC() algorithm, parameterized by the required hash
- *   algorithm.
- * - For cipher-suites that use CMAC-AES-128 for key confirmation, use the
- *   PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_CMAC() algorithm, parameterized by the required hash
- *   algorithm.
- * - Use a PAKE primitive for the required elliptic curve.
- *
- * For example, the following code creates a cipher suite to select SPAKE2+
- * using edwards25519 with the SHA-256 hash function:
- *
- * \code
- * psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT;
- * psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256));
- * psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(&cipher_suite,
- *                           PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC,
- *                               PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 255));
- * \endcode
- *
- * When setting up a PAKE cipher suite to use the SPAKE2+ protocol used by
- * Matter:
- * - Use the PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_MATTER algorithm.
- * - Use the PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC,
- *                              PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256)
- *   PAKE primitive.
- *
- * The following code creates a cipher suite to select the Matter variant of
- * SPAKE2+:
- *
- * \code
- * psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT;
- * psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(&cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_MATTER);
- * psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(&cipher_suite,
- *                           PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC,
- *                               PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256));
- * \endcode
- *
- * After initializing a SPAKE2+ operation, call
- *
- * \code
- * psa_pake_setup(operation, password, cipher_suite);
- * psa_pake_set_role(operation, ...);
- * \endcode
- *
- * The password provided to the client side must be of type
- * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR.
- * The password provided to the server side must be of type
- * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY.
- *
- * The role set by \c psa_pake_set_role() must be either
- * \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT or \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER.
- *
- * Then provide any additional, optional parameters:
- *
- * \code
- * psa_pake_set_user(operation, ...);
- * psa_pake_set_peer(operation, ...);
- * psa_pake_set_context(operation, ...);
- * \endcode
- *
- *
- * The key exchange flow for a SPAKE2+ client is as follows:
- * \code
- * // send shareP
- * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
- * // receive shareV
- * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
- * // receive confirmV
- * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...);
- * // send confirmP
- * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...);
- * // get K_shared
- * psa_pake_get_shared_key(operation, ...);
- * \endcode
- *
- * The key exchange flow for a SPAKE2+ server is as follows:
- * \code
- * // receive shareP
- * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
- * // send shareV
- * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
- * // send confirmV
- * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...);
- * // receive confirmP
- * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...);
- * // get K_shared
- * psa_pake_get_shared_key(operation, ...);
- * \endcode
- *
- * The shared secret that is produced by SPAKE2+ is pseudorandom. Although
- * it can be used directly as an encryption key, it is recommended to use
- * the shared secret as an input to a key derivation operation to produce
- * additional cryptographic keys.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_HMAC_BASE            ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000400)
-#define PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_HMAC(hash_alg) (PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_CMAC_BASE            ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000500)
-#define PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_CMAC(hash_alg) (PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_CMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-#define PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_MATTER                  ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0A000609)
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P(alg) (((alg) & ~0x000003ff) == PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_HMAC_BASE)
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_HMAC(alg) (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_HMAC_BASE)
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_CMAC(alg) (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_CMAC_BASE)
-
- /** The Secure Remote Passwort key exchange (SRP) algorithm.
- *
- * This is SRP-6 as defined by RFC 2945 and RFC 5054, instantiated with the
- * following parameters:
- *
- * - The group is defined over a finite field using a secure prime.
- * - A cryptographic hash function.
- *
- * To select these parameters and set up the cipher suite, call these functions:
- *
- * \code
- * psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT;
- * psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_SRP_6(hash));
- * psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(&cipher_suite,
- *                           PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(type, family, bits));
- * \endcode
- *
- * After initializing a SRP operation, call:
- *
- * \code
- * psa_pake_setup(operation, password, cipher_suite);
- * psa_pake_set_role(operation, ...);
- * psa_pake_set_user(operation, ...);
- * \endcode
- *
- * The password provided to the client side must be of type
- * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_KEY_PAIR.
- * The password provided to the server side must be of type
- * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY.
- *
- * The role set by \c psa_pake_set_role() must be either
- * \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT or \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER.
- *
- * For the SRP client key exchange call the following functions in any order:
- * \code
- * // get salt
- * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_SALT, ...);
- * // get server key
- * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
- * // write client key
- * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
- * \endcode
- *
- * For the SRP server key exchange call the following functions in any order:
- * \code
- * // get salt
- * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_SALT, ...);
- * // get client key
- * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
- * // write server key
- * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
- * \endcode
- *
- * For the client proof phase call the following functions in this order:
- * \code
- * // send M1
- * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...);
- * // receive M2
- * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...);
- * // Get secret
- * psa_pake_get_shared_key()
- * \endcode
- *
- * For the server proof phase call the following functions in this order:
- * \code
- * // receive M1
- * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...);
- * // send M2
- * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...);
- * // Get secret
- * psa_pake_get_shared_key()
- * \endcode
- *
- * The shared secret that is produced by SRP is pseudorandom. Although
- * it can be used directly as an encryption key, it is recommended to use
- * the shared secret as an input to a key derivation operation to produce
- * additional cryptographic keys.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_SRP_6_BASE                      ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000300)
-#define PSA_ALG_SRP_6(hash_alg) (PSA_ALG_SRP_6_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_SRP_6(alg) (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_SRP_6_BASE)
-
-/** @} */
-
-/** \defgroup pake Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE)
- *
- * This is a proposed PAKE interface for the PSA Crypto API. It is not part of
- * the official PSA Crypto API yet.
- *
- * \note The content of this section is not part of the stable API and ABI
- *       of Mbed TLS and may change arbitrarily from version to version.
- *       Same holds for the corresponding macros #PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE and
- *       #PSA_ALG_JPAKE.
- * @{
- */
-
-/** A value to indicate no role in a PAKE algorithm.
- * This value can be used in a call to psa_pake_set_role() for symmetric PAKE
- * algorithms which do not assign roles.
- */
-#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE                  ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x00)
-
-/** The first peer in a balanced PAKE.
- *
- * Although balanced PAKE algorithms are symmetric, some of them need an
- * ordering of peers for the transcript calculations. If the algorithm does not
- * need this, both #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST and #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND are
- * accepted.
- */
-#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST                ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x01)
-
-/** The second peer in a balanced PAKE.
- *
- * Although balanced PAKE algorithms are symmetric, some of them need an
- * ordering of peers for the transcript calculations. If the algorithm does not
- * need this, either #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST or #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND are
- * accepted.
- */
-#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND                ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x02)
-
-/** The client in an augmented PAKE.
- *
- * Augmented PAKE algorithms need to differentiate between client and server.
- */
-#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT                ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x11)
-
-/** The server in an augmented PAKE.
- *
- * Augmented PAKE algorithms need to differentiate between client and server.
- */
-#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER                ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x12)
-
-/** The PAKE primitive type indicating the use of elliptic curves.
- *
- * The values of the \c family and \c bits fields of the cipher suite identify a
- * specific elliptic curve, using the same mapping that is used for ECC
- * (::psa_ecc_family_t) keys.
- *
- * (Here \c family means the value returned by PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_FAMILY() and
- * \c bits means the value returned by PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS().)
- *
- * Input and output during the operation can involve group elements and scalar
- * values:
- * -# The format for group elements is the same as for public keys on the
- *  specific curve would be. For more information, consult the documentation of
- *  psa_export_public_key().
- * -# The format for scalars is the same as for private keys on the specific
- *  curve would be. For more information, consult the documentation of
- *  psa_export_key().
- */
-#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC       ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t) 0x01)
-
-/** The PAKE primitive type indicating the use of Diffie-Hellman groups.
- *
- * The values of the \c family and \c bits fields of the cipher suite identify
- * a specific Diffie-Hellman group, using the same mapping that is used for
- * Diffie-Hellman (::psa_dh_family_t) keys.
- *
- * (Here \c family means the value returned by PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_FAMILY() and
- * \c bits means the value returned by PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS().)
- *
- * Input and output during the operation can involve group elements and scalar
- * values:
- * -# The format for group elements is the same as for public keys on the
- *  specific group would be. For more information, consult the documentation of
- *  psa_export_public_key().
- * -# The format for scalars is the same as for private keys on the specific
- *  group would be. For more information, consult the documentation of
- *  psa_export_key().
- */
-#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH       ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t) 0x02)
-
-/** Construct a PAKE primitive from type, family and bit-size.
- *
- * \param pake_type     The type of the primitive
- *                      (value of type ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t).
- * \param pake_family   The family of the primitive
- *                      (the type and interpretation of this parameter depends
- *                      on \p pake_type, for more information consult the
- *                      documentation of individual ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t
- *                      constants).
- * \param pake_bits     The bit-size of the primitive
- *                      (Value of type \c size_t. The interpretation
- *                      of this parameter depends on \p pake_family, for more
- *                      information consult the documentation of individual
- *                      ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t constants).
- *
- * \return The constructed primitive value of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t.
- *         Return 0 if the requested primitive can't be encoded as
- *         ::psa_pake_primitive_t.
- */
-#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(pake_type, pake_family, pake_bits) \
-    (((pake_bits & 0xFFFF) != pake_bits) ? 0 :                 \
-     ((psa_pake_primitive_t) (((pake_type) << 24 |             \
-                              (pake_family) << 16) | (pake_bits))))
-
-#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(pake_primitive) \
-    ((size_t)(pake_primitive & 0xFFFF))
-
-#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_FAMILY(pake_primitive) \
-    ((psa_pake_family_t)((pake_primitive >> 16) & 0xFF))
-
-#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_TYPE(pake_primitive) \
-    ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t)((pake_primitive >> 24) & 0xFF))
-
-/** A key confirmation value that indicates a confirmed key in a PAKE cipher
- * suite.
- *
- * This key confirmation value will result in the PAKE algorithm exchanging
- * data to verify that the shared key is identical for both parties. This is
- * the default key confirmation value in an initialized PAKE cipher suite
- * object.
- * Some algorithms do not include confirmation of the shared key.
- */
-#define PSA_PAKE_CONFIRMED_KEY 0
-
-/** A key confirmation value that indicates an unconfirmed key in a PAKE cipher
- * suite.
- *
- * This key confirmation value will result in the PAKE algorithm terminating
- * prior to confirming that the resulting shared key is identical for both
- * parties.
- * Some algorithms do not support returning an unconfirmed shared key.
- */
-#define PSA_PAKE_UNCONFIRMED_KEY 1
-
- /** The key share being sent to or received from the peer.
- *
- * The format for both input and output at this step is the same as for public
- * keys on the group determined by the primitive (::psa_pake_primitive_t) would
- * be.
- *
- * For more information on the format, consult the documentation of
- * psa_export_public_key().
- *
- * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the
- * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE.
- */
-#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE                 ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x01)
-
-/** A Schnorr NIZKP public key.
- *
- * This is the ephemeral public key in the Schnorr Non-Interactive
- * Zero-Knowledge Proof (the value denoted by the letter 'V' in RFC 8235).
- *
- * The format for both input and output at this step is the same as for public
- * keys on the group determined by the primitive (::psa_pake_primitive_t) would
- * be.
- *
- * For more information on the format, consult the documentation of
- * psa_export_public_key().
- *
- * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the
- * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE.
- */
-#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC                 ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x02)
-
-/** A Schnorr NIZKP proof.
- *
- * This is the proof in the Schnorr Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof (the
- * value denoted by the letter 'r' in RFC 8235).
- *
- * Both for input and output, the value at this step is an integer less than
- * the order of the group selected in the cipher suite. The format depends on
- * the group as well:
- *
- * - For Montgomery curves, the encoding is little endian.
- * - For everything else the encoding is big endian (see Section 2.3.8 of
- *   _SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography_ at https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf).
- *
- * In both cases leading zeroes are allowed as long as the length in bytes does
- * not exceed the byte length of the group order.
- *
- * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the
- * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE.
- */
-#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF                  ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x03)
-
-/** The key confirmation value.
- *
- * This value is used during the key confirmation phase of a PAKE protocol.
- * The format of the value depends on the algorithm and cipher suite:
- *
- * For SPAKE2+ algorithms, the format for both input and output at this step is
- * the same as the output of the MAC algorithm specified in the cipher suite.
- *
- * For PSA_ALG_SRP_6, the format for both input and output at this step is
- * the same as the output of the Hash algorithm specified.
- */
-#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM                   ((psa_pake_step_t)0x04)
-
-/** The salt.
- *
- * The format for both input and output at this step is plain binary data.
- */
-#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_SALT                      ((psa_pake_step_t)0x05)
-
-/** Retrieve the PAKE algorithm from a PAKE cipher suite.
- *
- * \param[in] cipher_suite     The cipher suite structure to query.
- *
- * \return The PAKE algorithm stored in the cipher suite structure.
- */
-static psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm(
-    const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite);
-
-/** Declare the PAKE algorithm for the cipher suite.
- *
- * This function overwrites any PAKE algorithm
- * previously set in \p cipher_suite.
- *
- * \param[out] cipher_suite    The cipher suite structure to write to.
- * \param algorithm            The PAKE algorithm to write.
- *                             (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type ::psa_algorithm_t
- *                             such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true.)
- *                             If this is 0, the PAKE algorithm in
- *                             \p cipher_suite becomes unspecified.
- */
-static void psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
-                                      psa_algorithm_t algorithm);
-
-/** Retrieve the primitive from a PAKE cipher suite.
- *
- * \param[in] cipher_suite     The cipher suite structure to query.
- *
- * \return The primitive stored in the cipher suite structure.
- */
-static psa_pake_primitive_t psa_pake_cs_get_primitive(
-    const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite);
-
-/** Declare the primitive for a PAKE cipher suite.
- *
- * This function overwrites any primitive previously set in \p cipher_suite.
- *
- * \param[out] cipher_suite    The cipher suite structure to write to.
- * \param primitive            The primitive to write. If this is 0, the
- *                             primitive type in \p cipher_suite becomes
- *                             unspecified.
- */
-static void psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
-                                      psa_pake_primitive_t primitive);
-
-/** The type of the state data structure for PAKE operations.
- *
- * Before calling any function on a PAKE operation object, the application
- * must initialize it by any of the following means:
- * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_pake_operation_t operation;
- *   memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
- *   \endcode
- * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_pake_operation_t operation = {0};
- *   \endcode
- * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT,
- *   for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_pake_operation_t operation = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT;
- *   \endcode
- * - Assign the result of the function psa_pake_operation_init()
- *   to the structure, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_pake_operation_t operation;
- *   operation = psa_pake_operation_init();
- *   \endcode
- *
- * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
- * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
- * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */
-typedef struct psa_pake_operation_s psa_pake_operation_t;
-
-/** Return an initial value for a PAKE operation object.
- */
-static psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_operation_init(void);
-
-/** Set the session information for a password-authenticated key exchange.
- *
- * The sequence of operations to set up a password-authenticated key exchange
- * is as follows:
- * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
- *    listed here.
- * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
- *    documentation for #psa_pake_operation_t, e.g.
- *    #PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT.
- * -# Call psa_pake_setup() to specify the password key and the cipher suite.
- * -# Call \c psa_pake_set_xxx() functions on the operation to complete the
- *    setup. The exact sequence of \c psa_pake_set_xxx() functions that needs
- *    to be called depends on the algorithm in use.
- *
- * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX`
- * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true)
- * for more information.
- *
- * A typical sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key
- * exchange:
- * -# Call psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...) to get the
- *    key share that needs to be sent to the peer.
- * -# Call psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...) to provide
- *    the key share that was received from the peer.
- * -# Depending on the algorithm additional calls to psa_pake_output() and
- *    psa_pake_input() might be necessary.
- * -# Call psa_pake_get_shared_key() for accessing the shared secret.
- *
- * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX`
- * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true)
- * for more information.
- *
- * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_pake_setup(),
- * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_pake_abort(). The
- * application may call psa_pake_abort() at any time after the operation
- * has been initialized.
- *
- * After a successful call to psa_pake_setup(), the application must
- * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
- * operation:
- * - A call to psa_pake_abort().
- * - A successful call to psa_pake_get_shared_key().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to set up. It must have
- *                              been initialized but not set up yet.
- * \param[in] password_key      Identifier of the key holding the password or
- *                              a value derived from the password. It must
- *                              remain valid until the operation terminates.
- *                              The valid key types depend on the PAKE algorithm,
- *                              and participant role.
- * \param[in] cipher_suite      The cipher suite to use. (A cipher suite fully
- *                              characterizes a PAKE algorithm and determines
- *                              the algorithm as well.)
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- *         \p password_key is not a valid key identifier.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
- *         The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE flag, or it does not
- *         permit the \p operation's algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         The algorithm in \p cipher_suite is not a PAKE algorithm or encodes
- *         an invalid hash algorithm, or the PAKE primitive in \p cipher_suite
- *         is not compatible with the PAKE algorithm, or the key confirmation
- *         value in \p cipher_suite is not compatible with the PAKE algorithm
- *         and primitive, or the \p password_key is not compatible with
- *         \p cipher_suite.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         The algorithm in \p cipher_suite is not a supported PAKE algorithm,
- *         or the PAKE primitive in \p cipher_suite is not supported or not
- *         compatible with the PAKE algorithm, or the key confirmation value
- *         in \p cipher_suite is not supported or not compatible with the PAKE
- *         algorithm and primitive, or the key type or key size of
- *         \p password_key is not supported with \p cipher_suite.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid, or
- *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_pake_setup(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
-                            mbedtls_svc_key_id_t password_key,
-                            const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite);
-
-/** Set the application role for a password-authenticated key exchange.
-*
-* Not all PAKE algorithms need to differentiate the communicating entities.
-* It is optional to call this function for PAKEs that don't require a role
-* to be specified. For such PAKEs the application role parameter is ignored,
-* or #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE can be passed as \c role.
-*
-* Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX`
-* values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true)
-* for more information.
-*
-* \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to specify the
-*                              application's role for. It must have been set up
-*                              by psa_pake_setup() and not yet in use (neither
-*                              psa_pake_output() nor psa_pake_input() has been
-*                              called yet). It must be an operation for which
-*                              the application's role hasn't been specified
-*                              (psa_pake_set_role() hasn't been called yet).
-* \param role                  A value of type ::psa_pake_role_t indicating the
-*                              application's role in the PAKE algorithm
-*                              that is being set up. For more information see
-*                              the documentation of \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_XXX
-*                              constants.
-*
-* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
-*         Success.
-* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
-*         The \p role is not a valid PAKE role in the \p operation’s algorithm.
-* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
-*         The \p role for this algorithm is not supported or is not valid.
-* \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
-* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
-* \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
-*         The operation state is not valid, or
-*         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
-*         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
-*         results in this error code.
-*/
-psa_status_t psa_pake_set_role(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
-    psa_pake_role_t role);
-
-/** Set the user ID for a password-authenticated key exchange.
- *
- * Call this function to set the user ID. For PAKE algorithms that associate a
- * user identifier with each side of the session you need to call
- * psa_pake_set_peer() as well. For PAKE algorithms that associate a single
- * user identifier with the session, call psa_pake_set_user() only.
- *
- * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX`
- * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true)
- * for more information.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to set the user ID for. It
- *                              must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and
- *                              not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor
- *                              psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must
- *                              be on operation for which the user ID hasn't
- *                              been set (psa_pake_set_user() hasn't been
- *                              called yet).
- * \param[in] user_id           The user ID to authenticate with.
- * \param user_id_len           Size of the \p user_id buffer in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p user_id is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm and cipher
- *         suite.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         The value of \p user_id is not supported by the implementation.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid, or
- *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_pake_set_user(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
-                               const uint8_t *user_id,
-                               size_t user_id_len);
-
-/** Set the peer ID for a password-authenticated key exchange.
- *
- * Call this function in addition to psa_pake_set_user() for PAKE algorithms
- * that associate a user identifier with each side of the session. For PAKE
- * algorithms that associate a single user identifier with the session, call
- * psa_pake_set_user() only.
- *
- * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX`
- * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true)
- * for more information.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to set the peer ID for. It
- *                              must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and
- *                              not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor
- *                              psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must
- *                              be on operation for which the peer ID hasn't
- *                              been set (psa_pake_set_peer() hasn't been
- *                              called yet).
- * \param[in] peer_id           The peer's ID to authenticate.
- * \param peer_id_len           Size of the \p peer_id buffer in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p peer_id is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm and cipher
- *         suite.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         The algorithm doesn't associate a second identity with the session.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         Calling psa_pake_set_peer() is invalid with the \p operation's
- *         algorithm, the operation state is not valid, or the library has not
- *         been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_pake_set_peer(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
-                               const uint8_t *peer_id,
-                               size_t peer_id_len);
-
-/** Set the context data for a password-authenticated key exchange.
- *
- * Call this function for PAKE algorithms that accept additional context data
- * as part of the protocol setup.
- *
- * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX`
- * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true)
- * for more information.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to set the context for. It
- *                              must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and
- *                              not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor
- *                              psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must
- *                              be on operation for which the context hasn't
- *                              been set (psa_pake_set_context() hasn't been
- *                              called yet).
- * \param[in] context           The context.
- * \param context_len           Size of the \p context buffer in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         The \p context is not valid for the operation’s algorithm and cipher suite.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         The \p context is not supported by the implementation.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         Calling psa_pake_set_context() is invalid with the \p operation's
- *         algorithm, the operation state is not valid, or the library has not
- *         been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_pake_set_context(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
-                                  const uint8_t *context,
-                                  size_t context_len);
-
-/** Get output for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange.
- *
- * Depending on the algorithm being executed, you might need to call this
- * function several times or you might not need to call this at all.
- *
- * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key
- * exchange depends on the algorithm in use.  Refer to the documentation of
- * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type
- * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more
- * information.
- *
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation    Active PAKE operation.
- * \param step                 The step of the algorithm for which the output
- *                             is requested.
- * \param[out] output          Buffer where the output is to be written in the
- *                             format appropriate for this \p step. Refer to
- *                             the documentation of the individual
- *                             \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants for more
- *                             information.
- * \param output_size          Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. This must
- *                             be at least #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c alg, \c
- *                             primitive, \p output_step) where \c alg and
- *                             \p primitive are the PAKE algorithm and primitive
- *                             in the operation's cipher suite, and \p step is
- *                             the output step.
- *
- * \param[out] output_length   On success, the number of bytes of the returned
- *                             output.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
- *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \p step is not supported with the operation's algorithm.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and fully set
- *         up, and this call must conform to the algorithm's requirements
- *         for ordering of input and output steps), or the library has not
- *         been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_pake_output(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
-                             psa_pake_step_t step,
-                             uint8_t *output,
-                             size_t output_size,
-                             size_t *output_length);
-
-/** Provide input for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange.
- *
- * Depending on the algorithm being executed, you might need to call this
- * function several times or you might not need to call this at all.
- *
- * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key
- * exchange depends on the algorithm in use.  Refer to the documentation of
- * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type
- * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more
- * information.
- *
- * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
- * state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation    Active PAKE operation.
- * \param step                 The step for which the input is provided.
- * \param[in] input            Buffer containing the input in the format
- *                             appropriate for this \p step. Refer to the
- *                             documentation of the individual
- *                             \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants for more
- *                             information.
- * \param input_length         Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
- *         The verification fails for a #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF input step.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         \p step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or
- *         \p input_length is not compatible with the \p operation’s algorithm,
- *         or the \p input is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm,
- *         cipher suite or \p step.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         \p step is not supported with the operation's algorithm, or
- *         \p step p is not supported with the \p operation's algorithm, or the
- *         \p input is not supported for the \p operation's algorithm, cipher
- *         suite or \p step.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and fully set
- *         up, and this call must conform to the algorithm's requirements
- *         for ordering of input and output steps), or the library has not
- *         been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_pake_input(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
-                            psa_pake_step_t step,
-                            const uint8_t *input,
-                            size_t input_length);
-
-/** Get shared secret from a PAKE.
- *
- * This is the final call in a PAKE operation, which retrieves the shared
- * secret as a key. It is recommended that this key is used as an input to a
- * key derivation operation to produce additional cryptographic keys. For
- * some PAKE algorithms, the shared secret is also suitable for use as a key
- * in cryptographic operations such as encryption. Refer to the documentation
- * of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type
- * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more
- * information.
- *
- * Depending on the key confirmation requested in the cipher suite,
- * psa_pake_get_shared_key() must be called either before or after the
- * key-confirmation output and input steps for the PAKE algorithm. The key
- * confirmation affects the guarantees that can be made about the shared key:
- *
- * Unconfirmed key
- * If the cipher suite used to set up the operation requested an unconfirmed
- * key, the application must call psa_pake_get_shared_key() after the
- * key-exchange output and input steps are completed. The PAKE algorithm
- * provides a cryptographic guarantee that only a peer who used the same
- * password, and identity inputs, is able to compute the same key. However,
- * there is no guarantee that the peer is the participant it claims to be,
- * and was able to compute the same key.
- * Since the peer is not authenticated, no action should be taken that assumes
- * that the peer is who it claims to be. For example, do not access restricted
- * files on the peer’s behalf until an explicit authentication has succeeded.
- * Note:
- * Some PAKE algorithms do not enable the output of the shared secret until it
- * has been confirmed.
- *
- * Confirmed key
- * If the cipher suite used to set up the operation requested a confirmed key,
- * the application must call psa_pake_get_shared_key() after the key-exchange
- * and key-confirmation output and input steps are completed.
- * Following key confirmation, the PAKE algorithm provides a cryptographic
- * guarantee that the peer used the same password and identity inputs, and has
- * computed the identical shared secret key.
- * Since the peer is not authenticated, no action should be taken that assumes
- * that the peer is who it claims to be. For example, do not access restricted
- * files on the peer’s behalf until an explicit authentication has succeeded.
- * Note:
- * Some PAKE algorithms do not include any key-confirmation steps.
- *
- * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key
- * exchange depends on the algorithm in use.
- *
- * When this function returns successfully, \p operation becomes inactive.
- * If this function returns an error status, both \p operation
- * and \c key_derivation operations enter an error state and must be aborted
- * by calling psa_pake_abort().
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation    Active PAKE operation.
- * \param[in] attributes       The attributes for the new key.
- * \param[out] key             On success, an identifier for the newly created
- *                             key. #PSA_KEY_ID_NULL on failure.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
- *         The implementation does not permit creating a key with the
- *         specified attributes due to some implementation-specific policy.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
- *         This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is
- *         already a persistent key with the given identifier.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *         The key type is not valid for output from this operation’s
- *         algorithm, or the key size is nonzero, or the key lifetime is
- *         invalid, the key identifier is not valid for the key lifetime,
- *         or the key usage flags include invalid values, or the key’s
- *         permitted-usage algorithm is invalid, or the key attributes,
- *         as a whole, are invalid.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
- *         The key attributes, as a whole, are not supported for creation
- *         from a PAKE secret, either by the implementation in general or
- *         in the specified storage location.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The PAKE operation state is not valid (it must be ready to return
- *         the shared secret), or the library has not been previously
- *         initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_pake_get_shared_key(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
-                                     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                                     mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key);
-
-/** Abort a PAKE operation.
- *
- * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the \c
- * operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused
- * for another operation by calling psa_pake_setup() again.
- *
- * This function may be called at any time after the operation
- * object has been initialized as described in #psa_pake_operation_t.
- *
- * In particular, calling psa_pake_abort() after the operation has been
- * terminated by a call to psa_pake_abort() or psa_pake_get_shared_key()
- * is safe and has no effect.
- *
- * \param[in,out] operation    The operation to abort.
- *
- * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
- *         Success.
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
- * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
- *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
- *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
- *         results in this error code.
- */
-psa_status_t psa_pake_abort(psa_pake_operation_t *operation);
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_pake_output().
- *
- * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
- * that psa_pake_output() will not fail due to an insufficient output buffer
- * size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call.
- *
- * See also #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE
- *
- * \param alg           A PAKE algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\p alg) is true).
- * \param primitive     A primitive of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t that is
- *                      compatible with algorithm \p alg.
- * \param output_step   A value of type ::psa_pake_step_t that is valid for the
- *                      algorithm \p alg.
- * \return              A sufficient output buffer size for the specified
- *                      PAKE algorithm, primitive, and output step. If the
- *                      PAKE algorithm, primitive, or output step is not
- *                      recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
- *                      return 0.
- */
-#define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, output_step)               \
-    (output_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ? \
-        PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_TYPE(primitive) == PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH ? \
-            PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(primitive)) : \
-            PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(primitive)) : \
-     output_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ? \
-        PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(primitive)) : \
-     output_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF ? \
-        PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(primitive)) : \
-     output_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM ? \
-        PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_CMAC(alg) ? \
-            PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128, PSA_ALG_CMAC) : \
-            PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg) : \
-     0u)
-
-/** A sufficient input buffer size for psa_pake_input().
- *
- * The value returned by this macro is guaranteed to be large enough for any
- * valid input to psa_pake_input() in an operation with the specified
- * parameters.
- *
- * See also #PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE
- *
- * \param alg           A PAKE algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\p alg) is true).
- * \param primitive     A primitive of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t that is
- *                      compatible with algorithm \p alg.
- * \param input_step    A value of type ::psa_pake_step_t that is valid for the
- *                      algorithm \p alg.
- * \return              A sufficient input buffer size for the specified
- *                      input, cipher suite and algorithm. If the cipher suite,
- *                      the input type or PAKE algorithm is not recognized, or
- *                      the parameters are incompatible, return 0.
- */
-#define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, input_step)                 \
-    (input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ? \
-        PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_TYPE(primitive) == PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH ? \
-            PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(primitive)) : \
-            PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(primitive)) : \
-     input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ? \
-        PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(primitive)) : \
-     input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF ? \
-        PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(primitive)) : \
-     input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM ? \
-        PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_CMAC(alg) ? \
-            PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128, PSA_ALG_CMAC) : \
-            PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg) : \
-     input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_SALT ? \
-        64u : \
-     0u)
-
-/** Output buffer size for psa_pake_output() for any of the supported PAKE
- * algorithm and primitive suites and output step.
- *
- * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer.
- *
- * The value of this macro must be at least as large as the largest value
- * returned by PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE()
- *
- * See also #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p primitive, \p output_step).
- */
-#ifdef PSA_WANT_ALG_SRP_6
-#define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS)
-#else
-#define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)
-#endif
-
-/** Input buffer size for psa_pake_input() for any of the supported PAKE
- * algorithm and primitive suites and input step.
- *
- * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer.
- *
- * The value of this macro must be at least as large as the largest value
- * returned by PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE()
- *
- * See also #PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p primitive, \p output_step).
- */
-#ifdef PSA_WANT_ALG_SRP_6
-#define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS)
-#else
-#define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)
-#endif
-
-static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm(
-    const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite)
-{
-    return cipher_suite->algorithm;
-}
-
-static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(
-    psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
-    psa_algorithm_t algorithm)
-{
-    if (!PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(algorithm)) {
-        cipher_suite->algorithm = 0;
-    } else {
-        cipher_suite->algorithm = algorithm;
-    }
-}
-
-static inline psa_pake_primitive_t psa_pake_cs_get_primitive(
-    const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite)
-{
-    return cipher_suite->primitive;
-}
-
-static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(
-    psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
-    psa_pake_primitive_t primitive)
-{
-    cipher_suite->primitive = primitive;
-}
-
-static inline uint32_t psa_pake_cs_get_key_confirmation(
-    const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite)
-{
-    return cipher_suite->key_confirmation;
-}
-
-static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_key_confirmation(
-    psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite,
-    uint32_t key_confirmation)
-{
-    cipher_suite->key_confirmation = key_confirmation;
-}
-
-/**@}*/
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_platform.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_platform.h
deleted file mode 100644
index c462898..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_platform.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-/**
- * \file psa/crypto_platform.h
- *
- * \brief PSA cryptography module: TF-M platform definitions
- *
- * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
- * include psa/crypto.h.
- *
- * This file contains platform-dependent type definitions.
- *
- * In implementations with isolation between the application and the
- * cryptography module, implementers should take care to ensure that
- * the definitions that are exposed to applications match what the
- * module implements.
- */
-
-#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H
-#define PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H
-
-/* PSA requires several types which C99 provides in stdint.h. */
-#include <stdint.h>
-
-/* No particular platform definition is currently required for the
- * TF-M client view of the PSA Crytpo APIs, but we keep this header
- * available for reference and future compatibility
- */
-
-#if defined(__NRF_TFM__) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER)
-/*
- * This header file is provided by TF-M and is only intended to be
- * used by clients of PSA, not implementations of PSA. So secure
- * partitions in the TF-M image (other than the crypto partition
- * itself), and non-secure images.
- *
- * In NCS, the TF-M crypto partition should be using PSA header files
- * from Oberon as it is Oberon that implements PSA.
- *
- * We want to detect that a source file is in the crypto partition,
- * but has accidentally used this TF-M header instead of headers
- * provided by Oberon. To do this we would ideally have a
- * IS_IN_CRYPTO_PARTION define, but since there is no such define at
- * time of writing we check MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
- * instead, which should only be defined by the PSA implementation,
- * not by PSA clients.
- */
-#error "The TF-M image included the TF-M PSA headers but should have included Oberon PSA headers"
-#endif
-
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 94da583..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1351 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2018-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-/**
- * \file psa/crypto_sizes.h
- *
- * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS buffer size macros
- *
- * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
- * include psa/crypto.h.
- *
- * This file contains the definitions of macros that are useful to
- * compute buffer sizes. The signatures and semantics of these macros
- * are standardized, but the definitions are not, because they depend on
- * the available algorithms and, in some cases, on permitted tolerances
- * on buffer sizes.
- *
- * In implementations with isolation between the application and the
- * cryptography module, implementers should take care to ensure that
- * the definitions that are exposed to applications match what the
- * module implements.
- *
- * Macros that compute sizes whose values do not depend on the
- * implementation are in crypto.h.
- */
-
-#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H
-#define PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H
-
-#define PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) (((bits) + 7u) / 8u)
-#define PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(bytes) ((bytes) * 8u)
-#define PSA_MAX_OF_THREE(a, b, c) ((a) <= (b) ? (b) <= (c) ? \
-                                   (c) : (b) : (a) <= (c) ? (c) : (a))
-
-#define PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(block_size, length) \
-    (((length) + (block_size) - 1) / (block_size) * (block_size))
-
-/** The size of the output of psa_hash_finish(), in bytes.
- *
- * This is also the hash size that psa_hash_verify() expects.
- *
- * \param alg   A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *              #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true), or an HMAC algorithm
- *              (#PSA_ALG_HMAC(\c hash_alg) where \c hash_alg is a
- *              hash algorithm).
- *
- * \return The hash size for the specified hash algorithm.
- *         If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
- */
-#define PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg)                                        \
-    (                                                               \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 16u :           \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 20u :     \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 20u :         \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 28u :       \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 32u :       \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 48u :       \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 64u :       \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 28u :   \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 32u :   \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 28u :      \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 32u :      \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 48u :      \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 64u :      \
-        0u)
-
-/** The input block size of a hash algorithm, in bytes.
- *
- * Hash algorithms process their input data in blocks. Hash operations will
- * retain any partial blocks until they have enough input to fill the block or
- * until the operation is finished.
- * This affects the output from psa_hash_suspend().
- *
- * \param alg   A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *              PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true).
- *
- * \return      The block size in bytes for the specified hash algorithm.
- *              If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
- *              An implementation can return either 0 or the correct size for a
- *              hash algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.
- */
-#define PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(alg)                                  \
-    (                                                               \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 64u :           \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 64u :     \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 64u :         \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 64u :       \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 64u :       \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 128u :      \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 128u :      \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 128u :  \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 128u :  \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 144u :     \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 136u :     \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 104u :     \
-        PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 72u :      \
-        0u)
-
-/** \def PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE
- *
- * Maximum size of a hash.
- *
- * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value
- * is the maximum size of a hash in bytes.
- */
-/* Note: for HMAC-SHA-3, the block size is 144 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-224,
- * 136 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-256, 104 bytes for SHA3-384, 72 bytes for
- * HMAC-SHA3-512. */
-/* Note: PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE,
- * see the note on MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE for details.
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG)
-#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224)
-#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 144u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256)
-#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 136u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512)
-#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384)
-#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384)
-#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 104u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512)
-#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 72u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256)
-#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224)
-#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64u
-#else /* SHA-1 or smaller */
-#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64u
-#endif
-
-#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512)
-#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 64u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384)
-#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 48u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256)
-#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 32u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224)
-#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 28u
-#else /* SHA-1 or smaller */
-#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 20u
-#endif
-#else /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG)  */
-/* Without any PSA configuration we must assume the maximum size possible. */
-#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 64u
-#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 144u
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG)  */
-
-/** \def PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE
- *
- * Maximum size of a MAC.
- *
- * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value
- * is the maximum size of a MAC in bytes.
- */
-/* All non-HMAC MACs have a maximum size that's smaller than the
- * minimum possible value of PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE in this implementation. */
-/* Note that the encoding of truncated MAC algorithms limits this value
- * to 64 bytes.
- */
-#define PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE
-
-/** The length of a tag for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes.
- *
- * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to store the
- * tag output from psa_aead_finish().
- *
- * See also #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE.
- *
- * \param key_type            The type of the AEAD key.
- * \param key_bits            The size of the AEAD key in bits.
- * \param alg                 An AEAD algorithm
- *                            (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                            #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
- *
- * \return                    The tag length for the specified algorithm and key.
- *                            If the AEAD algorithm does not have an identified
- *                            tag that can be distinguished from the rest of
- *                            the ciphertext, return 0.
- *                            If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not
- *                            recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
- *                            return 0.
- */
-#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg)                        \
-    (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ?                            \
-     PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) :                                     \
-     ((void) (key_bits), 0u))
-
-/** The maximum tag size for all supported AEAD algorithms, in bytes.
- *
- * See also #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg).
- */
-#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE       16u
-
-/* The maximum size of an RSA key on this implementation, in bits.
- * This is a vendor-specific macro.
- *
- * Mbed TLS does not set a hard limit on the size of RSA keys: any key
- * whose parameters fit in a bignum is accepted. However large keys can
- * induce a large memory usage and long computation times. Unlike other
- * auxiliary macros in this file and in crypto.h, which reflect how the
- * library is configured, this macro defines how the library is
- * configured. This implementation refuses to import or generate an
- * RSA key whose size is larger than the value defined here.
- *
- * Note that an implementation may set different size limits for different
- * operations, and does not need to accept all key sizes up to the limit. */
-#define PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS 4096u
-
-/* The minimum size of an RSA key on this implementation, in bits.
- * This is a vendor-specific macro.
- *
- * Limits RSA key generation to a minimum due to avoid accidental misuse.
- * This value cannot be less than 128 bits.
- */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS)
-#define PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS
-#else
-#define PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS 1024
-#endif
-
-/* The maximum size of an DH key on this implementation, in bits.
- *
- * Note that an implementation may set different size limits for different
- * operations, and does not need to accept all key sizes up to the limit.
- */
-#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 8192u
-
-/* The maximum size of an ECC key on this implementation, in bits.
- * This is a vendor-specific macro. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG)
-#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521)
-#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 521u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512)
-#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 512u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448)
-#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 448u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384)
-#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384)
-#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256)
-#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256)
-#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256)
-#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255)
-#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 255u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224)
-#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224)
-#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192)
-#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192u
-#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192)
-#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192u
-#else
-#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 0u
-#endif
-#else /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG)  */
-/* Without any PSA configuration we must assume the maximum size possible. */
-#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 521
-#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG)  */
-
-/** This macro returns the maximum supported length of the PSK for the
- * TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS key derivation
- * (#PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(\c hash_alg)).
- *
- * The maximum supported length does not depend on the chosen hash algorithm.
- *
- * Quoting RFC 4279, Sect 5.3:
- * TLS implementations supporting these ciphersuites MUST support
- * arbitrary PSK identities up to 128 octets in length, and arbitrary
- * PSKs up to 64 octets in length.  Supporting longer identities and
- * keys is RECOMMENDED.
- *
- * Therefore, no implementation should define a value smaller than 64
- * for #PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE.
- */
-#define PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE 128u
-
-/* The expected size of input passed to psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_input,
- * which is expected to work with P-256 curve only. */
-#define PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_INPUT_SIZE 65u
-
-/* The size of a serialized K.X coordinate to be used in
- * psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_input. This function only accepts the P-256
- * curve. */
-#define PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE 32u
-
-/* The maximum number of iterations for PBKDF2 on this implementation, in bits.
- * This is a vendor-specific macro. This can be configured if necessary.
- */
-#define PSA_VENDOR_PBKDF2_MAX_ITERATIONS 0xffffffffU
-
-/** The maximum size of a block cipher. */
-#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE 16u
-
-/** The size of the output of psa_mac_sign_finish(), in bytes.
- *
- * This is also the MAC size that psa_mac_verify_finish() expects.
- *
- * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
- *          zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
- *          side effects.
- *
- * \param key_type      The type of the MAC key.
- * \param key_bits      The size of the MAC key in bits.
- * \param alg           A MAC algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
- *
- * \return              The MAC size for the specified algorithm with
- *                      the specified key parameters.
- * \return              0 if the MAC algorithm is not recognized.
- * \return              Either 0 or the correct size for a MAC algorithm that
- *                      the implementation recognizes, but does not support.
- * \return              Unspecified if the key parameters are not consistent
- *                      with the algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg)                                   \
-    ((alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ? PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(alg) :        \
-     PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) ? PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg)) :         \
-     PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) ? PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \
-     ((void) (key_type), (void) (key_bits), 0u))
-
-/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_encrypt(), in bytes.
- *
- * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is
- * guaranteed that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an
- * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of
- * the ciphertext may be smaller.
- *
- * See also #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p plaintext_length).
- *
- * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
- *          zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
- *          side effects.
- *
- * \param key_type            A symmetric key type that is
- *                            compatible with algorithm \p alg.
- * \param alg                 An AEAD algorithm
- *                            (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                            #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
- * \param plaintext_length    Size of the plaintext in bytes.
- *
- * \return                    The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified
- *                            algorithm.
- *                            If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not
- *                            recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
- *                            return 0.
- */
-#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, plaintext_length) \
-    (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ?                      \
-     (plaintext_length) + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) :          \
-     0u)
-
-/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_encrypt(), for any of the
- *  supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
- *
- * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
- * that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
- *
- * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are
- *       compile-time constants.
- *
- * See also #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg,
- * \p plaintext_length).
- *
- * \param plaintext_length    Size of the plaintext in bytes.
- *
- * \return                    A sufficient output buffer size for any of the
- *                            supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
- *
- */
-#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(plaintext_length)          \
-    ((plaintext_length) + PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE)
-
-
-/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_decrypt(), in bytes.
- *
- * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is
- * guaranteed that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an
- * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of
- * the plaintext may be smaller.
- *
- * See also #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p ciphertext_length).
- *
- * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
- *          zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
- *          side effects.
- *
- * \param key_type            A symmetric key type that is
- *                            compatible with algorithm \p alg.
- * \param alg                 An AEAD algorithm
- *                            (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                            #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
- * \param ciphertext_length   Size of the plaintext in bytes.
- *
- * \return                    The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified
- *                            algorithm.
- *                            If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not
- *                            recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
- *                            return 0.
- */
-#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, ciphertext_length) \
-    (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 &&                      \
-     (ciphertext_length) > PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) ?      \
-     (ciphertext_length) - PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) :      \
-     0u)
-
-/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_decrypt(), for any of the
- *  supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
- *
- * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
- * that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
- *
- * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are
- *       compile-time constants.
- *
- * See also #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg,
- * \p ciphertext_length).
- *
- * \param ciphertext_length   Size of the ciphertext in bytes.
- *
- * \return                    A sufficient output buffer size for any of the
- *                            supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
- *
- */
-#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(ciphertext_length)     \
-    (ciphertext_length)
-
-/** The default nonce size for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes.
- *
- * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to
- * store the nonce output from #psa_aead_generate_nonce().
- *
- * See also #PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE.
- *
- * \note This is not the maximum size of nonce supported as input to
- *       #psa_aead_set_nonce(), #psa_aead_encrypt() or #psa_aead_decrypt(),
- *       just the default size that is generated by #psa_aead_generate_nonce().
- *
- * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
- *          zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
- *          side effects.
- *
- * \param key_type  A symmetric key type that is compatible with
- *                  algorithm \p alg.
- *
- * \param alg       An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                  #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
- *
- * \return The default nonce size for the specified key type and algorithm.
- *         If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not recognized,
- *         or the parameters are incompatible, return 0.
- */
-#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) \
-    (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) == 16 ? \
-     MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_CCM) ? 13u : \
-     MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_GCM) ? 12u : \
-     0u : \
-     (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \
-     MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) ? 12u : \
-     0u)
-
-/** The maximum default nonce size among all supported pairs of key types and
- *  AEAD algorithms, in bytes.
- *
- * This is equal to or greater than any value that #PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH()
- * may return.
- *
- * \note This is not the maximum size of nonce supported as input to
- *       #psa_aead_set_nonce(), #psa_aead_encrypt() or #psa_aead_decrypt(),
- *       just the largest size that may be generated by
- *       #psa_aead_generate_nonce().
- */
-#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE 13u
-
-/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update().
- *
- * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is
- * guaranteed that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an
- * insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output may be smaller
- * in any given call.
- *
- * See also #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length).
- *
- * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
- *          zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
- *          side effects.
- *
- * \param key_type            A symmetric key type that is
- *                            compatible with algorithm \p alg.
- * \param alg                 An AEAD algorithm
- *                            (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                            #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
- * \param input_length        Size of the input in bytes.
- *
- * \return                    A sufficient output buffer size for the specified
- *                            algorithm.
- *                            If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not
- *                            recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
- *                            return 0.
- */
-/* For all the AEAD modes defined in this specification, it is possible
- * to emit output without delay. However, hardware may not always be
- * capable of this. So for modes based on a block cipher, allow the
- * implementation to delay the output until it has a full block. */
-#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length)                             \
-    (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ?                                             \
-     PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ?                                              \
-     PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), (input_length)) : \
-     (input_length) : \
-     0u)
-
-/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update(), for any of the
- *  supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
- *
- * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
- * that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
- *
- * See also #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length).
- *
- * \param input_length      Size of the input in bytes.
- */
-#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length)                           \
-    (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, (input_length)))
-
-/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish().
- *
- * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is
- * guaranteed that psa_aead_finish() will not fail due to an
- * insufficient ciphertext buffer size. The actual size of the output may
- * be smaller in any given call.
- *
- * See also #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.
- *
- * \param key_type            A symmetric key type that is
-                              compatible with algorithm \p alg.
- * \param alg                 An AEAD algorithm
- *                            (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                            #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
- *
- * \return                    A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for the
- *                            specified algorithm.
- *                            If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not
- *                            recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
- *                            return 0.
- */
-#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \
-    (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 &&  \
-     PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ?    \
-     PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \
-     0u)
-
-/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish(), for any of the
- *  supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
- *
- * See also #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg).
- */
-#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE     (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE)
-
-/** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify().
- *
- * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is
- * guaranteed that psa_aead_verify() will not fail due to an
- * insufficient plaintext buffer size. The actual size of the output may
- * be smaller in any given call.
- *
- * See also #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.
- *
- * \param key_type            A symmetric key type that is
- *                            compatible with algorithm \p alg.
- * \param alg                 An AEAD algorithm
- *                            (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                            #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
- *
- * \return                    A sufficient plaintext buffer size for the
- *                            specified algorithm.
- *                            If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not
- *                            recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
- *                            return 0.
- */
-#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \
-    (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 &&  \
-     PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ?    \
-     PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \
-     0u)
-
-/** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify(), for any of the
- *  supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
- *
- * See also #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg).
- */
-#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE     (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE)
-
-#define PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg)                         \
-    (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ?                                   \
-     2u * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg)) + 1u :   \
-     11u /*PKCS#1v1.5*/)
-
-/**
- * \brief ECDSA signature size for a given curve bit size
- *
- * \param curve_bits    Curve size in bits.
- * \return              Signature size in bytes.
- *
- * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one.
- */
-#define PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(curve_bits)    \
-    (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits) * 2u)
-
-/** Sufficient signature buffer size for psa_sign_hash().
- *
- * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a signature using a key
- * of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm.
- * Note that the actual size of the signature may be smaller
- * (some algorithms produce a variable-size signature).
- *
- * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or
- *          zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
- *          side effects.
- *
- * \param key_type  An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a
- *                  key pair type or a public key type).
- * \param key_bits  The size of the key in bits.
- * \param alg       The signature algorithm.
- *
- * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return
- *         a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
- *         psa_sign_hash() will not fail with
- *         #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
- *         If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported,
- *         return either a sensible size or 0.
- *         If the parameters are not valid, the
- *         return value is unspecified.
- */
-#define PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg)        \
-    (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? ((void) alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) : \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(key_type) ? PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(key_bits) : \
-     ((void) alg, 0u))
-
-#define PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE     \
-    PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)
-
-/** \def PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
- *
- * Maximum size of an asymmetric signature.
- *
- * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value
- * is the maximum size of a signature in bytes.
- */
-#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE      1
-
-#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \
-    (PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE > PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE)
-#undef PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
-#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE      PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
-#endif
-#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS)) && \
-    (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE)
-#undef PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
-#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE      PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)
-#endif
-
-/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt().
- *
- * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a ciphertext produced using
- * a key of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm.
- * Note that the actual size of the ciphertext may be smaller, depending
- * on the algorithm.
- *
- * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or
- *          zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
- *          side effects.
- *
- * \param key_type  An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a
- *                  key pair type or a public key type).
- * \param key_bits  The size of the key in bits.
- * \param alg       The asymmetric encryption algorithm.
- *
- * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return
- *         a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
- *         psa_asymmetric_encrypt() will not fail with
- *         #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
- *         If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported,
- *         return either a sensible size or 0.
- *         If the parameters are not valid, the
- *         return value is unspecified.
- */
-#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg)     \
-    (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ?                                    \
-     ((void) alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) :                         \
-     0u)
-
-/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt(), for any
- *  supported asymmetric encryption.
- *
- * See also #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg).
- */
-/* This macro assumes that RSA is the only supported asymmetric encryption. */
-#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE          \
-    (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS))
-
-/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt().
- *
- * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a plaintext produced using
- * a key of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm.
- * Note that the actual size of the plaintext may be smaller, depending
- * on the algorithm.
- *
- * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or
- *          zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
- *          side effects.
- *
- * \param key_type  An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a
- *                  key pair type or a public key type).
- * \param key_bits  The size of the key in bits.
- * \param alg       The asymmetric encryption algorithm.
- *
- * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return
- *         a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
- *         psa_asymmetric_decrypt() will not fail with
- *         #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
- *         If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported,
- *         return either a sensible size or 0.
- *         If the parameters are not valid, the
- *         return value is unspecified.
- */
-#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg)     \
-    (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ?                                    \
-     PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) - PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) :  \
-     0u)
-
-/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt(), for any
- *  supported asymmetric decryption.
- *
- * This macro assumes that RSA is the only supported asymmetric encryption.
- *
- * See also #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg).
- */
-#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE          \
-    (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS))
-
-/* Maximum size of the ASN.1 encoding of an INTEGER with the specified
- * number of bits.
- *
- * This definition assumes that bits <= 2^19 - 9 so that the length field
- * is at most 3 bytes. The length of the encoding is the length of the
- * bit string padded to a whole number of bytes plus:
- * - 1 type byte;
- * - 1 to 3 length bytes;
- * - 0 to 1 bytes of leading 0 due to the sign bit.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(bits)      \
-    ((bits) / 8u + 5u)
-
-/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA public key.
- * Assumes that the public exponent is less than 2^32.
- *
- * RSAPublicKey  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
- *    modulus            INTEGER,    -- n
- *    publicExponent     INTEGER  }  -- e
- *
- * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead;
- * - n : INTEGER;
- * - 7 bytes for the public exponent.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits)        \
-    (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) + 11u)
-
-/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA key pair.
- * Assumes that the public exponent is less than 2^32 and that the size
- * difference between the two primes is at most 1 bit.
- *
- * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
- *     version           Version,  -- 0
- *     modulus           INTEGER,  -- N-bit
- *     publicExponent    INTEGER,  -- 32-bit
- *     privateExponent   INTEGER,  -- N-bit
- *     prime1            INTEGER,  -- N/2-bit
- *     prime2            INTEGER,  -- N/2-bit
- *     exponent1         INTEGER,  -- N/2-bit
- *     exponent2         INTEGER,  -- N/2-bit
- *     coefficient       INTEGER,  -- N/2-bit
- * }
- *
- * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead;
- * - 3 bytes of version;
- * - 7 half-size INTEGERs plus 2 full-size INTEGERs,
- *   overapproximated as 9 half-size INTEGERS;
- * - 7 bytes for the public exponent.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits)   \
-    (9u * PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE((key_bits) / 2u + 1u) + 14u)
-
-/* Maximum size of the export encoding of a DSA public key.
- *
- * SubjectPublicKeyInfo  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
- *      algorithm            AlgorithmIdentifier,
- *      subjectPublicKey     BIT STRING  } -- contains DSAPublicKey
- * AlgorithmIdentifier  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
- *      algorithm               OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
- *      parameters              Dss-Params  } -- SEQUENCE of 3 INTEGERs
- * DSAPublicKey  ::=  INTEGER -- public key, Y
- *
- * - 3 * 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead;
- * - 1 + 1 + 7 bytes of algorithm (DSA OID);
- * - 4 bytes of BIT STRING overhead;
- * - 3 full-size INTEGERs (p, g, y);
- * - 1 + 1 + 32 bytes for 1 sub-size INTEGER (q <= 256 bits).
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits)        \
-    (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3u + 59u)
-
-/* Maximum size of the export encoding of a DSA key pair.
- *
- * DSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
- *     version             Version,  -- 0
- *     prime               INTEGER,  -- p
- *     subprime            INTEGER,  -- q
- *     generator           INTEGER,  -- g
- *     public              INTEGER,  -- y
- *     private             INTEGER,  -- x
- * }
- *
- * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead;
- * - 3 bytes of version;
- * - 3 full-size INTEGERs (p, g, y);
- * - 2 * (1 + 1 + 32) bytes for 2 sub-size INTEGERs (q, x <= 256 bits).
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits)   \
-    (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3u + 75u)
-
-/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an ECC public key.
- *
- * The representation of an ECC public key is:
- *      - The byte 0x04;
- *      - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian;
- *      - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian;
- *      - where m is the bit size associated with the curve.
- *
- * - 1 byte + 2 * point size.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits)        \
-    (2u * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 1u)
-
-/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an ECC key pair.
- *
- * An ECC key pair is represented by the secret value.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits)   \
-    (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits))
-
-/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an DH key pair.
- *
- * An DH key pair is represented by the secret value.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits)   \
-    (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits))
-
-/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an DH public key.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits)   \
-    (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits))
-
-/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an SPAKE2+ public key.
- *
- * An SPAKE2+ public key is represented by the secret values w0 and L.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits)   \
-    (3u * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 1u)
-
-/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an SPAKE2+ key pair.
- *
- * An SPAKE2+ key pair is represented by the secret values w0 and w1.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits)   \
-    (2u * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits))
-
-/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an SRP public key.
- *
- * An SRP public key is represented by the password verifier.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits)   \
-    (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits))
-
-/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an SRP key pair.
- *
- * An SRP key pair is represented by the password hash.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_SRP_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits)   \
-    (PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE)
-
-/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_export_key() or
- * psa_export_public_key().
- *
- * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are
- * compile-time constants.
- *
- * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
- *          zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
- *          side effects.
- *
- * The following code illustrates how to allocate enough memory to export
- * a key by querying the key type and size at runtime.
- * \code{c}
- * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
- * psa_status_t status;
- * status = psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes);
- * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...);
- * psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
- * size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes);
- * size_t buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits);
- * psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
- * uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size);
- * if (buffer == NULL) handle_error(...);
- * size_t buffer_length;
- * status = psa_export_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length);
- * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...);
- * \endcode
- *
- * \param key_type  A supported key type.
- * \param key_bits  The size of the key in bits.
- *
- * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return
- *         a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
- *         psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key() will not fail with
- *         #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
- *         If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported,
- *         return either a sensible size or 0.
- *         If the parameters are not valid, the return value is unspecified.
- */
-#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits)                                              \
-    (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) :                         \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) :                                   \
-     (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) :     \
-     (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
-     (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) :     \
-     (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR(key_type) ? 2u * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type) ? 3u * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 1u : \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SRP_KEY_PAIR(key_type) ? PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE : \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) :      \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) :  \
-     0u)
-
-/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_export_public_key().
- *
- * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are
- * compile-time constants.
- *
- * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
- *          zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
- *          side effects.
- *
- * The following code illustrates how to allocate enough memory to export
- * a public key by querying the key type and size at runtime.
- * \code{c}
- * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
- * psa_status_t status;
- * status = psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes);
- * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...);
- * psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
- * size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes);
- * size_t buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits);
- * psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
- * uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size);
- * if (buffer == NULL) handle_error(...);
- * size_t buffer_length;
- * status = psa_export_public_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length);
- * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...);
- * \endcode
- *
- * \param key_type      A public key or key pair key type.
- * \param key_bits      The size of the key in bits.
- *
- * \return              If the parameters are valid and supported, return
- *                      a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
- *                      psa_export_public_key() will not fail with
- *                      #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
- *                      If the parameters are a valid combination that is not
- *                      supported, return either a sensible size or 0.
- *                      If the parameters are not valid,
- *                      the return value is unspecified.
- *
- *                      If the parameters are valid and supported,
- *                      return the same result as
- *                      #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(
- *                          \p #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(\p key_type),
- *                          \p key_bits).
- */
-#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits)                           \
-    (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P(key_type) ? 3u * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 1u : \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SRP(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \
-     0u)
-
-/** Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric key pair.
- *
- * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is
- * a sufficient buffer size when calling psa_export_key() to export any
- * asymmetric key pair, regardless of the exact key type and key size.
- *
- * See also #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits).
- */
-#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE            1
-
-#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \
-    (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) > \
-     PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE)
-#undef PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE
-#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE    \
-    PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)
-#endif
-#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \
-    (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \
-     PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE)
-#undef PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE
-#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE    \
-    PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)
-#endif
-#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \
-    (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \
-     PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE)
-#undef PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE
-#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE    \
-    PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS)
-#endif
-#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \
-    (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) > \
-     PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE)
-#undef PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE
-#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE    \
-    PSA_KEY_EXPORT_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)
-#endif
-#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_SRP_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \
-    (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_SRP_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \
-     PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE)
-#undef PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE
-#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE    \
-    PSA_KEY_EXPORT_SRP_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS)
-#endif
-
-/** Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric public key.
- *
- * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is
- * a sufficient buffer size when calling psa_export_key() or
- * psa_export_public_key() to export any asymmetric public key,
- * regardless of the exact key type and key size.
- *
- * See also #PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits).
- */
-#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE            1
-
-#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \
-    (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) > \
-     PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE)
-#undef PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE
-#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE    \
-    PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)
-#endif
-#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) && \
-    (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \
-     PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE)
-#undef PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE
-#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE    \
-    PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)
-#endif
-#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) && \
-    (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \
-     PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE)
-#undef PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE
-#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE    \
-    PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS)
-#endif
-#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY) && \
-    (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) > \
-     PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE)
-#undef PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE
-#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE    \
-    PSA_KEY_EXPORT_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)
-#endif
-#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY) && \
-    (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \
-     PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE)
-#undef PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE
-#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE    \
-    PSA_KEY_EXPORT_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS)
-#endif
-
-/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_raw_key_agreement().
- *
- * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are
- * compile-time constants.
- *
- * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
- *          zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
- *          side effects.
- *
- * See also #PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.
- *
- * \param key_type      A supported key type.
- * \param key_bits      The size of the key in bits.
- *
- * \return              If the parameters are valid and supported, return
- *                      a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
- *                      psa_raw_key_agreement() will not fail with
- *                      #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
- *                      If the parameters are a valid combination that
- *                      is not supported, return either a sensible size or 0.
- *                      If the parameters are not valid,
- *                      the return value is unspecified.
- */
-#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits)   \
-    ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) || \
-      PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(key_type)) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : 0u)
-
-/** Maximum size of the output from psa_raw_key_agreement().
- *
- * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is the
- * maximum size of the output any raw key agreement algorithm, in bytes.
- *
- * See also #PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits).
- */
-#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE       1
-
-#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) && \
-    (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) > PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE)
-#undef PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE
-#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE    PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)
-#endif
-#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) && \
-    (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) > PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE)
-#undef PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE
-#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE    PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS)
-#endif
-
-/** The default IV size for a cipher algorithm, in bytes.
- *
- * The IV that is generated as part of a call to #psa_cipher_encrypt() is always
- * the default IV length for the algorithm.
- *
- * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to
- * store the IV output from #psa_cipher_generate_iv() when using
- * a multi-part cipher operation.
- *
- * See also #PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE.
- *
- * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
- *          zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
- *          side effects.
- *
- * \param key_type  A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm \p alg.
- *
- * \param alg       A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
- *
- * \return The default IV size for the specified key type and algorithm.
- *         If the algorithm does not use an IV, return 0.
- *         If the key type or cipher algorithm is not recognized,
- *         or the parameters are incompatible, return 0.
- */
-#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg) \
-    (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) > 1 && \
-     ((alg) == PSA_ALG_CTR || \
-      (alg) == PSA_ALG_CFB || \
-      (alg) == PSA_ALG_OFB || \
-      (alg) == PSA_ALG_XTS || \
-      (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || \
-      (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) ? PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \
-     (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \
-     (alg) == PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ? 12u : \
-     (alg) == PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG ? 13u : \
-     0u)
-
-/** The maximum IV size for all supported cipher algorithms, in bytes.
- *
- * See also #PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH().
- */
-#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE 16u
-
-/** The maximum size of the output of psa_cipher_encrypt(), in bytes.
- *
- * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
- * that psa_cipher_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
- * Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of the output might be smaller.
- *
- * See also #PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length).
- *
- * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
- *          zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
- *          side effects.
- *
- * \param key_type      A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm
- *                      alg.
- * \param alg           A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
- * \param input_length  Size of the input in bytes.
- *
- * \return              A sufficient output size for the specified key type and
- *                      algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not
- *                      recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
- *                      return 0.
- */
-#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length)     \
-    (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ?                                         \
-     (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) != 0 ?                    \
-      PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), \
-                               (input_length) + 1u) +                   \
-      PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH((key_type), (alg)) : 0u) :                   \
-     (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ?                                          \
-      (input_length) + PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH((key_type), (alg)) :        \
-      0u))
-
-/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_encrypt(), for any of the
- *  supported key types and cipher algorithms.
- *
- * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
- * that psa_cipher_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
- *
- * See also #PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length).
- *
- * \param input_length  Size of the input in bytes.
- *
- */
-#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length)                \
-    (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE,          \
-                              (input_length) + 1u) +                    \
-     PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE)
-
-/** The maximum size of the output of psa_cipher_decrypt(), in bytes.
- *
- * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
- * that psa_cipher_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
- * Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of the output might be smaller.
- *
- * See also #PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length).
- *
- * \param key_type      A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm
- *                      alg.
- * \param alg           A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
- * \param input_length  Size of the input in bytes.
- *
- * \return              A sufficient output size for the specified key type and
- *                      algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not
- *                      recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
- *                      return 0.
- */
-#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length)     \
-    (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) &&                                          \
-     ((key_type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \
-     (input_length) :                                                   \
-     0u)
-
-/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_decrypt(), for any of the
- *  supported key types and cipher algorithms.
- *
- * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
- * that psa_cipher_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
- *
- * See also #PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length).
- *
- * \param input_length  Size of the input in bytes.
- */
-#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length)    \
-    (input_length)
-
-/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_update().
- *
- * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
- * that psa_cipher_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
- * The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call.
- *
- * See also #PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length).
- *
- * \param key_type      A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm
- *                      alg.
- * \param alg           A cipher algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
- * \param input_length  Size of the input in bytes.
- *
- * \return              A sufficient output size for the specified key type and
- *                      algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not
- *                      recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0.
- */
-#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length)      \
-    (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ?                                           \
-     (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) != 0 ?                    \
-      (((alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7      ||                              \
-        (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ||                              \
-        (alg) == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) ?                              \
-       PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), \
-                                input_length) :                         \
-       (input_length)) : 0u) :                                          \
-     0u)
-
-/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_update(), for any of the
- *  supported key types and cipher algorithms.
- *
- * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
- * that psa_cipher_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
- *
- * See also #PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length).
- *
- * \param input_length  Size of the input in bytes.
- */
-#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length)     \
-    (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, input_length))
-
-/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_cipher_finish().
- *
- * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is
- * guaranteed that psa_cipher_finish() will not fail due to an insufficient
- * ciphertext buffer size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in
- * any given call.
- *
- * See also #PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE().
- *
- * \param key_type      A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm
- *                      alg.
- * \param alg           A cipher algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
- * \return              A sufficient output size for the specified key type and
- *                      algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not
- *                      recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0.
- */
-#define PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg)    \
-    (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ?                           \
-     (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ?                        \
-      PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) :         \
-      0u) :                                             \
-     0u)
-
-/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_cipher_finish(), for any of the
- *  supported key types and cipher algorithms.
- *
- * See also #PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg).
- */
-#define PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE           \
-    (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE)
-
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_struct.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_struct.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 1cbbe40..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_struct.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,267 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2018-2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-/**
- * \file psa/crypto_struct.h
- *
- * \brief PSA cryptography module: structured type implementations
- *
- * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
- * include psa/crypto.h.
- *
- * This file contains the definitions of some data structures with
- * implementation-specific definitions.
- *
- * In implementations with isolation between the application and the
- * cryptography module, it is expected that the front-end and the back-end
- * would have different versions of this file.
- */
-
-#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H
-#define PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Note that the below structures are different from the decalrations in
- * mbed-crypto. This is because TF-M maintains 'front-end' and 'back-end'
- * versions of this header. In the front-end version, exported to NS
- * clients in interface/include/psa, a crypto operation is defined as an
- * opaque handle to a context in the Crypto service. The back-end
- * version, directly included from the mbed-crypto repo by the Crypto
- * service, contains the full definition of the operation structs.
- *
- * One of the functions of the Crypto service is to allocate the back-end
- * operation contexts in its own partition memory (in crypto_alloc.c),
- * and then do the mapping between front-end operation handles passed by
- * NS clients and the corresponding back-end operation contexts. The
- * advantage of doing it this way is that internal mbed-crypto state is never
- * exposed to the NS client.
- */
-
-struct psa_hash_operation_s
-{
-    uint32_t handle;
-};
-
-#define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT {0}
-static inline struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_init(void)
-{
-    const struct psa_hash_operation_s v = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
-    return v;
-}
-
-struct psa_mac_operation_s
-{
-    uint32_t handle;
-};
-
-#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT {0}
-static inline struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_init(void)
-{
-    const struct psa_mac_operation_s v = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
-    return v;
-}
-
-struct psa_cipher_operation_s
-{
-    uint32_t handle;
-};
-
-#define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT {0}
-static inline struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_init(void)
-{
-    const struct psa_cipher_operation_s v = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT;
-    return v;
-}
-
-struct psa_aead_operation_s
-{
-    uint32_t handle;
-};
-
-#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT {0}
-static inline struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_init(void)
-{
-    const struct psa_aead_operation_s v = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
-    return v;
-}
-
-struct psa_key_derivation_s
-{
-    uint32_t handle;
-};
-
-#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT {0}
-static inline struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_init(void)
-{
-    const struct psa_key_derivation_s v = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
-    return v;
-}
-
-/* The type used internally for key sizes.
- * Public interfaces use size_t, but internally we use a smaller type. */
-typedef uint16_t psa_key_bits_t;
-/* The maximum value of the type used to represent bit-sizes.
- * This is used to mark an invalid key size. */
-#define PSA_KEY_BITS_TOO_LARGE          ((psa_key_bits_t) -1)
-/* The maximum size of a key in bits.
- * Currently defined as the maximum that can be represented, rounded down
- * to a whole number of bytes.
- * This is an uncast value so that it can be used in preprocessor
- * conditionals. */
-#define PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS 0xfff8
-
-/* On the client side, only some key attributes are visible.
- * The server has a different definition of psa_key_attributes_s which
- * maintains more attributes.
- */
-#include "crypto_client_struct.h"
-struct psa_key_attributes_s {
-    struct psa_client_key_attributes_s client;
-};
-
-#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT {PSA_CLIENT_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT}
-
-static inline struct psa_key_attributes_s psa_key_attributes_init(void)
-{
-    const struct psa_key_attributes_s v = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
-    return v;
-}
-
-static inline void psa_set_key_id(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                                  mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key)
-{
-    psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = attributes->client.lifetime;
-
-    attributes->client.id = (psa_key_id_t)key;
-
-    if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime))
-    {
-        attributes->client.lifetime =
-            PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(
-                PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT,
-                PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime));
-    }
-}
-
-static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_get_key_id(
-    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
-{
-    return (mbedtls_svc_key_id_t)attributes->client.id;
-}
-
-static inline void psa_set_key_lifetime(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                                        psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime)
-{
-    attributes->client.lifetime = lifetime;
-    if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime))
-    {
-        attributes->client.id = 0;
-    }
-}
-
-static inline psa_key_lifetime_t psa_get_key_lifetime(
-    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
-{
-    return attributes->client.lifetime;
-}
-
-static inline void psa_extend_key_usage_flags(psa_key_usage_t *usage_flags)
-{
-    if (*usage_flags & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) {
-        *usage_flags |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE;
-    }
-
-    if (*usage_flags & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH) {
-        *usage_flags |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE;
-    }
-}
-
-static inline void psa_set_key_usage_flags(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                                           psa_key_usage_t usage_flags)
-{
-    psa_extend_key_usage_flags(&usage_flags);
-    attributes->client.usage = usage_flags;
-}
-
-static inline psa_key_usage_t psa_get_key_usage_flags(
-    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
-{
-    return attributes->client.usage;
-}
-
-static inline void psa_set_key_algorithm(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                                         psa_algorithm_t alg)
-{
-    attributes->client.alg = alg;
-}
-
-static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_algorithm(
-    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
-{
-    return attributes->client.alg;
-}
-
-static inline void psa_set_key_type(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                                    psa_key_type_t type)
-{
-    attributes->client.type = type;
-}
-
-static inline psa_key_type_t psa_get_key_type(
-    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
-{
-    return attributes->client.type;
-}
-
-static inline void psa_set_key_bits(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                                    size_t bits)
-{
-    if (bits > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) {
-        attributes->client.bits = PSA_KEY_BITS_TOO_LARGE;
-    } else {
-        attributes->client.bits = bits;
-    }
-}
-
-static inline size_t psa_get_key_bits(
-    const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
-{
-    return attributes->client.bits;
-}
-
-struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s {
-    psa_algorithm_t algorithm;
-    psa_pake_primitive_t primitive;
-    uint32_t key_confirmation;
-};
-
-#define PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT {PSA_ALG_NONE, 0, 0}
-static inline struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(void)
-{
-    const struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s v = PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT;
-    return v;
-}
-
-struct psa_pake_operation_s {
-    uint32_t handle;
-};
-
-#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT {0}
-static inline struct psa_pake_operation_s psa_pake_operation_init(void)
-{
-    const struct psa_pake_operation_s v = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT;
-    return v;
-}
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_types.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_types.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 01feaeb..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_types.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,500 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2018-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-/**
- * \file psa/crypto_types.h
- *
- * \brief PSA cryptography module: type aliases.
- *
- * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
- * include psa/crypto.h. Drivers must include the appropriate driver
- * header file.
- *
- * This file contains portable definitions of integral types for properties
- * of cryptographic keys, designations of cryptographic algorithms, and
- * error codes returned by the library.
- *
- * This header file does not declare any function.
- */
-
-#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H
-#define PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE)
-#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE
-#else
-#include "crypto_platform.h"
-#endif
-
-#include <stdint.h>
-
-/** \defgroup error Error codes
- * @{
- */
-
-/**
- * \brief Function return status.
- *
- * This is either #PSA_SUCCESS (which is zero), indicating success,
- * or a small negative value indicating that an error occurred. Errors are
- * encoded as one of the \c PSA_ERROR_xxx values defined here. */
-/* If #PSA_SUCCESS is already defined, it means that #psa_status_t
- * is also defined in an external header, so prevent its multiple
- * definition.
- */
-#ifndef PSA_SUCCESS
-typedef int32_t psa_status_t;
-#endif
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types
- * @{
- */
-
-/** \brief Encoding of a key type.
- *
- * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called
- * `PSA_KEY_TYPE_xxx`.
- *
- * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
- *       Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
- *       format version and providing a translation when reading the old
- *       format.
- */
-typedef uint16_t psa_key_type_t;
-
-/** The type of PSA elliptic curve family identifiers.
- *
- * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called
- * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`.
- *
- * The curve identifier is required to create an ECC key using the
- * PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR() or PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY()
- * macros.
- *
- * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff.
- * Vendors who define additional families must use an encoding in this range.
- *
- * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
- *       Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
- *       format version and providing a translation when reading the old
- *       format.
- */
-typedef uint8_t psa_ecc_family_t;
-
-/** The type of PSA Diffie-Hellman group family identifiers.
- *
- * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called
- * `PSA_DH_FAMILY_xxx`.
- *
- * The group identifier is required to create a Diffie-Hellman key using the
- * PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR() or PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY()
- * macros.
- *
- * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff.
- * Vendors who define additional families must use an encoding in this range.
- *
- * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
- *       Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
- *       format version and providing a translation when reading the old
- *       format.
- */
-typedef uint8_t psa_dh_family_t;
-
-/** \brief Encoding of a cryptographic algorithm.
- *
- * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called
- * `PSA_ALG_xxx`.
- *
- * For algorithms that can be applied to multiple key types, this type
- * does not encode the key type. For example, for symmetric ciphers
- * based on a block cipher, #psa_algorithm_t encodes the block cipher
- * mode and the padding mode while the block cipher itself is encoded
- * via #psa_key_type_t.
- *
- * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
- *       Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
- *       format version and providing a translation when reading the old
- *       format.
- */
-typedef uint32_t psa_algorithm_t;
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes
- * @{
- */
-
-/** Encoding of key lifetimes.
- *
- * The lifetime of a key indicates where it is stored and what system actions
- * may create and destroy it.
- *
- * Lifetime values have the following structure:
- * - Bits 0-7 (#PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(\c lifetime)):
- *   persistence level. This value indicates what device management
- *   actions can cause it to be destroyed. In particular, it indicates
- *   whether the key is _volatile_ or _persistent_.
- *   See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information.
- * - Bits 8-31 (#PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(\c lifetime)):
- *   location indicator. This value indicates which part of the system
- *   has access to the key material and can perform operations using the key.
- *   See ::psa_key_location_t for more information.
- *
- * Volatile keys are automatically destroyed when the application instance
- * terminates or on a power reset of the device. Persistent keys are
- * preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an
- * integration-specific device management event occurs (for example,
- * a factory reset).
- *
- * Persistent keys have a key identifier of type #mbedtls_svc_key_id_t.
- * This identifier remains valid throughout the lifetime of the key,
- * even if the application instance that created the key terminates.
- * The application can call psa_open_key() to open a persistent key that
- * it created previously.
- *
- * The default lifetime of a key is #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. The lifetime
- * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT is supported if persistent storage is
- * available. Other lifetime values may be supported depending on the
- * library configuration.
- *
- * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called
- * `PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_xxx`.
- *
- * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
- *       Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
- *       format version and providing a translation when reading the old
- *       format.
- */
-typedef uint32_t psa_key_lifetime_t;
-
-/** Encoding of key persistence levels.
- *
- * What distinguishes different persistence levels is what device management
- * events may cause keys to be destroyed. _Volatile_ keys are destroyed
- * by a power reset. Persistent keys may be destroyed by events such as
- * a transfer of ownership or a factory reset. What management events
- * actually affect persistent keys at different levels is outside the
- * scope of the PSA Cryptography specification.
- *
- * The PSA Cryptography specification defines the following values of
- * persistence levels:
- * - \c 0 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE: volatile key.
- *   A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when
- *   the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key
- *   is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device.
- * - \c 1 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT:
- *   persistent key with a default lifetime.
- * - \c 2-254: currently not supported by Mbed TLS.
- * - \c 255 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY:
- *   read-only or write-once key.
- *   A key with this persistence level cannot be destroyed.
- *   Mbed TLS does not currently offer a way to create such keys, but
- *   integrations of Mbed TLS can use it for built-in keys that the
- *   application cannot modify (for example, a hardware unique key (HUK)).
- *
- * \note Key persistence levels are 8-bit values. Key management
- *       interfaces operate on lifetimes (type ::psa_key_lifetime_t) which
- *       encode the persistence as the lower 8 bits of a 32-bit value.
- *
- * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
- *       Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
- *       format version and providing a translation when reading the old
- *       format.
- */
-typedef uint8_t psa_key_persistence_t;
-
-/** Encoding of key location indicators.
- *
- * If an integration of Mbed TLS can make calls to external
- * cryptoprocessors such as secure elements, the location of a key
- * indicates which secure element performs the operations on the key.
- * Depending on the design of the secure element, the key
- * material may be stored either in the secure element, or
- * in wrapped (encrypted) form alongside the key metadata in the
- * primary local storage.
- *
- * The PSA Cryptography API specification defines the following values of
- * location indicators:
- * - \c 0: primary local storage.
- *   This location is always available.
- *   The primary local storage is typically the same storage area that
- *   contains the key metadata.
- * - \c 1: primary secure element.
- *   Integrations of Mbed TLS should support this value if there is a secure
- *   element attached to the operating environment.
- *   As a guideline, secure elements may provide higher resistance against
- *   side channel and physical attacks than the primary local storage, but may
- *   have restrictions on supported key types, sizes, policies and operations
- *   and may have different performance characteristics.
- * - \c 2-0x7fffff: other locations defined by a PSA specification.
- *   The PSA Cryptography API does not currently assign any meaning to these
- *   locations, but future versions of that specification or other PSA
- *   specifications may do so.
- * - \c 0x800000-0xffffff: vendor-defined locations.
- *   No PSA specification will assign a meaning to locations in this range.
- *
- * \note Key location indicators are 24-bit values. Key management
- *       interfaces operate on lifetimes (type ::psa_key_lifetime_t) which
- *       encode the location as the upper 24 bits of a 32-bit value.
- *
- * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
- *       Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
- *       format version and providing a translation when reading the old
- *       format.
- */
-typedef uint32_t psa_key_location_t;
-
-/** Encoding of identifiers of persistent keys.
- *
- * - Applications may freely choose key identifiers in the range
- *   #PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN to #PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX.
- * - The implementation may define additional key identifiers in the range
- *   #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN to #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX.
- * - 0 is reserved as an invalid key identifier.
- * - Key identifiers outside these ranges are reserved for future use.
- *
- * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
- *       Any changes to how values are allocated must require careful
- *       consideration to allow backward compatibility.
- */
-typedef uint32_t psa_key_id_t;
-
-/** Encoding of key identifiers as seen inside the PSA Crypto implementation.
- *
- * When PSA Crypto is built as a library inside an application, this type
- * is identical to #psa_key_id_t. When PSA Crypto is built as a service
- * that can store keys on behalf of multiple clients, this type
- * encodes the #psa_key_id_t value seen by each client application as
- * well as extra information that identifies the client that owns
- * the key.
- *
- * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
- *       Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
- *       format version and providing a translation when reading the old
- *       format.
- */
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER)
-typedef psa_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_t;
-
-#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */
-/* Define the MBEDTLS_PRIVATE macro. */
-#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
-/* Implementation-specific: The Mbed Cryptography library can be built as
- * part of a multi-client service that exposes the PSA Cryptography API in each
- * client and encodes the client identity in the key identifier argument of
- * functions such as psa_open_key().
- */
-typedef struct {
-    psa_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id);
-    mbedtls_key_owner_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner);
-} mbedtls_svc_key_id_t;
-
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup policy Key policies
- * @{
- */
-
-/** \brief Encoding of permitted usage on a key.
- *
- * Values of this type are generally constructed as bitwise-ors of macros
- * called `PSA_KEY_USAGE_xxx`.
- *
- * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
- *       Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
- *       format version and providing a translation when reading the old
- *       format.
- */
-typedef uint32_t psa_key_usage_t;
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup attributes Key attributes
- * @{
- */
-
-/** The type of a structure containing key attributes.
- *
- * This is an opaque structure that can represent the metadata of a key
- * object. Metadata that can be stored in attributes includes:
- * - The location of the key in storage, indicated by its key identifier
- *   and its lifetime.
- * - The key's policy, comprising usage flags and a specification of
- *   the permitted algorithm(s).
- * - Information about the key itself: the key type and its size.
- * - Additional implementation-defined attributes.
- *
- * The actual key material is not considered an attribute of a key.
- * Key attributes do not contain information that is generally considered
- * highly confidential.
- *
- * An attribute structure works like a simple data structure where each function
- * `psa_set_key_xxx` sets a field and the corresponding function
- * `psa_get_key_xxx` retrieves the value of the corresponding field.
- * However, a future version of the library  may report values that are
- * equivalent to the original one, but have a different encoding. Invalid
- * values may be mapped to different, also invalid values.
- *
- * An attribute structure may contain references to auxiliary resources,
- * for example pointers to allocated memory or indirect references to
- * pre-calculated values. In order to free such resources, the application
- * must call psa_reset_key_attributes(). As an exception, calling
- * psa_reset_key_attributes() on an attribute structure is optional if
- * the structure has only been modified by the following functions
- * since it was initialized or last reset with psa_reset_key_attributes():
- * - psa_set_key_id()
- * - psa_set_key_lifetime()
- * - psa_set_key_type()
- * - psa_set_key_bits()
- * - psa_set_key_usage_flags()
- * - psa_set_key_algorithm()
- *
- * Before calling any function on a key attribute structure, the application
- * must initialize it by any of the following means:
- * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
- *   memset(&attributes, 0, sizeof(attributes));
- *   \endcode
- * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {0};
- *   \endcode
- * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT,
- *   for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
- *   \endcode
- * - Assign the result of the function psa_key_attributes_init()
- *   to the structure, for example:
- *   \code
- *   psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
- *   attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
- *   \endcode
- *
- * A freshly initialized attribute structure contains the following
- * values:
- *
- * - lifetime: #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE.
- * - key identifier: 0 (which is not a valid key identifier).
- * - type: \c 0 (meaning that the type is unspecified).
- * - key size: \c 0 (meaning that the size is unspecified).
- * - usage flags: \c 0 (which allows no usage except exporting a public key).
- * - algorithm: \c 0 (which allows no cryptographic usage, but allows
- *   exporting).
- *
- * A typical sequence to create a key is as follows:
- * -# Create and initialize an attribute structure.
- * -# If the key is persistent, call psa_set_key_id().
- *    Also call psa_set_key_lifetime() to place the key in a non-default
- *    location.
- * -# Set the key policy with psa_set_key_usage_flags() and
- *    psa_set_key_algorithm().
- * -# Set the key type with psa_set_key_type().
- *    Skip this step if copying an existing key with psa_copy_key().
- * -# When generating a random key with psa_generate_key() or deriving a key
- *    with psa_key_derivation_output_key(), set the desired key size with
- *    psa_set_key_bits().
- * -# Call a key creation function: psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(),
- *    psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key(). This function reads
- *    the attribute structure, creates a key with these attributes, and
- *    outputs a key identifier to the newly created key.
- * -# The attribute structure is now no longer necessary.
- *    You may call psa_reset_key_attributes(), although this is optional
- *    with the workflow presented here because the attributes currently
- *    defined in this specification do not require any additional resources
- *    beyond the structure itself.
- *
- * A typical sequence to query a key's attributes is as follows:
- * -# Call psa_get_key_attributes().
- * -# Call `psa_get_key_xxx` functions to retrieve the attribute(s) that
- *    you are interested in.
- * -# Call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free any resources that may be
- *    used by the attribute structure.
- *
- * Once a key has been created, it is impossible to change its attributes.
- */
-typedef struct psa_key_attributes_s psa_key_attributes_t;
-
-
-#ifndef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
-/* Mbed TLS defines this type in crypto_types.h because it is also
- * visible to applications through an implementation-specific extension.
- * For the PSA Cryptography specification, this type is only visible
- * via crypto_se_driver.h.
- */
-typedef uint64_t psa_key_slot_number_t;
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
-#endif /* !__DOXYGEN_ONLY__ */
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup derivation Key derivation
- * @{
- */
-
-/** \brief Encoding of the step of a key derivation.
- *
- * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called
- * `PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx`.
- */
-typedef uint16_t psa_key_derivation_step_t;
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** The type of the data structure for PAKE cipher suites.
- *
- * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
- * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
- * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice.
- */
-typedef struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s psa_pake_cipher_suite_t;
-
-/** Encoding of the type of the PAKE's primitive.
-*
-* Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff.
-* Vendors who define additional types must use an encoding in this range.
-*
-* For more information see the documentation of individual
-* \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants.
-*/
-typedef uint8_t psa_pake_primitive_type_t;
-
-/** \brief Encoding of the family of the primitive associated with the PAKE.
-*
-* For more information see the documentation of individual
-* \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants.
-*/
-typedef uint8_t psa_pake_family_t;
-
-/** \brief Encoding of the primitive associated with the PAKE.
-*
-* For more information see the documentation of the #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE macro.
-*/
-typedef uint32_t psa_pake_primitive_t;
-
-/** \brief Encoding of the application role of PAKE
- *
- * Encodes the application's role in the algorithm being executed. For more
- * information see the documentation of individual \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_XXX
- * constants.
- */
-typedef uint8_t psa_pake_role_t;
-
-/** Encoding of input and output indicators for PAKE.
- *
- * Some PAKE algorithms need to exchange more data than just a single key share.
- * This type is for encoding additional input and output data for such
- * algorithms.
- */
-typedef uint8_t psa_pake_step_t;
-
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_values.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_values.h
deleted file mode 100644
index a2b21ae..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_values.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2793 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2018-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-/**
- * \file psa/crypto_values.h
- *
- * \brief PSA cryptography module: macros to build and analyze integer values.
- *
- * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
- * include psa/crypto.h. Drivers must include the appropriate driver
- * header file.
- *
- * This file contains portable definitions of macros to build and analyze
- * values of integral types that encode properties of cryptographic keys,
- * designations of cryptographic algorithms, and error codes returned by
- * the library.
- *
- * Note that many of the constants defined in this file are embedded in
- * the persistent key store, as part of key metadata (including usage
- * policies). As a consequence, they must not be changed (unless the storage
- * format version changes).
- *
- * This header file only defines preprocessor macros.
- */
-
-#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H
-#define PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H
-
-/** \defgroup error Error codes
- * @{
- */
-
-/* PSA error codes */
-
-/* Error codes are standardized across PSA domains (framework, crypto, storage,
- * etc.). Do not change the values in this section or even the expansions
- * of each macro: it must be possible to `#include` both this header
- * and some other PSA component's headers in the same C source,
- * which will lead to duplicate definitions of the `PSA_SUCCESS` and
- * `PSA_ERROR_xxx` macros, which is ok if and only if the macros expand
- * to the same sequence of tokens.
- *
- * If you must add a new
- * value, check with the Arm PSA framework group to pick one that other
- * domains aren't already using. */
-
-/* Tell uncrustify not to touch the constant definitions, otherwise
- * it might change the spacing to something that is not PSA-compliant
- * (e.g. adding a space after casts).
- *
- * *INDENT-OFF*
- */
-
-/** The action was completed successfully. */
-#ifndef PSA_SUCCESS
-#define PSA_SUCCESS ((psa_status_t)0)
-#endif
-
-/** An error occurred that does not correspond to any defined
- * failure cause.
- *
- * Implementations may use this error code if none of the other standard
- * error codes are applicable. */
-#define PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR         ((psa_status_t)-132)
-
-/** The requested operation or a parameter is not supported
- * by this implementation.
- *
- * Implementations should return this error code when an enumeration
- * parameter such as a key type, algorithm, etc. is not recognized.
- * If a combination of parameters is recognized and identified as
- * not valid, return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT instead. */
-#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED         ((psa_status_t)-134)
-
-/** The requested action is denied by a policy.
- *
- * Implementations should return this error code when the parameters
- * are recognized as valid and supported, and a policy explicitly
- * denies the requested operation.
- *
- * If a subset of the parameters of a function call identify a
- * forbidden operation, and another subset of the parameters are
- * not valid or not supported, it is unspecified whether the function
- * returns #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED or
- * #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. */
-#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED         ((psa_status_t)-133)
-
-/** An output buffer is too small.
- *
- * Applications can call the \c PSA_xxx_SIZE macro listed in the function
- * description to determine a sufficient buffer size.
- *
- * Implementations should preferably return this error code only
- * in cases when performing the operation with a larger output
- * buffer would succeed. However implementations may return this
- * error if a function has invalid or unsupported parameters in addition
- * to the parameters that determine the necessary output buffer size. */
-#define PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL      ((psa_status_t)-138)
-
-/** Asking for an item that already exists
- *
- * Implementations should return this error, when attempting
- * to write an item (like a key) that already exists. */
-#define PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS        ((psa_status_t)-139)
-
-/** Asking for an item that doesn't exist
- *
- * Implementations should return this error, if a requested item (like
- * a key) does not exist. */
-#define PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST        ((psa_status_t)-140)
-
-/** The requested action cannot be performed in the current state.
- *
- * Multipart operations return this error when one of the
- * functions is called out of sequence. Refer to the function
- * descriptions for permitted sequencing of functions.
- *
- * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate
- * that a key either exists or not,
- * but shall instead return #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS or #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
- * as applicable.
- *
- * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a
- * key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * instead. */
-#define PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE             ((psa_status_t)-137)
-
-/** The parameters passed to the function are invalid.
- *
- * Implementations may return this error any time a parameter or
- * combination of parameters are recognized as invalid.
- *
- * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a
- * key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
- * instead.
- */
-#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT      ((psa_status_t)-135)
-
-/** There is not enough runtime memory.
- *
- * If the action is carried out across multiple security realms, this
- * error can refer to available memory in any of the security realms. */
-#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY   ((psa_status_t)-141)
-
-/** There is not enough persistent storage.
- *
- * Functions that modify the key storage return this error code if
- * there is insufficient storage space on the host media. In addition,
- * many functions that do not otherwise access storage may return this
- * error code if the implementation requires a mandatory log entry for
- * the requested action and the log storage space is full. */
-#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE  ((psa_status_t)-142)
-
-/** There was a communication failure inside the implementation.
- *
- * This can indicate a communication failure between the application
- * and an external cryptoprocessor or between the cryptoprocessor and
- * an external volatile or persistent memory. A communication failure
- * may be transient or permanent depending on the cause.
- *
- * \warning If a function returns this error, it is undetermined
- * whether the requested action has completed or not. Implementations
- * should return #PSA_SUCCESS on successful completion whenever
- * possible, however functions may return #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
- * if the requested action was completed successfully in an external
- * cryptoprocessor but there was a breakdown of communication before
- * the cryptoprocessor could report the status to the application.
- */
-#define PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-145)
-
-/** There was a storage failure that may have led to data loss.
- *
- * This error indicates that some persistent storage is corrupted.
- * It should not be used for a corruption of volatile memory
- * (use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED), for a communication error
- * between the cryptoprocessor and its external storage (use
- * #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE), or when the storage is
- * in a valid state but is full (use #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE).
- *
- * Note that a storage failure does not indicate that any data that was
- * previously read is invalid. However this previously read data may no
- * longer be readable from storage.
- *
- * When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure
- * the global integrity of the keystore. Depending on the global
- * integrity guarantees offered by the implementation, access to other
- * data may or may not fail even if the data is still readable but
- * its integrity cannot be guaranteed.
- *
- * Implementations should only use this error code to report a
- * permanent storage corruption. However application writers should
- * keep in mind that transient errors while reading the storage may be
- * reported using this error code. */
-#define PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE       ((psa_status_t)-146)
-
-/** A hardware failure was detected.
- *
- * A hardware failure may be transient or permanent depending on the
- * cause. */
-#define PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE      ((psa_status_t)-147)
-
-/** A tampering attempt was detected.
- *
- * If an application receives this error code, there is no guarantee
- * that previously accessed or computed data was correct and remains
- * confidential. Applications should not perform any security function
- * and should enter a safe failure state.
- *
- * Implementations may return this error code if they detect an invalid
- * state that cannot happen during normal operation and that indicates
- * that the implementation's security guarantees no longer hold. Depending
- * on the implementation architecture and on its security and safety goals,
- * the implementation may forcibly terminate the application.
- *
- * This error code is intended as a last resort when a security breach
- * is detected and it is unsure whether the keystore data is still
- * protected. Implementations shall only return this error code
- * to report an alarm from a tampering detector, to indicate that
- * the confidentiality of stored data can no longer be guaranteed,
- * or to indicate that the integrity of previously returned data is now
- * considered compromised. Implementations shall not use this error code
- * to indicate a hardware failure that merely makes it impossible to
- * perform the requested operation (use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE,
- * #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE, #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE,
- * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY or other applicable error code
- * instead).
- *
- * This error indicates an attack against the application. Implementations
- * shall not return this error code as a consequence of the behavior of
- * the application itself. */
-#define PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED    ((psa_status_t)-151)
-
-/** There is not enough entropy to generate random data needed
- * for the requested action.
- *
- * This error indicates a failure of a hardware random generator.
- * Application writers should note that this error can be returned not
- * only by functions whose purpose is to generate random data, such
- * as key, IV or nonce generation, but also by functions that execute
- * an algorithm with a randomized result, as well as functions that
- * use randomization of intermediate computations as a countermeasure
- * to certain attacks.
- *
- * Implementations should avoid returning this error after psa_crypto_init()
- * has succeeded. Implementations should generate sufficient
- * entropy during initialization and subsequently use a cryptographically
- * secure pseudorandom generator (PRNG). However implementations may return
- * this error at any time if a policy requires the PRNG to be reseeded
- * during normal operation. */
-#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY  ((psa_status_t)-148)
-
-/** The signature, MAC or hash is incorrect.
- *
- * Verification functions return this error if the verification
- * calculations completed successfully, and the value to be verified
- * was determined to be incorrect.
- *
- * If the value to verify has an invalid size, implementations may return
- * either #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE. */
-#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE     ((psa_status_t)-149)
-
-/** The decrypted padding is incorrect.
- *
- * \warning In some protocols, when decrypting data, it is essential that
- * the behavior of the application does not depend on whether the padding
- * is correct, down to precise timing. Applications should prefer
- * protocols that use authenticated encryption rather than plain
- * encryption. If the application must perform a decryption of
- * unauthenticated data, the application writer should take care not
- * to reveal whether the padding is invalid.
- *
- * Implementations should strive to make valid and invalid padding
- * as close as possible to indistinguishable to an external observer.
- * In particular, the timing of a decryption operation should not
- * depend on the validity of the padding. */
-#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING       ((psa_status_t)-150)
-
-/** Return this error when there's insufficient data when attempting
- * to read from a resource. */
-#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA     ((psa_status_t)-143)
-
-/** The key identifier is not valid. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`.
- */
-#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE        ((psa_status_t)-136)
-
-/** Stored data has been corrupted.
- *
- * This error indicates that some persistent storage has suffered corruption.
- * It does not indicate the following situations, which have specific error
- * codes:
- *
- * - A corruption of volatile memory - use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED.
- * - A communication error between the cryptoprocessor and its external
- *   storage - use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE.
- * - When the storage is in a valid state but is full - use
- *   #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE.
- * - When the storage fails for other reasons - use
- *   #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE.
- * - When the stored data is not valid - use #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID.
- *
- * \note A storage corruption does not indicate that any data that was
- * previously read is invalid. However this previously read data might no
- * longer be readable from storage.
- *
- * When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure the
- * global integrity of the keystore.
- */
-#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT          ((psa_status_t)-152)
-
-/** Data read from storage is not valid for the implementation.
- *
- * This error indicates that some data read from storage does not have a valid
- * format. It does not indicate the following situations, which have specific
- * error codes:
- *
- * - When the storage or stored data is corrupted - use #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
- * - When the storage fails for other reasons - use #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
- * - An invalid argument to the API - use #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
- *
- * This error is typically a result of either storage corruption on a
- * cleartext storage backend, or an attempt to read data that was
- * written by an incompatible version of the library.
- */
-#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID          ((psa_status_t)-153)
-
-/** The function that returns this status is defined as interruptible and
- *  still has work to do, thus the user should call the function again with the
- *  same operation context until it either returns #PSA_SUCCESS or any other
- *  error. This is not an error per se, more a notification of status.
- */
-#define PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE           ((psa_status_t)-248)
-
-/* *INDENT-ON* */
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types
- * @{
- */
-
-/* Note that key type values, including ECC family and DH group values, are
- * embedded in the persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a
- * consequence, they must not be changed (unless the storage format version
- * changes).
- */
-
-/** An invalid key type value.
- *
- * Zero is not the encoding of any key type.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE                           ((psa_key_type_t) 0x0000)
-
-/** Vendor-defined key type flag.
- *
- * Key types defined by this standard will never have the
- * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set. Vendors who define additional key types
- * must use an encoding with the #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should
- * respect the bitwise structure used by standard encodings whenever practical.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG                    ((psa_key_type_t) 0x8000)
-
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK                  ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7000)
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW                   ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1000)
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC             ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2000)
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY            ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4000)
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR              ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7000)
-
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR             ((psa_key_type_t) 0x3000)
-
-/** Whether a key type is vendor-defined.
- *
- * See also #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(type) \
-    (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0)
-
-/** Whether a key type is an unstructured array of bytes.
- *
- * This encompasses both symmetric keys and non-key data.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(type) \
-    (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW || \
-     ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC)
-
-/** Whether a key type is asymmetric: either a key pair or a public key. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(type)                                \
-    (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK                               \
-      & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) ==                            \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY)
-/** Whether a key type is the public part of a key pair. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type)                                \
-    (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY)
-/** Whether a key type is a key pair containing a private part and a public
- * part. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)                                   \
-    (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR)
-/** The key pair type corresponding to a public key type.
- *
- * You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged.
- *
- * \param type      A public key type or key pair type.
- *
- * \return          The corresponding key pair type.
- *                  If \p type is not a public key or a key pair,
- *                  the return value is undefined.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY(type)        \
-    ((type) | PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR)
-/** The public key type corresponding to a key pair type.
- *
- * You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged.
- *
- * \param type      A public key type or key pair type.
- *
- * \return          The corresponding public key type.
- *                  If \p type is not a public key or a key pair,
- *                  the return value is undefined.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type)        \
-    ((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR)
-
-/** Raw data.
- *
- * A "key" of this type cannot be used for any cryptographic operation.
- * Applications may use this type to store arbitrary data in the keystore. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA                       ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1001)
-
-/** HMAC key.
- *
- * The key policy determines which underlying hash algorithm the key can be
- * used for.
- *
- * HMAC keys should generally have the same size as the underlying hash.
- * This size can be calculated with #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where
- * \c alg is the HMAC algorithm or the underlying hash algorithm. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC                           ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1100)
-
-/** A secret for key derivation.
- *
- * This key type is for high-entropy secrets only. For low-entropy secrets,
- * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD should be used instead.
- *
- * These keys can be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or
- * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input of key derivation algorithms.
- *
- * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key
- * can be used for.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE                         ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1200)
-
-/** A low-entropy secret for password hashing or key derivation.
- *
- * This key type is suitable for passwords and passphrases which are typically
- * intended to be memorizable by humans, and have a low entropy relative to
- * their size. It can be used for randomly generated or derived keys with
- * maximum or near-maximum entropy, but #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE is more suitable
- * for such keys. It is not suitable for passwords with extremely low entropy,
- * such as numerical PINs.
- *
- * These keys can be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input of
- * key derivation algorithms. Algorithms that accept such an input were
- * designed to accept low-entropy secret and are known as password hashing or
- * key stretching algorithms.
- *
- * These keys cannot be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET input of
- * key derivation algorithms, as the algorithms that take such an input expect
- * it to be high-entropy.
- *
- * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key can be
- * used for, among the permissible subset defined above.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD                       ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1203)
-
-/** A secret value that can be used to verify a password hash.
- *
- * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key
- * can be used for, among the same permissible subset as for
- * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH                  ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1205)
-
-/** A secret value that can be used in when computing a password hash.
- *
- * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key
- * can be used for, among the subset of algorithms that can use pepper.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER                         ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1206)
-
-/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the AES block cipher.
- *
- * The size of the key can be 16 bytes (AES-128), 24 bytes (AES-192) or
- * 32 bytes (AES-256).
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES                            ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2400)
-
-/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the
- * ARIA block cipher. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA                           ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2406)
-
-/** Key for a cipher or MAC algorithm based on DES or 3DES (Triple-DES).
- *
- * The size of the key can be 64 bits (single DES), 128 bits (2-key 3DES) or
- * 192 bits (3-key 3DES).
- *
- * Note that single DES and 2-key 3DES are weak and strongly
- * deprecated and should only be used to decrypt legacy data. 3-key 3DES
- * is weak and deprecated and should only be used in legacy protocols.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES                            ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2301)
-
-/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the
- * Camellia block cipher. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA                       ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2403)
-
-/** Key for the ChaCha20 stream cipher or the Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm.
- *
- * ChaCha20 and the ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction are defined in RFC 7539.
- *
- * \note For ChaCha20 and ChaCha20_Poly1305, Mbed TLS only supports
- *       12-byte nonces.
- *
- * \note For ChaCha20, the initial counter value is 0. To encrypt or decrypt
- *       with the initial counter value 1, you can process and discard a
- *       64-byte block before the real data.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20                       ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2004)
-
-/** RSA public key.
- *
- * The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY                 ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4001)
-/** RSA key pair (private and public key).
- *
- * The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR                   ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7001)
-/** Whether a key type is an RSA key (pair or public-only). */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)                                       \
-    (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
-
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE            ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4100)
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE              ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7100)
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK                 ((psa_key_type_t) 0x00ff)
-/** Elliptic curve key pair.
- *
- * The size of an elliptic curve key is the bit size associated with the curve,
- * i.e. the bit size of *q* for a curve over a field *F<sub>q</sub>*.
- * See the documentation of `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` curve families for details.
- *
- * \param curve     A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that
- *                  identifies the ECC curve to be used.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve)         \
-    (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (curve))
-/** Elliptic curve public key.
- *
- * The size of an elliptic curve public key is the same as the corresponding
- * private key (see #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR and the documentation of
- * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` curve families).
- *
- * \param curve     A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that
- *                  identifies the ECC curve to be used.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve)              \
-    (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (curve))
-
-/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key (pair or public-only). */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type)                                       \
-    ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) &                        \
-      ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
-/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key pair. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type)                               \
-    (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) ==                         \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE)
-/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve public key. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(type)                            \
-    (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) ==                         \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
-
-/** Extract the curve from an elliptic curve key type. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type)                        \
-    ((psa_ecc_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) ?             \
-                         ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) : \
-                         0))
-
-/** Check if the curve of given family is Weierstrass elliptic curve. */
-#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_IS_WEIERSTRASS(family) ((family & 0xc0) == 0)
-
-/** SEC Koblitz curves over prime fields.
- *
- * This family comprises the following curves:
- * secp192k1, secp224k1, secp256k1.
- * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
- * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
- * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
- */
-#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1           ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x17)
-
-/** SEC random curves over prime fields.
- *
- * This family comprises the following curves:
- * secp192k1, secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1.
- * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
- * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
- * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
- */
-#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1           ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x12)
-/* SECP160R2 (SEC2 v1, obsolete) */
-#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2           ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x1b)
-
-/** SEC Koblitz curves over binary fields.
- *
- * This family comprises the following curves:
- * sect163k1, sect233k1, sect239k1, sect283k1, sect409k1, sect571k1.
- * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
- * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
- * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
- */
-#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1           ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x27)
-
-/** SEC random curves over binary fields.
- *
- * This family comprises the following curves:
- * sect163r1, sect233r1, sect283r1, sect409r1, sect571r1.
- * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
- * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
- * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
- */
-#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1           ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x22)
-
-/** SEC additional random curves over binary fields.
- *
- * This family comprises the following curve:
- * sect163r2.
- * It is defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
- * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
- * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
- */
-#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2           ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x2b)
-
-/** Brainpool P random curves.
- *
- * This family comprises the following curves:
- * brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP256r1,
- * brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1.
- * It is defined in RFC 5639.
- */
-#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1    ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x30)
-
-/** Curve25519 and Curve448.
- *
- * This family comprises the following Montgomery curves:
- * - 255-bit: Bernstein et al.,
- *   _Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records_, LNCS 3958, 2006.
- *   The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X25519 when used with this curve.
- * - 448-bit: Hamburg,
- *   _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015.
- *   The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X448 when used with this curve.
- */
-#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY        ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x41)
-
-/** The twisted Edwards curves Ed25519 and Ed448.
- *
- * These curves are suitable for EdDSA (#PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA for both curves,
- * #PSA_ALG_ED25519PH for the 255-bit curve,
- * #PSA_ALG_ED448PH for the 448-bit curve).
- *
- * This family comprises the following twisted Edwards curves:
- * - 255-bit: Edwards25519, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent
- *   to Curve25519.
- *   Bernstein et al., _Twisted Edwards curves_, Africacrypt 2008.
- * - 448-bit: Edwards448, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent
- *   to Curve448.
- *   Hamburg, _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015.
- */
-#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS   ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x42)
-
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE             ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4200)
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE               ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7200)
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK                  ((psa_key_type_t) 0x00ff)
-/** Diffie-Hellman key pair.
- *
- * \param group     A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the
- *                  Diffie-Hellman group to be used.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(group)          \
-    (PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (group))
-/** Diffie-Hellman public key.
- *
- * \param group     A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the
- *                  Diffie-Hellman group to be used.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(group)               \
-    (PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (group))
-
-/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key (pair or public-only). */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type)                                        \
-    ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) &                        \
-      ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
-/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key pair. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(type)                               \
-    (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) ==                         \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE)
-/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman public key. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(type)                            \
-    (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) ==                         \
-     PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
-
-/** Extract the group from a Diffie-Hellman key type. */
-#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY(type)                        \
-    ((psa_dh_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) ?              \
-                        ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) :  \
-                        0))
-
-/** Diffie-Hellman groups defined in RFC 7919 Appendix A.
- *
- * This family includes groups with the following key sizes (in bits):
- * 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192. A given implementation may support
- * all of these sizes or only a subset.
- */
-#define PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919            ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x03)
-
-/** Diffie-Hellman groups defined in RFC 3526.
- *
- * This family includes groups with the following key sizes (in bits):
- * 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192. A given implementation may support
- * all of these sizes or only a subset.
- */
-#define PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC3526            ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x05)  /*!!OM*/
-
-#define PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type)      \
-    (((type) >> 8) & 7)
-/** The block size of a block cipher.
- *
- * \param type  A cipher key type (value of type #psa_key_type_t).
- *
- * \return      The block size for a block cipher, or 1 for a stream cipher.
- *              The return value is undefined if \p type is not a supported
- *              cipher key type.
- *
- * \note It is possible to build stream cipher algorithms on top of a block
- *       cipher, for example CTR mode (#PSA_ALG_CTR).
- *       This macro only takes the key type into account, so it cannot be
- *       used to determine the size of the data that #psa_cipher_update()
- *       might buffer for future processing in general.
- *
- * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one.
- *
- * \warning This macro may evaluate its argument multiple times.
- */
-#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(type)                                     \
-    (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \
-     1u << PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) :                         \
-        0u)
-
-/* Note that algorithm values are embedded in the persistent key store,
- * as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they must not be changed
- * (unless the storage format version changes).
- */
-
-/** Vendor-defined algorithm flag.
- *
- * Algorithms defined by this standard will never have the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG
- * bit set. Vendors who define additional algorithms must use an encoding with
- * the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should respect the bitwise structure
- * used by standard encodings whenever practical.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG                     ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x80000000)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK                   ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x7f000000)
-#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH                   ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000000)
-#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC                    ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03000000)
-#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER                 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04000000)
-#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD                   ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05000000)
-#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN                   ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000000)
-#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION  ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000000)
-#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION         ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000000)
-#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT          ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x09000000)
-
-/** Whether an algorithm is vendor-defined.
- *
- * See also #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(alg)                                  \
-    (((alg) & PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash algorithm.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
- *         algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg)                                            \
-    (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
- *         algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg)                                             \
-    (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is a symmetric cipher algorithm.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \p alg is a symmetric cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
- *         algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)                                          \
-    (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is an authenticated encryption
- * with associated data (AEAD) algorithm.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
- *         algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg)                                            \
-    (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric signature algorithm,
- * also known as public-key signature algorithm.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric signature algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
- *         algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(alg)                                            \
-    (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm,
- * also known as public-key encryption algorithm.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
- *         algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg)                           \
-    (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key agreement algorithm.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \p alg is a key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
- *         algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)                                   \
-    (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key derivation algorithm.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \p alg is a key derivation algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
- *         algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg)                                  \
-    (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key stretching / password hashing
- * algorithm.
- *
- * A key stretching / password hashing algorithm is a key derivation algorithm
- * that is suitable for use with a low-entropy secret such as a password.
- * Equivalently, it's a key derivation algorithm that uses a
- * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input step.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \p alg is a key stretching / password hashing algorithm, 0
- *         otherwise. This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a
- *         supported algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING(alg)                                  \
-    (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) &&              \
-     (alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG)
-
-/** An invalid algorithm identifier value. */
-/* *INDENT-OFF* (https://github.com/ARM-software/psa-arch-tests/issues/337) */
-#define PSA_ALG_NONE                            ((psa_algorithm_t)0)
-/* *INDENT-ON* */
-
-#define PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK                       ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x000000ff)
-/** MD5 */
-#define PSA_ALG_MD5                             ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000003)
-/** PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 */
-#define PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160                       ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000004)
-/** SHA1 */
-#define PSA_ALG_SHA_1                           ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000005)
-/** SHA2-224 */
-#define PSA_ALG_SHA_224                         ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000008)
-/** SHA2-256 */
-#define PSA_ALG_SHA_256                         ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000009)
-/** SHA2-384 */
-#define PSA_ALG_SHA_384                         ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000a)
-/** SHA2-512 */
-#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512                         ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000b)
-/** SHA2-512/224 */
-#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224                     ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000c)
-/** SHA2-512/256 */
-#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256                     ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000d)
-/** SHA3-224 */
-#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_224                        ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000010)
-/** SHA3-256 */
-#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_256                        ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000011)
-/** SHA3-384 */
-#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_384                        ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000012)
-/** SHA3-512 */
-#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_512                        ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000013)
-/** The first 512 bits (64 bytes) of the SHAKE256 output.
- *
- * This is the prehashing for Ed448ph (see #PSA_ALG_ED448PH). For other
- * scenarios where a hash function based on SHA3/SHAKE is desired, SHA3-512
- * has the same output size and a (theoretically) higher security strength.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512                    ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000015)
-
-/** In a hash-and-sign algorithm policy, allow any hash algorithm.
- *
- * This value may be used to form the algorithm usage field of a policy
- * for a signature algorithm that is parametrized by a hash. The key
- * may then be used to perform operations using the same signature
- * algorithm parametrized with any supported hash.
- *
- * That is, suppose that `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` is one of the following macros:
- * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT,
- * - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA, #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA.
- * Then you may create and use a key as follows:
- * - Set the key usage field using #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH, for example:
- *   ```
- *   psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); // or VERIFY
- *   psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH));
- *   ```
- * - Import or generate key material.
- * - Call psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(), passing
- *   an algorithm built from `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` and a specific hash. Each
- *   call to sign or verify a message may use a different hash.
- *   ```
- *   psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), ...);
- *   psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), ...);
- *   psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA3_256), ...);
- *   ```
- *
- * This value may not be used to build other algorithms that are
- * parametrized over a hash. For any valid use of this macro to build
- * an algorithm \c alg, #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(\c alg) is true.
- *
- * This value may not be used to build an algorithm specification to
- * perform an operation. It is only valid to build policies.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH                        ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x020000ff)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK            ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00c00000)
-#define PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE                       ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03800000)
-/** Macro to build an HMAC algorithm.
- *
- * For example, #PSA_ALG_HMAC(#PSA_ALG_SHA_256) is HMAC-SHA-256.
- *
- * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
- *
- * \return              The corresponding HMAC algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
- *                      hash algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg)                                  \
-    (PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-
-#define PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(hmac_alg)                             \
-    (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hmac_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HMAC algorithm.
- *
- * HMAC is a family of MAC algorithms that are based on a hash function.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \p alg is an HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
- *         algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg)                                            \
-    (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \
-     PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE)
-
-/* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bits corresponding to
- * PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK encode the length to which the MAC is
- * truncated. As an exception, the value 0 means the untruncated algorithm,
- * whatever its length is. The length is encoded in 6 bits, so it can
- * reach up to 63; the largest MAC is 64 bytes so its trivial truncation
- * to full length is correctly encoded as 0 and any non-trivial truncation
- * is correctly encoded as a value between 1 and 63. */
-#define PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK             ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x003f0000)
-#define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET 16
-
-/* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bit corresponding to
- * #PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm
- * is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted
- * algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the
- * same base class and having a (potentially truncated) MAC length greater or
- * equal than the one encoded in #PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK. */
-#define PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG   ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00008000)
-
-/** Macro to build a truncated MAC algorithm.
- *
- * A truncated MAC algorithm is identical to the corresponding MAC
- * algorithm except that the MAC value for the truncated algorithm
- * consists of only the first \p mac_length bytes of the MAC value
- * for the untruncated algorithm.
- *
- * \note    This macro may allow constructing algorithm identifiers that
- *          are not valid, either because the specified length is larger
- *          than the untruncated MAC or because the specified length is
- *          smaller than permitted by the implementation.
- *
- * \note    It is implementation-defined whether a truncated MAC that
- *          is truncated to the same length as the MAC of the untruncated
- *          algorithm is considered identical to the untruncated algorithm
- *          for policy comparison purposes.
- *
- * \param mac_alg       A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
- *                      #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg)
- *                      is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated
- *                      MAC algorithm.
- * \param mac_length    Desired length of the truncated MAC in bytes.
- *                      This must be at most the full length of the MAC
- *                      and must be at least an implementation-specified
- *                      minimum. The implementation-specified minimum
- *                      shall not be zero.
- *
- * \return              The corresponding MAC algorithm with the specified
- *                      length.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported
- *                      MAC algorithm or if \p mac_length is too small or
- *                      too large for the specified MAC algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, mac_length)              \
-    (((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK |               \
-                    PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) |   \
-     ((mac_length) << PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK))
-
-/** Macro to build the base MAC algorithm corresponding to a truncated
- * MAC algorithm.
- *
- * \param mac_alg       A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
- *                      #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg)
- *                      is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated
- *                      MAC algorithm.
- *
- * \return              The corresponding base MAC algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported
- *                      MAC algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg)                        \
-    ((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK |                \
-                   PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG))
-
-/** Length to which a MAC algorithm is truncated.
- *
- * \param mac_alg       A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
- *                      #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg)
- *                      is true).
- *
- * \return              Length of the truncated MAC in bytes.
- * \return              0 if \p mac_alg is a non-truncated MAC algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported
- *                      MAC algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(mac_alg)                               \
-    (((mac_alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK) >> PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET)
-
-/** Macro to build a MAC minimum-MAC-length wildcard algorithm.
- *
- * A minimum-MAC-length MAC wildcard algorithm permits all MAC algorithms
- * sharing the same base algorithm, and where the (potentially truncated) MAC
- * length of the specific algorithm is equal to or larger then the wildcard
- * algorithm's minimum MAC length.
- *
- * \note    When setting the minimum required MAC length to less than the
- *          smallest MAC length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively
- *          becomes an 'any-MAC-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm.
- *
- * \param mac_alg         A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
- *                        #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg)
- *                        is true).
- * \param min_mac_length  Desired minimum length of the message authentication
- *                        code in bytes. This must be at most the untruncated
- *                        length of the MAC and must be at least 1.
- *
- * \return                The corresponding MAC wildcard algorithm with the
- *                        specified minimum length.
- * \return                Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported MAC
- *                        algorithm or if \p min_mac_length is less than 1 or
- *                        too large for the specified MAC algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length)   \
-    (PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) |              \
-     PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE                 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03c00000)
-/** The CBC-MAC construction over a block cipher
- *
- * \warning CBC-MAC is insecure in many cases.
- * A more secure mode, such as #PSA_ALG_CMAC, is recommended.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC                         ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03c00100)
-/** The CMAC construction over a block cipher */
-#define PSA_ALG_CMAC                            ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03c00200)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
- *         algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg)                                \
-    (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \
-     PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG              ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00800000)
-#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG          ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00400000)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is a stream cipher.
- *
- * A stream cipher is a symmetric cipher that encrypts or decrypts messages
- * by applying a bitwise-xor with a stream of bytes that is generated
- * from a key.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \p alg is a stream cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
- *         algorithm identifier or if it is not a symmetric cipher algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(alg)            \
-    (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG)) == \
-     (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG))
-
-/** The stream cipher mode of a stream cipher algorithm.
- *
- * The underlying stream cipher is determined by the key type.
- * - To use ChaCha20, use a key type of #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER                   ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04800100)
-
-/** The CTR stream cipher mode.
- *
- * CTR is a stream cipher which is built from a block cipher.
- * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
- * For example, to use AES-128-CTR, use this algorithm with
- * a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES and a length of 128 bits (16 bytes).
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_CTR                             ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01000)
-
-/** The CFB stream cipher mode.
- *
- * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_CFB                             ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01100)
-
-/** The OFB stream cipher mode.
- *
- * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_OFB                             ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01200)
-
-/** The XTS cipher mode.
- *
- * XTS is a cipher mode which is built from a block cipher. It requires at
- * least one full block of input, but beyond this minimum the input
- * does not need to be a whole number of blocks.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_XTS                             ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0440ff00)
-
-/** The Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode of a block cipher, with no padding.
- *
- * \warning ECB mode does not protect the confidentiality of the encrypted data
- * except in extremely narrow circumstances. It is recommended that applications
- * only use ECB if they need to construct an operating mode that the
- * implementation does not provide. Implementations are encouraged to provide
- * the modes that applications need in preference to supporting direct access
- * to ECB.
- *
- * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
- *
- * This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths are a
- * multiple of the block size of the chosen block cipher.
- *
- * ECB mode does not accept an initialization vector (IV). When using a
- * multi-part cipher operation with this algorithm, psa_cipher_generate_iv()
- * and psa_cipher_set_iv() must not be called.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING                  ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04404400)
-
-/** The CBC block cipher chaining mode, with no padding.
- *
- * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
- *
- * This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths
- * are whole number of blocks for the chosen block cipher.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING                  ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04404000)
-
-/** The CBC block cipher chaining mode with PKCS#7 padding.
- *
- * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
- *
- * This is the padding method defined by PKCS#7 (RFC 2315) &sect;10.3.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7                       ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04404100)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG            ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00400000)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is an AEAD mode on a block cipher.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm which is an AEAD mode based on
- *         a block cipher, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
- *         algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg)    \
-    (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG)) == \
-     (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG))
-
-/** The CCM authenticated encryption algorithm.
- *
- * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_CCM                             ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05500100)
-
-/** The CCM* cipher mode without authentication.
- *
- * This is CCM* as specified in IEEE 802.15.4 §7, with a tag length of 0.
- * For CCM* with a nonzero tag length, use the AEAD algorithm #PSA_ALG_CCM.
- *
- * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
- *
- * Currently only 13-byte long IV's are supported.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG                 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01300)
-
-/** The GCM authenticated encryption algorithm.
- *
- * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_GCM                             ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05500200)
-
-/** The Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm.
- *
- * The ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction is defined in RFC 7539.
- *
- * Implementations must support 12-byte nonces, may support 8-byte nonces,
- * and should reject other sizes.
- *
- * Implementations must support 16-byte tags and should reject other sizes.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305               ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05100500)
-
-/* In the encoding of an AEAD algorithm, the bits corresponding to
- * PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK encode the length of the AEAD tag.
- * The constants for default lengths follow this encoding.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK            ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x003f0000)
-#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET 16
-
-/* In the encoding of an AEAD algorithm, the bit corresponding to
- * #PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm
- * is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted
- * algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the
- * same base class and having a tag length greater than or equal to the one
- * encoded in #PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK. */
-#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG  ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00008000)
-
-/** Macro to build a shortened AEAD algorithm.
- *
- * A shortened AEAD algorithm is similar to the corresponding AEAD
- * algorithm, but has an authentication tag that consists of fewer bytes.
- * Depending on the algorithm, the tag length may affect the calculation
- * of the ciphertext.
- *
- * \param aead_alg      An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type
- *                      #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg)
- *                      is true).
- * \param tag_length    Desired length of the authentication tag in bytes.
- *
- * \return              The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the specified
- *                      length.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported
- *                      AEAD algorithm or if \p tag_length is not valid
- *                      for the specified AEAD algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, tag_length)           \
-    (((aead_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK |                     \
-                     PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) |         \
-     ((tag_length) << PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET &                      \
-        PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK))
-
-/** Retrieve the tag length of a specified AEAD algorithm
- *
- * \param aead_alg      An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type
- *                      #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg)
- *                      is true).
- *
- * \return              The tag length specified by the input algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported
- *                      AEAD algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(aead_alg)                           \
-    (((aead_alg) & PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK) >>                     \
-     PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET)
-
-/** Calculate the corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default tag length.
- *
- * \param aead_alg      An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true).
- *
- * \return              The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default
- *                      tag length for that algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg)                   \
-    (                                                                    \
-        PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CCM) \
-        PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_GCM) \
-        PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) \
-        0)
-#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, ref)         \
-    PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, 0) ==                      \
-    PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(ref, 0) ?                            \
-    ref :
-
-/** Macro to build an AEAD minimum-tag-length wildcard algorithm.
- *
- * A minimum-tag-length AEAD wildcard algorithm permits all AEAD algorithms
- * sharing the same base algorithm, and where the tag length of the specific
- * algorithm is equal to or larger then the minimum tag length specified by the
- * wildcard algorithm.
- *
- * \note    When setting the minimum required tag length to less than the
- *          smallest tag length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively
- *          becomes an 'any-tag-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm.
- *
- * \param aead_alg        An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type
- *                        #psa_algorithm_t such that
- *                        #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true).
- * \param min_tag_length  Desired minimum length of the authentication tag in
- *                        bytes. This must be at least 1 and at most the largest
- *                        allowed tag length of the algorithm.
- *
- * \return                The corresponding AEAD wildcard algorithm with the
- *                        specified minimum length.
- * \return                Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported
- *                        AEAD algorithm or if \p min_tag_length is less than 1
- *                        or too large for the specified AEAD algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) \
-    (PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) |            \
-     PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE          ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000200)
-/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature with hashing.
- *
- * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017
- * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name
- * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
- *
- * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
- *                      This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
- *                      when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
- *
- * \return              The corresponding RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
- *                      hash algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg)                             \
-    (PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-/** Raw PKCS#1 v1.5 signature.
- *
- * The input to this algorithm is the DigestInfo structure used by
- * RFC 8017 (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications), &sect;9.2
- * steps 3&ndash;6.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg)                               \
-    (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE               ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000300)
-#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE      ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06001300)
-/** RSA PSS signature with hashing.
- *
- * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017
- * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name
- * RSASSA-PSS, with the message generation function MGF1, and with
- * a salt length equal to the length of the hash, or the largest
- * possible salt length for the algorithm and key size if that is
- * smaller than the hash length. The specified hash algorithm is
- * used to hash the input message, to create the salted hash, and
- * for the mask generation.
- *
- * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
- *                      This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
- *                      when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
- *
- * \return              The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
- *                      hash algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg)                               \
-    (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-
-/** RSA PSS signature with hashing with relaxed verification.
- *
- * This algorithm has the same behavior as #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS when signing,
- * but allows an arbitrary salt length (including \c 0) when verifying a
- * signature.
- *
- * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
- *                      This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
- *                      when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
- *
- * \return              The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
- *                      hash algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(hash_alg)                      \
-    (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS with standard salt.
- *
- * \param alg           An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard.
- *
- * \return              1 if \p alg is of the form
- *                      #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(\c hash_alg),
- *                      where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or
- *                      #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise.
- *                      This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not
- *                      a supported algorithm identifier or policy.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg)                   \
-    (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS with any salt.
- *
- * \param alg           An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard.
- *
- * \return              1 if \p alg is of the form
- *                      #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE(\c hash_alg),
- *                      where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or
- *                      #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise.
- *                      This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not
- *                      a supported algorithm identifier or policy.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg)                                \
-    (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS.
- *
- * This includes any of the RSA PSS algorithm variants, regardless of the
- * constraints on salt length.
- *
- * \param alg           An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard.
- *
- * \return              1 if \p alg is of the form
- *                      #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(\c hash_alg) or
- *                      #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE(\c hash_alg),
- *                      where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or
- *                      #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise.
- *                      This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not
- *                      a supported algorithm identifier or policy.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)                                 \
-    (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg) ||                   \
-     PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg))
-
-#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE                      ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000600)
-/** ECDSA signature with hashing.
- *
- * This is the ECDSA signature scheme defined by ANSI X9.62,
- * with a random per-message secret number (*k*).
- *
- * The representation of the signature as a byte string consists of
- * the concatenation of the signature values *r* and *s*. Each of
- * *r* and *s* is encoded as an *N*-octet string, where *N* is the length
- * of the base point of the curve in octets. Each value is represented
- * in big-endian order (most significant octet first).
- *
- * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
- *                      This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
- *                      when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
- *
- * \return              The corresponding ECDSA signature algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
- *                      hash algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg)                                 \
-    (PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-/** ECDSA signature without hashing.
- *
- * This is the same signature scheme as #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(), but
- * without specifying a hash algorithm. This algorithm may only be
- * used to sign or verify a sequence of bytes that should be an
- * already-calculated hash. Note that the input is padded with
- * zeros on the left or truncated on the left as required to fit
- * the curve size.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE
-#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE        ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000700)
-/** Deterministic ECDSA signature with hashing.
- *
- * This is the deterministic ECDSA signature scheme defined by RFC 6979.
- *
- * The representation of a signature is the same as with #PSA_ALG_ECDSA().
- *
- * Note that when this algorithm is used for verification, signatures
- * made with randomized ECDSA (#PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg)) with the
- * same private key are accepted. In other words,
- * #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) differs from
- * #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) only for signature, not for verification.
- *
- * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
- *                      This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
- *                      when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
- *
- * \return              The corresponding deterministic ECDSA signature
- *                      algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
- *                      hash algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(hash_alg)                           \
-    (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG        ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00000100)
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg)                                           \
-    (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) ==  \
-     PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE)
-#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)             \
-    (((alg) & PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0)
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(alg)                             \
-    (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg))
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA(alg)                                \
-    (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg))
-
-/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm without prehashing (PureEdDSA),
- * using standard parameters.
- *
- * Contexts are not supported in the current version of this specification
- * because there is no suitable signature interface that can take the
- * context as a parameter. A future version of this specification may add
- * suitable functions and extend this algorithm to support contexts.
- *
- * PureEdDSA requires an elliptic curve key on a twisted Edwards curve.
- * In this specification, the following curves are supported:
- * - #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 255-bit: Ed25519 as specified
- *   in RFC 8032.
- *   The curve is Edwards25519.
- *   The hash function used internally is SHA-512.
- * - #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 448-bit: Ed448 as specified
- *   in RFC 8032.
- *   The curve is Edwards448.
- *   The hash function used internally is the first 114 bytes of the
- *   SHAKE256 output.
- *
- * This algorithm can be used with psa_sign_message() and
- * psa_verify_message(). Since there is no prehashing, it cannot be used
- * with psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash().
- *
- * The signature format is the concatenation of R and S as defined by
- * RFC 8032 §5.1.6 and §5.2.6 (a 64-byte string for Ed25519, a 114-byte
- * string for Ed448).
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA                      ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000800)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE                 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000900)
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg)              \
-    (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE)
-
-/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with prehashing (HashEdDSA),
- * using SHA-512 and the Edwards25519 curve.
- *
- * See #PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA regarding context support and the signature format.
- *
- * This algorithm is Ed25519 as specified in RFC 8032.
- * The curve is Edwards25519.
- * The prehash is SHA-512.
- * The hash function used internally is SHA-512.
- *
- * This is a hash-and-sign algorithm: to calculate a signature,
- * you can either:
- * - call psa_sign_message() on the message;
- * - or calculate the SHA-512 hash of the message
- *   with psa_hash_compute()
- *   or with a multi-part hash operation started with psa_hash_setup(),
- *   using the hash algorithm #PSA_ALG_SHA_512,
- *   then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash().
- * Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or
- * psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_ED25519PH                               \
-    (PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE | (PSA_ALG_SHA_512 & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-
-/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with prehashing (HashEdDSA),
- * using SHAKE256 and the Edwards448 curve.
- *
- * See #PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA regarding context support and the signature format.
- *
- * This algorithm is Ed448 as specified in RFC 8032.
- * The curve is Edwards448.
- * The prehash is the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output.
- * The hash function used internally is the first 114 bytes of the
- * SHAKE256 output.
- *
- * This is a hash-and-sign algorithm: to calculate a signature,
- * you can either:
- * - call psa_sign_message() on the message;
- * - or calculate the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output of the message
- *   with psa_hash_compute()
- *   or with a multi-part hash operation started with psa_hash_setup(),
- *   using the hash algorithm #PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512,
- *   then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash().
- * Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or
- * psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_ED448PH                                 \
-    (PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE | (PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-
-/* Default definition, to be overridden if the library is extended with
- * more hash-and-sign algorithms that we want to keep out of this header
- * file. */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) 0
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used
- * with psa_sign_hash() and psa_verify_hash().
- *
- * This encompasses all strict hash-and-sign algorithms categorized by
- * PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(), as well as algorithms that follow the
- * paradigm more loosely:
- * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW (expects its input to be an encoded hash)
- * - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY (doesn't specify what kind of hash the input is)
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a
- *         hash. 0 if alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used
- *         to sign a message. 0 if alg is not a signature algorithm.
- *         This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a
- *         supported algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg)                                       \
-    (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) ||    \
-     PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) ||             \
-     PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg))
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used
- * with psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message().
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a
- *         message. 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used
- *         to sign an already-calculated hash. 0 if \p alg is not a signature
- *         algorithm. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a
- *         supported algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg)                                    \
-    (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) || (alg) == PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash-and-sign algorithm.
- *
- * Hash-and-sign algorithms are asymmetric (public-key) signature algorithms
- * structured in two parts: first the calculation of a hash in a way that
- * does not depend on the key, then the calculation of a signature from the
- * hash value and the key. Hash-and-sign algorithms encode the hash
- * used for the hashing step, and you can call #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH
- * to extract this algorithm.
- *
- * Thus, for a hash-and-sign algorithm,
- * `psa_sign_message(key, alg, input, ...)` is equivalent to
- * ```
- * psa_hash_compute(PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg), input, ..., hash, ...);
- * psa_sign_hash(key, alg, hash, ..., signature, ...);
- * ```
- * Most usefully, separating the hash from the signature allows the hash
- * to be calculated in multiple steps with psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update()
- * and psa_hash_finish(). Likewise psa_verify_message() is equivalent to
- * calculating the hash and then calling psa_verify_hash().
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash-and-sign algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
- *         algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg)                                   \
-    (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) &&                                       \
-     ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) != 0)
-
-/** Get the hash used by a hash-and-sign signature algorithm.
- *
- * A hash-and-sign algorithm is a signature algorithm which is
- * composed of two phases: first a hashing phase which does not use
- * the key and produces a hash of the input message, then a signing
- * phase which only uses the hash and the key and not the message
- * itself.
- *
- * \param alg   A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *              #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(\p alg) is true).
- *
- * \return      The underlying hash algorithm if \p alg is a hash-and-sign
- *              algorithm.
- * \return      0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that does not
- *              follow the hash-and-sign structure.
- * \return      Unspecified if \p alg is not a signature algorithm or
- *              if it is not supported by the implementation.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg)                                     \
-    (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ?                                   \
-     ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH :             \
-     0)
-
-/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT              ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000200)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE                   ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000300)
-/** RSA OAEP encryption.
- *
- * This is the encryption scheme defined by RFC 8017
- * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name
- * RSAES-OAEP, with the message generation function MGF1.
- *
- * \param hash_alg      The hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true) to use
- *                      for MGF1.
- *
- * \return              The corresponding RSA OAEP encryption algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
- *                      hash algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash_alg)                              \
-    (PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg)                                \
-    (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE)
-#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg)                          \
-    (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ?                                 \
-     ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH :      \
-     0)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE                       ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000100)
-/** Macro to build an HKDF algorithm.
- *
- * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is HKDF using HMAC-SHA-256.
- *
- * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
- * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt used in the "extract" step.
- *   It is optional; if omitted, the derivation uses an empty salt.
- * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key used in the "extract" step.
- * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string used in the "expand" step.
- * You must pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT before #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET.
- * You may pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO at any time after steup and before
- * starting to generate output.
- *
- *  \warning  HKDF processes the salt as follows: first hash it with hash_alg
- *  if the salt is longer than the block size of the hash algorithm; then
- *  pad with null bytes up to the block size. As a result, it is possible
- *  for distinct salt inputs to result in the same outputs. To ensure
- *  unique outputs, it is recommended to use a fixed length for salt values.
- *
- * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
- *
- * \return              The corresponding HKDF algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
- *                      hash algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_HKDF(hash_alg)                                  \
-    (PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF algorithm.
- *
- * HKDF is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based on a hash
- * function and the HMAC construction.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
- *         key derivation algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(alg)                            \
-    (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE)
-#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg)                         \
-    (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-
-#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE                       ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000400)
-/** Macro to build an HKDF-Extract algorithm.
- *
- * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is
- * HKDF-Extract using HMAC-SHA-256.
- *
- * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
- *  - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt.
- *  - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the input keying material used in the
- *    "extract" step.
- * The inputs are mandatory and must be passed in the order above.
- * Each input may only be passed once.
- *
- *  \warning HKDF-Extract is not meant to be used on its own. PSA_ALG_HKDF
- *  should be used instead if possible. PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT is provided
- *  as a separate algorithm for the sake of protocols that use it as a
- *  building block. It may also be a slight performance optimization
- *  in applications that use HKDF with the same salt and key but many
- *  different info strings.
- *
- *  \warning  HKDF processes the salt as follows: first hash it with hash_alg
- *  if the salt is longer than the block size of the hash algorithm; then
- *  pad with null bytes up to the block size. As a result, it is possible
- *  for distinct salt inputs to result in the same outputs. To ensure
- *  unique outputs, it is recommended to use a fixed length for salt values.
- *
- * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
- *
- * \return              The corresponding HKDF-Extract algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
- *                      hash algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(hash_alg)                                  \
-    (PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF-Extract algorithm.
- *
- * HKDF-Extract is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based
- * on a hash function and the HMAC construction.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF-Extract algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
- *         key derivation algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(alg)                            \
-    (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE                       ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000500)
-/** Macro to build an HKDF-Expand algorithm.
- *
- * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is
- * HKDF-Expand using HMAC-SHA-256.
- *
- * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
- *  - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the pseudorandom key (PRK).
- *  - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string.
- *
- *  The inputs are mandatory and must be passed in the order above.
- *  Each input may only be passed once.
- *
- *  \warning HKDF-Expand is not meant to be used on its own. `PSA_ALG_HKDF`
- *  should be used instead if possible. `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND` is provided as
- *  a separate algorithm for the sake of protocols that use it as a building
- *  block. It may also be a slight performance optimization in applications
- *  that use HKDF with the same salt and key but many different info strings.
- *
- * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
- *
- * \return              The corresponding HKDF-Expand algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
- *                      hash algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(hash_alg)                                  \
-    (PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF-Expand algorithm.
- *
- * HKDF-Expand is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based
- * on a hash function and the HMAC construction.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF-Expand algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
- *         key derivation algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(alg)                            \
-    (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF or HKDF-Extract or
- *  HKDF-Expand algorithm.
- *
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \c alg is any HKDF type algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
- *         key derivation algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF(alg)                                   \
-    (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE ||          \
-     ((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE ||  \
-     ((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE                  ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000200)
-/** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.
- *
- * TLS 1.2 uses a custom pseudorandom function (PRF) for key schedule,
- * specified in Section 5 of RFC 5246. It is based on HMAC and can be
- * used with either SHA-256 or SHA-384.
- *
- * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be
- * passed in the order given here:
- * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed.
- * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key.
- * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label.
- *
- * For the application to TLS-1.2 key expansion, the seed is the
- * concatenation of ServerHello.Random + ClientHello.Random,
- * and the label is "key expansion".
- *
- * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` represents the
- * TLS 1.2 PRF using HMAC-SHA-256.
- *
- * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
- *
- * \return              The corresponding TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
- *                      hash algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(hash_alg)                                  \
-    (PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
- *         key derivation algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg)                                    \
-    (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE)
-#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg)                         \
-    (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-
-#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE            ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000300)
-/** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MasterSecret algorithm.
- *
- * In a pure-PSK handshake in TLS 1.2, the master secret is derived
- * from the PreSharedKey (PSK) through the application of padding
- * (RFC 4279, Section 2) and the TLS-1.2 PRF (RFC 5246, Section 5).
- * The latter is based on HMAC and can be used with either SHA-256
- * or SHA-384.
- *
- * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be
- * passed in the order given here:
- * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed.
- * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET is the other secret for the
- *   computation of the premaster secret. This input is optional;
- *   if omitted, it defaults to a string of null bytes with the same length
- *   as the secret (PSK) input.
- * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key.
- * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label.
- *
- * For the application to TLS-1.2, the seed (which is
- * forwarded to the TLS-1.2 PRF) is the concatenation of the
- * ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random,
- * the label is "master secret" or "extended master secret" and
- * the other secret depends on the key exchange specified in the cipher suite:
- * - for a plain PSK cipher suite (RFC 4279, Section 2), omit
- *   PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET
- * - for a DHE-PSK (RFC 4279, Section 3) or ECDHE-PSK cipher suite
- *   (RFC 5489, Section 2), the other secret should be the output of the
- *   PSA_ALG_FFDH or PSA_ALG_ECDH key agreement performed with the peer.
- *   The recommended way to pass this input is to use a key derivation
- *   algorithm constructed as
- *   PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg))
- *   and to call psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(). Alternatively,
- *   this input may be an output of `psa_raw_key_agreement()` passed with
- *   psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(), or an equivalent input passed with
- *   psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_input_key().
- * - for a RSA-PSK cipher suite (RFC 4279, Section 4), the other secret
- *   should be the 48-byte client challenge (the PreMasterSecret of
- *   (RFC 5246, Section 7.4.7.1)) concatenation of the TLS version and
- *   a 46-byte random string chosen by the client. On the server, this is
- *   typically an output of psa_asymmetric_decrypt() using
- *   PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, passed to the key derivation operation
- *   with `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`.
- *
- * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` represents the
- * TLS-1.2 PSK to MasterSecret derivation PRF using HMAC-SHA-256.
- *
- * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
- *
- * \return              The corresponding TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
- *                      hash algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg)                                  \
-    (PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
- *         key derivation algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg)                                    \
-    (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE)
-#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg)                         \
-    (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-
-/* The TLS 1.2 ECJPAKE-to-PMS KDF. It takes the shared secret K (an EC point
- * in case of EC J-PAKE) and calculates SHA256(K.X) that the rest of TLS 1.2
- * will use to derive the session secret, as defined by step 2 of
- * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01#section-8.7.
- * Uses PSA_ALG_SHA_256.
- * This function takes a single input:
- * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the shared secret K from EC J-PAKE.
- * The only supported curve is secp256r1 (the 256-bit curve in
- * #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1), so the input must be exactly 65 bytes.
- * The output has to be read as a single chunk of 32 bytes, defined as
- * PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS            ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000609)
-
-/* This flag indicates whether the key derivation algorithm is suitable for
- * use on low-entropy secrets such as password - these algorithms are also
- * known as key stretching or password hashing schemes. These are also the
- * algorithms that accepts inputs of type #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD.
- *
- * Those algorithms cannot be combined with a key agreement algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG  ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00800000)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE                ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08800100)
-/** Macro to build a PBKDF2-HMAC password hashing / key stretching algorithm.
- *
- * PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2).
- * This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using a PRF based on
- * HMAC with the specified hash.
- * For example, `PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` specifies PBKDF2
- * using the PRF HMAC-SHA-256.
- *
- * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be
- * provided in the following order:
- * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST is the iteration count.
- *   This input step must be used exactly once.
- * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt.
- *   This input step must be used one or more times; if used several times, the
- *   inputs will be concatenated. This can be used to build the final salt
- *   from multiple sources, both public and secret (also known as pepper).
- * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD is the password to be hashed.
- *   This input step must be used exactly once.
- *
- * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
- *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
- *
- * \return              The corresponding PBKDF2-HMAC-XXX algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
- *                      hash algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(hash_alg)                                  \
-    (PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \c alg is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
- *         key derivation algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(alg)                                    \
-    (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_CMAC          ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000800)
-
-/** The PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128 password hashing / key stretching algorithm.
- *
- * PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2).
- * This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using the
- * AES-CMAC-PRF-128 PRF specified by RFC 4615.
- *
- * This key derivation algorithm uses the same inputs as
- * #PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC() with the same constraints.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128         ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08800200)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_SRP_PASSWORD_HASH_BASE          ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08800300)
- /** The SRP password to password-hash KDF.
- * It takes the password p, the salt s, and the user id u.
- * It calculates the password hash h as
- * h = H(salt || H(u || ":" || p))
- * where H is the given hash algorithm.
- *
- * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be
- * provided in the following order:
- * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the user id.
- * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD is the password.
- * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt.
- * The output has to be read as a key of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_KEY_PAIR.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_SRP_PASSWORD_HASH(hash_alg)                            \
-    (PSA_ALG_SRP_PASSWORD_HASH_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
-
- /** Whether the specified algorithm is a key derivation algorithm constructed
- * using #PSA_ALG_SRP_PASSWORD_HASH(\p hash_alg).
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \p alg is a key derivation algorithm constructed using #PSA_ALG_SRP_PASSWORD_HASH(),
- *         0 otherwise. This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
- *         key derivation algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_SRP_PASSWORD_HASH(alg)                         \
-    (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_SRP_PASSWORD_HASH_BASE)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK             ((psa_algorithm_t) 0xfe00ffff)
-#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK              ((psa_algorithm_t) 0xffff0000)
-
-/** Macro to build a combined algorithm that chains a key agreement with
- * a key derivation.
- *
- * \param ka_alg        A key agreement algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such
- *                      that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p ka_alg) is true).
- * \param kdf_alg       A key derivation algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such
- *                      that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p kdf_alg) is true).
- *
- * \return              The corresponding key agreement and derivation
- *                      algorithm.
- * \return              Unspecified if \p ka_alg is not a supported
- *                      key agreement algorithm or \p kdf_alg is not a
- *                      supported key derivation algorithm.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, kdf_alg)  \
-    ((ka_alg) | (kdf_alg))
-
-#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg)                              \
-    (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg)                             \
-    (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is a raw key agreement algorithm.
- *
- * A raw key agreement algorithm is one that does not specify
- * a key derivation function.
- * Usually, raw key agreement algorithms are constructed directly with
- * a \c PSA_ALG_xxx macro while non-raw key agreement algorithms are
- * constructed with #PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT().
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \p alg is a raw key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
- *         algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)                               \
-    (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) &&                                   \
-     PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
-
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_OR_AGREEMENT(alg)     \
-    ((PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)))
-
-/** The finite-field Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement algorithm.
- *
- * The shared secret produced by key agreement is
- * `g^{ab}` in big-endian format.
- * It is `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where `m` is the size of the prime `p`
- * in bits.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_FFDH                            ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x09010000)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm.
- *
- * This includes the raw finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as
- * finite-field Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation
- * algorithm.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \c alg is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm, 0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
- *         key agreement algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_FFDH(alg) \
-    (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_FFDH)
-
-/** The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm.
- *
- * The shared secret produced by key agreement is the x-coordinate of
- * the shared secret point. It is always `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where
- * `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of the
- * order of the curve's coordinate field. When `m` is not a multiple of 8,
- * the byte containing the most significant bit of the shared secret
- * is padded with zero bits. The byte order is either little-endian
- * or big-endian depending on the curve type.
- *
- * - For Montgomery curves (curve types `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_CURVEXXX`),
- *   the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A`
- *   in little-endian byte order.
- *   The bit size is 448 for Curve448 and 255 for Curve25519.
- * - For Weierstrass curves over prime fields (curve types
- *   `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECPXXX` and `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`),
- *   the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A`
- *   in big-endian byte order.
- *   The bit size is `m = ceiling(log_2(p))` for the field `F_p`.
- * - For Weierstrass curves over binary fields (curve types
- *   `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECTXXX`),
- *   the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A`
- *   in big-endian byte order.
- *   The bit size is `m` for the field `F_{2^m}`.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_ECDH                            ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x09020000)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman
- * algorithm.
- *
- * This includes the raw elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as
- * elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation
- * algorithm.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \c alg is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm,
- *         0 otherwise.
- *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
- *         key agreement algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) \
-    (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_ECDH)
-
-/** Whether the specified algorithm encoding is a wildcard.
- *
- * Wildcard values may only be used to set the usage algorithm field in
- * a policy, not to perform an operation.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return 1 if \c alg is a wildcard algorithm encoding.
- * \return 0 if \c alg is a non-wildcard algorithm encoding (suitable for
- *         an operation).
- * \return This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
- *         algorithm identifier.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg)                            \
-    (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ?                        \
-     PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH :       \
-     PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) ?                                  \
-     (alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 :   \
-     PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) ?                                 \
-     (alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 :  \
-     (alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)
-
-/** Get the hash used by a composite algorithm.
- *
- * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
- *
- * \return The underlying hash algorithm if alg is a composite algorithm that
- * uses a hash algorithm.
- *
- * \return \c 0 if alg is not a composite algorithm that uses a hash.
- */
-#define PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg) \
-    (((alg) & 0x000000ff) == 0 ? ((psa_algorithm_t) 0) : 0x02000000 | ((alg) & 0x000000ff))
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes
- * @{
- */
-
-/* Note that location and persistence level values are embedded in the
- * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they
- * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes).
- */
-
-/** The default lifetime for volatile keys.
- *
- * A volatile key only exists as long as the identifier to it is not destroyed.
- * The key material is guaranteed to be erased on a power reset.
- *
- * A key with this lifetime is typically stored in the RAM area of the
- * PSA Crypto subsystem. However this is an implementation choice.
- * If an implementation stores data about the key in a non-volatile memory,
- * it must release all the resources associated with the key and erase the
- * key material if the calling application terminates.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE               ((psa_key_lifetime_t) 0x00000000)
-
-/** The default lifetime for persistent keys.
- *
- * A persistent key remains in storage until it is explicitly destroyed or
- * until the corresponding storage area is wiped. This specification does
- * not define any mechanism to wipe a storage area, but integrations may
- * provide their own mechanism (for example to perform a factory reset,
- * to prepare for device refurbishment, or to uninstall an application).
- *
- * This lifetime value is the default storage area for the calling
- * application. Integrations of Mbed TLS may support other persistent lifetimes.
- * See ::psa_key_lifetime_t for more information.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT             ((psa_key_lifetime_t) 0x00000001)
-
-/** The persistence level of volatile keys.
- *
- * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE            ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0x00)
-
-/** The default persistence level for persistent keys.
- *
- * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT             ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0x01)
-
-/** A persistence level indicating that a key is never destroyed.
- *
- * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY           ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0xff)
-
-#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime)      \
-    ((psa_key_persistence_t) ((lifetime) & 0x000000ff))
-
-#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime)      \
-    ((psa_key_location_t) ((lifetime) >> 8))
-
-/** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is volatile.
- *
- * A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when
- * the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key
- * is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device.
- *
- * A key that is not volatile is persistent. Persistent keys are
- * preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an
- * implementation-specific device management event occurs (for example,
- * a factory reset).
- *
- * \param lifetime      The lifetime value to query (value of type
- *                      ::psa_key_lifetime_t).
- *
- * \return \c 1 if the key is volatile, otherwise \c 0.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime)  \
-    (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \
-     PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE)
-
-/** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is read-only.
- *
- * Read-only keys cannot be created or destroyed through the PSA Crypto API.
- * They must be created through platform-specific means that bypass the API.
- *
- * Some platforms may offer ways to destroy read-only keys. For example,
- * consider a platform with multiple levels of privilege, where a
- * low-privilege application can use a key but is not allowed to destroy
- * it, and the platform exposes the key to the application with a read-only
- * lifetime. High-privilege code can destroy the key even though the
- * application sees the key as read-only.
- *
- * \param lifetime      The lifetime value to query (value of type
- *                      ::psa_key_lifetime_t).
- *
- * \return \c 1 if the key is read-only, otherwise \c 0.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY(lifetime)  \
-    (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \
-     PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY)
-
-/** Construct a lifetime from a persistence level and a location.
- *
- * \param persistence   The persistence level
- *                      (value of type ::psa_key_persistence_t).
- * \param location      The location indicator
- *                      (value of type ::psa_key_location_t).
- *
- * \return The constructed lifetime value.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(persistence, location) \
-    ((location) << 8 | (persistence))
-
-/** The local storage area for persistent keys.
- *
- * This storage area is available on all systems that can store persistent
- * keys without delegating the storage to a third-party cryptoprocessor.
- *
- * See ::psa_key_location_t for more information.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE          ((psa_key_location_t) 0x000000)
-
-#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_VENDOR_FLAG            ((psa_key_location_t) 0x800000)
-
-/* Note that key identifier values are embedded in the
- * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they
- * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes).
- */
-
-/** The null key identifier.
- */
-/* *INDENT-OFF* (https://github.com/ARM-software/psa-arch-tests/issues/337) */
-#define PSA_KEY_ID_NULL                         ((psa_key_id_t)0)
-/* *INDENT-ON* */
-/** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the application.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN                     ((psa_key_id_t) 0x00000001)
-/** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the application.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX                     ((psa_key_id_t) 0x3fffffff)
-/** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN                   ((psa_key_id_t) 0x40000000)
-/** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX                   ((psa_key_id_t) 0x7fffffff)
-
-
-#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER)
-
-#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ((psa_key_id_t) 0)
-#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(id) (id)
-#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(id) (0)
-
-/** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime.
- *
- * \param unused  Unused parameter.
- * \param key_id  Identifier of the key.
- */
-static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make(
-    unsigned int unused, psa_key_id_t key_id)
-{
-    (void) unused;
-
-    return key_id;
-}
-
-/** Compare two key identifiers.
- *
- * \param id1 First key identifier.
- * \param id2 Second key identifier.
- *
- * \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise.
- */
-static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1,
-                                           mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2)
-{
-    return id1 == id2;
-}
-
-/** Check whether a key identifier is null.
- *
- * \param key Key identifier.
- *
- * \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise.
- */
-static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key)
-{
-    return key == 0;
-}
-
-#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */
-#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
-#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ((mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ 0, 0 })
-#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(id) ((id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id))
-#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(id) ((id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner))
-
-/** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime.
- *
- * \param owner_id Identifier of the key owner.
- * \param key_id   Identifier of the key.
- */
-static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make(
-    mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner_id, psa_key_id_t key_id)
-{
-    return (mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ .MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) = key_id,
-                                   .MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner) = owner_id };
-}
-
-/** Compare two key identifiers.
- *
- * \param id1 First key identifier.
- * \param id2 Second key identifier.
- *
- * \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise.
- */
-static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1,
-                                           mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2)
-{
-    return (id1.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) == id2.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id)) &&
-           mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal(id1.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner), id2.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner));
-}
-
-/** Check whether a key identifier is null.
- *
- * \param key Key identifier.
- *
- * \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise.
- */
-static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key)
-{
-    return key.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) == 0;
-}
-
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup policy Key policies
- * @{
- */
-
-/* Note that key usage flags are embedded in the
- * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they
- * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes).
- */
-
-/** Whether the key may be exported.
- *
- * A public key or the public part of a key pair may always be exported
- * regardless of the value of this permission flag.
- *
- * If a key does not have export permission, implementations shall not
- * allow the key to be exported in plain form from the cryptoprocessor,
- * whether through psa_export_key() or through a proprietary interface.
- * The key may however be exportable in a wrapped form, i.e. in a form
- * where it is encrypted by another key.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT                    ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000001)
-
-/** Whether the key may be copied.
- *
- * This flag allows the use of psa_copy_key() to make a copy of the key
- * with the same policy or a more restrictive policy.
- *
- * For lifetimes for which the key is located in a secure element which
- * enforce the non-exportability of keys, copying a key outside the secure
- * element also requires the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT.
- * Copying the key inside the secure element is permitted with just
- * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY if the secure element supports it.
- * For keys with the lifetime #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or
- * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY
- * is sufficient to permit the copy.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY                      ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000002)
-
-/** Whether the key may be used to encrypt a message.
- *
- * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric encryption operation,
- * for an AEAD encryption-and-authentication operation,
- * or for an asymmetric encryption operation,
- * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
- *
- * For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT                   ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000100)
-
-/** Whether the key may be used to decrypt a message.
- *
- * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric decryption operation,
- * for an AEAD decryption-and-verification operation,
- * or for an asymmetric decryption operation,
- * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
- *
- * For a key pair, this concerns the private key.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT                   ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000200)
-
-/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message.
- *
- * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation or for
- * an asymmetric message signature operation, if otherwise permitted by the
- * key’s type and policy.
- *
- * For a key pair, this concerns the private key.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE              ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000400)
-
-/** Whether the key may be used to verify a message.
- *
- * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation or for
- * an asymmetric message signature verification operation, if otherwise
- * permitted by the key’s type and policy.
- *
- * For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE            ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000800)
-
-/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message.
- *
- * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation
- * or for an asymmetric signature operation,
- * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
- *
- * For a key pair, this concerns the private key.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH                 ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00001000)
-
-/** Whether the key may be used to verify a message signature.
- *
- * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation
- * or for an asymmetric signature verification operation,
- * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
- *
- * For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH               ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00002000)
-
-/** Whether the key may be used to derive other keys or produce a password
- * hash.
- *
- * This flag allows the key to be used for a key derivation operation or for
- * a key agreement operation, if otherwise permitted by the key's type and
- * policy.
- *
- * If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to
- * psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key derivation operation, then it
- * permits calling psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() or
- * psa_key_derivation_output_key() at the end of the operation.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE                    ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00004000)
-
-/** Whether the key may be used to verify the result of a key derivation,
- * including password hashing.
- *
- * This flag allows the key to be used:
- *
- * This flag allows the key to be used in a key derivation operation, if
- * otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
- *
- * If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to
- * psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key derivation operation, then it
- * permits calling psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() or
- * psa_key_derivation_verify_key() at the end of the operation.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION         ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00008000)
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup derivation Key derivation
- * @{
- */
-
-/* Key input steps are not embedded in the persistent storage, so you can
- * change them if needed: it's only an ABI change. */
-
-/** A secret input for key derivation.
- *
- * This should be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE
- * (passed to psa_key_derivation_input_key())
- * or the shared secret resulting from a key agreement
- * (obtained via psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()).
- *
- * The secret can also be a direct input (passed to
- * key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation
- * may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow
- * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(),
- * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), or
- * psa_key_derivation_verify_key(), but not
- * psa_key_derivation_output_key().
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET     ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0101)
-
-/** A low-entropy secret input for password hashing / key stretching.
- *
- * This is usually a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD (passed to
- * psa_key_derivation_input_key()) or a direct input (passed to
- * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()) that is a password or passphrase. It can
- * also be high-entropy secret such as a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE or
- * the shared secret resulting from a key agreement.
- *
- * The secret can also be a direct input (passed to
- * key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation
- * may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow
- * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(),
- * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), or
- * psa_key_derivation_verify_key(), but not
- * psa_key_derivation_output_key().
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD   ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0102)
-
-/** A high-entropy additional secret input for key derivation.
- *
- * This is typically the shared secret resulting from a key agreement obtained
- * via `psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()`. It may alternatively be a key of
- * type `PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE` passed to `psa_key_derivation_input_key()`, or
- * a direct input passed to `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET \
-    ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0103)
-
-/** A label for key derivation.
- *
- * This should be a direct input.
- * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL      ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0201)
-
-/** A salt for key derivation.
- *
- * This should be a direct input.
- * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA or
- * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT       ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0202)
-
-/** An information string for key derivation.
- *
- * This should be a direct input.
- * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO       ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0203)
-
-/** A seed for key derivation.
- *
- * This should be a direct input.
- * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED       ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0204)
-
-/** A cost parameter for password hashing / key stretching.
- *
- * This must be a direct input, passed to psa_key_derivation_input_integer().
- */
-#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST       ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0205)
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup helper_macros Helper macros
- * @{
- */
-
-/* Helper macros */
-
-/** Check if two AEAD algorithm identifiers refer to the same AEAD algorithm
- *  regardless of the tag length they encode.
- *
- * \param aead_alg_1 An AEAD algorithm identifier.
- * \param aead_alg_2 An AEAD algorithm identifier.
- *
- * \return           1 if both identifiers refer to the same AEAD algorithm,
- *                   0 otherwise.
- *                   Unspecified if neither \p aead_alg_1 nor \p aead_alg_2 are
- *                   a supported AEAD algorithm.
- */
-#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(aead_alg_1, aead_alg_2) \
-    (!(((aead_alg_1) ^ (aead_alg_2)) & \
-       ~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)))
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/**@}*/
-
-/** \defgroup interruptible Interruptible operations
- * @{
- */
-
-/** Maximum value for use with \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to determine
- *  the maximum number of ops allowed to be executed by an interruptible
- *  function in a single call.
- */
-#define PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED UINT32_MAX
-
-/**@}*/
-
-#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/error.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/error.h
deleted file mode 100644
index fee8c99..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/error.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2019-2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-
-/**
- * \file psa/error.h
- * \brief Standard error codes for the SPM and RoT Services
- */
-
-#ifndef __PSA_ERROR_H__
-#define __PSA_ERROR_H__
-
-#include <stdint.h>
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/* If #PSA_SUCCESS is already defined, it means that #psa_status_t
- * is also defined in an external header, so prevent its multiple
- * definition.
- */
-#ifndef PSA_SUCCESS
-typedef int32_t psa_status_t;
-#endif
-
-#define PSA_SUCCESS                     ((psa_status_t)0)
-
-#define PSA_ERROR_PROGRAMMER_ERROR      ((psa_status_t)-129)
-#define PSA_ERROR_CONNECTION_REFUSED    ((psa_status_t)-130)
-#define PSA_ERROR_CONNECTION_BUSY       ((psa_status_t)-131)
-#define PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR         ((psa_status_t)-132)
-#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED         ((psa_status_t)-133)
-#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED         ((psa_status_t)-134)
-#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT      ((psa_status_t)-135)
-#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE        ((psa_status_t)-136)
-#define PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE             ((psa_status_t)-137)
-#define PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL      ((psa_status_t)-138)
-#define PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS        ((psa_status_t)-139)
-#define PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST        ((psa_status_t)-140)
-#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY   ((psa_status_t)-141)
-#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE  ((psa_status_t)-142)
-#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA     ((psa_status_t)-143)
-#define PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE       ((psa_status_t)-144)
-#define PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-145)
-#define PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE       ((psa_status_t)-146)
-#define PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE      ((psa_status_t)-147)
-#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE     ((psa_status_t)-149)
-#define PSA_ERROR_DEPENDENCY_NEEDED     ((psa_status_t)-156)
-#define PSA_ERROR_FLASH_ABUSE           ((psa_status_t)-160)
-#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_POWER    ((psa_status_t)-161)
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* __PSA_ERROR_H__ */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/framework_feature.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/framework_feature.h
deleted file mode 100644
index bb9436e..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/framework_feature.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2021, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef __PSA_FRAMEWORK_FEATURE_H__
-#define __PSA_FRAMEWORK_FEATURE_H__
-
-#define PSA_FRAMEWORK_ISOLATION_LEVEL  1
-#define PSA_FRAMEWORK_HAS_MM_IOVEC 0
-
-#endif /* __PSA_FRAMEWORK_FEATURE_H__ */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa_manifest/sid.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa_manifest/sid.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 203ab4e..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa_manifest/sid.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2019-2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-
-/***********  WARNING: This is an auto-generated file. Do not edit!  ***********/
-
-#ifndef __PSA_MANIFEST_SID_H__
-#define __PSA_MANIFEST_SID_H__
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/******** TFM_SP_CRYPTO ********/
-#define TFM_CRYPTO_SID                                             (0x00000080U)
-#define TFM_CRYPTO_VERSION                                         (1U)
-#define TFM_CRYPTO_HANDLE                                          (0x40000100U)
-
-/******** TFM_SP_PLATFORM ********/
-#define TFM_PLATFORM_SERVICE_SID                                   (0x00000040U)
-#define TFM_PLATFORM_SERVICE_VERSION                               (1U)
-#define TFM_PLATFORM_SERVICE_HANDLE                                (0x40000105U)
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* __PSA_MANIFEST_SID_H__ */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_crypto_defs.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_crypto_defs.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 4b3cfca..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_crypto_defs.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,303 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2018-2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef __TFM_CRYPTO_DEFS_H__
-#define __TFM_CRYPTO_DEFS_H__
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include "psa/crypto.h"
-#ifdef PLATFORM_DEFAULT_CRYPTO_KEYS
-#include "crypto_keys/tfm_builtin_key_ids.h"
-#else
-#include "tfm_builtin_key_ids.h"
-#endif /* PLATFORM_DEFAULT_CRYPTO_KEYS */
-
-/**
- * \brief The maximum supported length of a nonce through the TF-M
- *        interfaces
- */
-#define TFM_CRYPTO_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH (16u)
-
-/**
- * \brief This type is used to overcome a limitation in the number of maximum
- *        IOVECs that can be used especially in psa_aead_encrypt and
- *        psa_aead_decrypt. By using this type we pack the nonce and the actual
- *        nonce_length at part of the same structure
- */
-struct tfm_crypto_aead_pack_input {
-    uint8_t nonce[TFM_CRYPTO_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
-    uint32_t nonce_length;
-};
-
-/**
- * \brief Structure used to pack non-pointer types in a call to PSA Crypto APIs
- *
- */
-struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec {
-    psa_key_id_t key_id;     /*!< Key id */
-    psa_algorithm_t alg;     /*!< Algorithm */
-    uint32_t op_handle;      /*!< Frontend context handle associated to a
-                              *   multipart operation
-                              */
-    size_t ad_length;        /*!< Additional Data length for multipart AEAD */
-    size_t plaintext_length; /*!< Plaintext length for multipart AEAD */
-
-    struct tfm_crypto_aead_pack_input aead_in; /*!< Packs AEAD-related inputs */
-
-    uint16_t function_id;    /*!< Used to identify the function in the
-                              *   API dispatcher to the service backend
-                              *   See tfm_crypto_func_sid for detail
-                              */
-    uint16_t step;           /*!< Key derivation step */
-    psa_pake_role_t role;    /*!< PAKE role */
-    union {
-        size_t capacity;     /*!< Key derivation capacity */
-        uint64_t value;      /*!< Key derivation integer for update*/
-    };
-};
-
-/**
- * \brief Type associated to the group of a function encoding. There can be
- *        nine groups (Random, Key management, Hash, MAC, Cipher, AEAD,
- *        Asym sign, Asym encrypt, Key derivation).
- */
-enum tfm_crypto_group_id {
-    TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_RANDOM = 0x0,
-    TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_KEY_MANAGEMENT,
-    TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_HASH,
-    TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_MAC,
-    TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_CIPHER,
-    TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_AEAD,
-    TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_ASYM_SIGN,
-    TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_ASYM_ENCRYPT,
-    TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_KEY_DERIVATION,
-    TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_PAKE,
-};
-
-/* Set of X macros describing each of the available PSA Crypto APIs */
-#define KEY_MANAGEMENT_FUNCS                       \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_GET_KEY_ATTRIBUTES)               \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_RESET_KEY_ATTRIBUTES)             \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_OPEN_KEY)                         \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_CLOSE_KEY)                        \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_IMPORT_KEY)                       \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_DESTROY_KEY)                      \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_EXPORT_KEY)                       \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY)                \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_PURGE_KEY)                        \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_COPY_KEY)                         \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_GENERATE_KEY)
-
-#define HASH_FUNCS                                 \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_HASH_COMPUTE)                     \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_HASH_COMPARE)                     \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_HASH_SETUP)                       \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_HASH_UPDATE)                      \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_HASH_CLONE)                       \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_HASH_FINISH)                      \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_HASH_VERIFY)                      \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_HASH_ABORT)
-
-#define MAC_FUNCS                                  \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_MAC_COMPUTE)                      \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_MAC_VERIFY)                       \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_MAC_SIGN_SETUP)                   \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_MAC_VERIFY_SETUP)                 \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_MAC_UPDATE)                       \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_MAC_SIGN_FINISH)                  \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_MAC_VERIFY_FINISH)                \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_MAC_ABORT)
-
-#define CIPHER_FUNCS                               \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_CIPHER_ENCRYPT)                   \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_CIPHER_DECRYPT)                   \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_SETUP)             \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_CIPHER_DECRYPT_SETUP)             \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_CIPHER_GENERATE_IV)               \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_CIPHER_SET_IV)                    \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_CIPHER_UPDATE)                    \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_CIPHER_FINISH)                    \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_CIPHER_ABORT)
-
-#define AEAD_FUNCS                                 \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_ENCRYPT)                     \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_DECRYPT)                     \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_ENCRYPT_SETUP)               \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_DECRYPT_SETUP)               \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_GENERATE_NONCE)              \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_SET_NONCE)                   \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_SET_LENGTHS)                 \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_UPDATE_AD)                   \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_UPDATE)                      \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_FINISH)                      \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_VERIFY)                      \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_ABORT)
-
-#define ASYMMETRIC_SIGN_FUNCS                      \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_ASYMMETRIC_SIGN_MESSAGE)          \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_ASYMMETRIC_VERIFY_MESSAGE)        \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_ASYMMETRIC_SIGN_HASH)             \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_ASYMMETRIC_VERIFY_HASH)
-
-#define AYSMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_FUNCS                   \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT)               \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT)
-
-#define KEY_DERIVATION_FUNCS                       \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT)                \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_SETUP)             \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_GET_CAPACITY)      \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_SET_CAPACITY)      \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_BYTES)       \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_KEY)         \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INTEGER)     \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_KEY_AGREEMENT)     \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_OUTPUT_BYTES)      \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_OUTPUT_KEY)        \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_ABORT)
-
-#define RANDOM_FUNCS                               \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_GENERATE_RANDOM)
-
-#define PAKE_FUNCS                                  \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_PAKE_SETUP)                        \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_PAKE_SET_ROLE)                     \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_PAKE_SET_USER)                     \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_PAKE_SET_PEER)                     \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_PAKE_SET_CONTEXT)                  \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_PAKE_OUTPUT)                       \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_PAKE_INPUT)                        \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_PAKE_GET_SHARED_KEY)               \
-    X(TFM_CRYPTO_PAKE_ABORT)
-
-/**
- * \brief Define function IDs in each group. The function ID will be encoded into
- *        tfm_crypto_func_sid below. Each group is defined as a dedicated enum
- */
-#define X(func_id)    func_id,
-enum tfm_crypto_key_management_func_id {
-    KEY_MANAGEMENT_FUNCS
-};
-enum tfm_crypto_hash_func_id {
-    HASH_FUNCS
-};
-enum tfm_crypto_mac_func_id {
-    MAC_FUNCS
-};
-enum tfm_crypto_cipher_func_id {
-    CIPHER_FUNCS
-};
-enum tfm_crypto_aead_func_id {
-    AEAD_FUNCS
-};
-enum tfm_crypto_asym_sign_func_id {
-    ASYMMETRIC_SIGN_FUNCS
-};
-enum tfm_crypto_asym_encrypt_func_id {
-    AYSMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_FUNCS
-};
-enum tfm_crypto_key_derivation_func_id {
-    KEY_DERIVATION_FUNCS
-};
-enum tfm_crypto_random_func_id {
-    RANDOM_FUNCS
-};
-enum tfm_crypto_pake_func_id {
-    PAKE_FUNCS
-};
-#undef X
-
-/**
- * \brief This macro is used to encode a function ID in a 16-bit value as the
- *        top 8 bits towards the MSB
- */
-#define FUNC_ID(func_id)    (((func_id) & 0xFF) << 8)
-
-/**
- * \brief This macro is used to extract the group_id from an encoded function_id
- *        by accessing the low 8 bits towards the LSB
- */
-#define TFM_CRYPTO_GET_GROUP_ID(_function_id)    \
-                        ((enum tfm_crypto_group_id)((_function_id) & 0xFF))
-/**
- * \brief This type defines numerical progressive values identifying a function API
- *        exposed through the interfaces (S or NS). It's used to dispatch the requests
- *        from S/NS to the corresponding API implementation in the Crypto service backend.
- *
- * \note Each function SID is encoded as uint16_t.
- *        +-----------+-----------+
- *        |  Func ID  |  Group ID |
- *        +-----------+-----------+
- *   (MSB)15         8 7          0(LSB)
- *
- *       where Func ID is defined in each group tfm_crypto_*_func_id enum above and Group ID
- *       is defined in \ref tfm_crypto_group_id.
- */
-enum tfm_crypto_func_sid {
-
-#define X(func_id)      func_id ## _SID = (uint16_t)((FUNC_ID(func_id)) | \
-                                   (TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_KEY_MANAGEMENT & 0xFF)),
-
-    KEY_MANAGEMENT_FUNCS
-
-#undef X
-#define X(func_id)      func_id ## _SID = (uint16_t)((FUNC_ID(func_id)) | \
-                                            (TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_HASH & 0xFF)),
-    HASH_FUNCS
-
-#undef X
-#define X(func_id)      func_id ## _SID = (uint16_t)((FUNC_ID(func_id)) | \
-                                            (TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_MAC & 0xFF)),
-    MAC_FUNCS
-
-#undef X
-#define X(func_id)      func_id ## _SID = (uint16_t)((FUNC_ID(func_id)) | \
-                                           (TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_CIPHER & 0xFF)),
-    CIPHER_FUNCS
-
-#undef X
-#define X(func_id)      func_id ## _SID = (uint16_t)((FUNC_ID(func_id)) | \
-                                             (TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_AEAD & 0xFF)),
-    AEAD_FUNCS
-
-#undef X
-#define X(func_id)      func_id ## _SID = (uint16_t)((FUNC_ID(func_id)) | \
-                                        (TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_ASYM_SIGN & 0xFF)),
-    ASYMMETRIC_SIGN_FUNCS
-
-#undef X
-#define X(func_id)      func_id ## _SID = (uint16_t)((FUNC_ID(func_id)) | \
-                                     (TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_ASYM_ENCRYPT & 0xFF)),
-    AYSMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_FUNCS
-
-#undef X
-#define X(func_id)      func_id ## _SID = (uint16_t)((FUNC_ID(func_id)) | \
-                                   (TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_KEY_DERIVATION & 0xFF)),
-    KEY_DERIVATION_FUNCS
-
-#undef X
-#define X(func_id)      func_id ## _SID = (uint16_t)((FUNC_ID(func_id)) | \
-                                           (TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_RANDOM & 0xFF)),
-    RANDOM_FUNCS
-
-#undef X
-#define X(func_id)      func_id ## _SID = (uint16_t)((FUNC_ID(func_id)) | \
-                                   (TFM_CRYPTO_GROUP_ID_PAKE & 0xFF)),
-    PAKE_FUNCS
-
-};
-#undef X
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* __TFM_CRYPTO_DEFS_H__ */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_ioctl_core_api.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_ioctl_core_api.h
deleted file mode 100644
index df3c8d6..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_ioctl_core_api.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2021 Nordic Semiconductor ASA
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- */
-
-/** @file
- * @brief TFM IOCTL API header.
- */
-
-
-#ifndef TFM_IOCTL_CORE_API_H__
-#define TFM_IOCTL_CORE_API_H__
-
-/**
- * @defgroup tfm_ioctl_api TFM IOCTL API
- * @{
- *
- */
-
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <tfm_platform_api.h>
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/** @brief Supported request types.
- */
-enum tfm_platform_ioctl_core_reqest_types_t {
-	TFM_PLATFORM_IOCTL_READ_SERVICE,
-	TFM_PLATFORM_IOCTL_GPIO_SERVICE,
-
-	/* Last core service, start platform specific from this value. */
-	TFM_PLATFORM_IOCTL_CORE_LAST
-};
-
-/** @brief Argument list for each platform read service.
- */
-struct tfm_read_service_args_t {
-	void *destination;
-	uint32_t addr;
-	size_t len;
-};
-
-
-/** @brief Output list for each read platform service
- */
-struct tfm_read_service_out_t {
-	uint32_t result;
-};
-
-enum tfm_gpio_service_type {
-	/** Select which MCU / Subsystem controls the pin */
-	TFM_GPIO_SERVICE_TYPE_PIN_MCU_SELECT = 0,
-};
-
-/** @brief Arguments for selecting the MCU to control a GPIO pin. */
-struct tfm_gpio_service_args_mcu_select {
-	uint32_t pin_number;
-	uint32_t mcu;
-};
-
-/** @brief Argument list for each platform GPIO service */
-struct tfm_gpio_service_args {
-	uint32_t type;
-	union {
-		struct tfm_gpio_service_args_mcu_select mcu_select;
-	};
-};
-
-/** @brief Output list for each GPIO platform service
- */
-struct tfm_gpio_service_out {
-	uint32_t result;
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief Perform a read operation.
- *
- * @param[out] destination   Pointer where read result is stored
- * @param[in]  addr          Address to read from
- * @param[in]  len           Number of bytes to read
- * @param[out] result        Result of operation
- *
- * @return Returns values as specified by the tfm_platform_err_t
- */
-enum tfm_platform_err_t tfm_platform_mem_read(void *destination, uint32_t addr,
-					      size_t len, uint32_t *result);
-
-/** @brief Represents an accepted read range.
- */
-struct tfm_read_service_range {
-	uint32_t start;
-	size_t size;
-};
-
-/**
- * @brief Perform a GPIO MCU select operation.
- *
- * @param pin_number         Pin_number.
- * @param mcu                MCU to control the pin, use nrf_gpio_pin_sel_t values.
-
- * @param[out] result        Result of operation
- *
- * @return Returns values as specified by the tfm_platform_err_t
- */
-enum tfm_platform_err_t tfm_platform_gpio_pin_mcu_select(uint32_t pin_number, uint32_t mcu,
-							 uint32_t *result);
-
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-/**
- * @}
- */
-
-#endif /* TFM_IOCTL_CORE_API_H__ */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_ns_client_ext.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_ns_client_ext.h
deleted file mode 100644
index b6e944c..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_ns_client_ext.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2021, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef __TFM_NS_CLIENT_EXT_H__
-#define __TFM_NS_CLIENT_EXT_H__
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-#include <stdint.h>
-
-#define TFM_NS_CLIENT_INVALID_TOKEN         0xFFFFFFFF
-
-/* TF-M NSID Error code */
-#define TFM_NS_CLIENT_ERR_SUCCESS           0x0
-#define TFM_NS_CLIENT_ERR_INVALID_TOKEN     0x1
-#define TFM_NS_CLIENT_ERR_INVALID_NSID      0x2
-#define TFM_NS_CLIENT_ERR_INVALID_ACCESS    0x3
-
-/**
- * \brief Initialize the non-secure client extension
- *
- * \details This function should be called before any other non-secure client
- *          APIs. It gives NSPE the opportunity to initialize the non-secure
- *          client extension in TF-M. Also, NSPE can get the number of allocated
- *          non-secure client context slots in the return value. That is useful
- *          if NSPE wants to decide the group (context) assignment at runtime.
- *
- * \param[in] ctx_requested The number of non-secure context requested from the
- *            NS entity. If request maximum available context, then set it to 0.
- *
- * \return Returns the number of non-secure context allocated to the NS entity.
- *         The allocated context number <= maximum supported context number.
- *         If the initialization is failed, then 0 is returned.
- */
-uint32_t tfm_nsce_init(uint32_t ctx_requested);
-
-/**
- * \brief Acquire the context for a non-secure client
- *
- * \details This function should be called before a non-secure client calling
- *          the PSA API into TF-M. It is to request the allocation of the
- *          context for the upcoming service call from that non-secure client.
- *          The non-secure clients in one group share the same context.
- *          The thread ID is used to identify the different non-secure clients.
- *
- * \param[in] group_id The group ID of the non-secure client
- * \param[in] thread_id The thread ID of the non-secure client
- *
- * \return Returns the token of the allocated context. 0xFFFFFFFF means the
- *         allocation failed and the token is invalid.
- */
-uint32_t tfm_nsce_acquire_ctx(uint8_t group_id, uint8_t thread_id);
-
-/**
- * \brief Release the context for the non-secure client
- *
- * \details This function should be called when a non-secure client is going to
- *          be terminated or will not call TF-M secure services in the future.
- *          It is to release the context allocated for the calling non-secure
- *          client. If the calling non-secure client is the only thread in the
- *          group, then the context will be deallocated. Otherwise, the context
- *          will still be taken for the other threads in the group.
- *
- * \param[in] token The token returned by tfm_nsce_acquire_ctx
- *
- * \return Returns the error code.
- */
-uint32_t tfm_nsce_release_ctx(uint32_t token);
-
-/**
- * \brief Load the context for the non-secure client
- *
- * \details This function should be called when a non-secure client is going to
- *          be scheduled in at the non-secure side.
- *          The caller is usually the scheduler of the RTOS.
- *          The non-secure client ID is managed by the non-secure world and
- *          passed to TF-M as the input parameter of TF-M.
- *
- * \param[in] token The token returned by tfm_nsce_acquire_ctx
- * \param[in] nsid The non-secure client ID for this client
- *
- * \return Returns the error code.
- */
-uint32_t tfm_nsce_load_ctx(uint32_t token, int32_t nsid);
-
-/**
- * \brief Save the context for the non-secure client
- *
- * \details This function should be called when a non-secure client is going to
- *          be scheduled out at the non-secure side.
- *          The caller is usually the scheduler of the RTOS.
- *
- * \param[in] token The token returned by tfm_nsce_acquire_ctx
- *
- * \return Returns the error code.
- */
-uint32_t tfm_nsce_save_ctx(uint32_t token);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* __TFM_NS_CLIENT_EXT_H__ */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_ns_interface.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_ns_interface.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 32a04c5..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_ns_interface.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2017-2021, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2023 Cypress Semiconductor Corporation (an Infineon company)
- * or an affiliate of Cypress Semiconductor Corporation. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-#ifndef __TFM_NS_INTERFACE_H__
-#define __TFM_NS_INTERFACE_H__
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include "tfm_veneers.h"
-
-typedef int32_t (*veneer_fn) (uint32_t arg0, uint32_t arg1,
-                              uint32_t arg2, uint32_t arg3);
-
-/**
- * \brief NS interface, veneer function dispatcher
- *
- * \details This function implements the dispatching mechanism for the
- *          desired veneer function, to be called with the parameters
- *          described from arg0 to arg3.
- *
- * \note    NSPE can use default implementation of this function or implement
- *          this function according to NS specific implementation and actual
- *          usage scenario.
- *
- * \param[in] fn   Function pointer to the veneer function desired
- * \param[in] arg0 Argument 0 of fn
- * \param[in] arg1 Argument 1 of fn
- * \param[in] arg2 Argument 2 of fn
- * \param[in] arg3 Argument 3 of fn
- *
- * \return Returns the same return value of the requested veneer function
- *
- * \note This API must ensure the return value is from the veneer function.
- *       Other unrecoverable errors must be considered as fatal error and should
- *       not return.
- */
-int32_t tfm_ns_interface_dispatch(veneer_fn fn,
-                                  uint32_t arg0, uint32_t arg1,
-                                  uint32_t arg2, uint32_t arg3);
-
-/**
- * \brief NS interface initialization function
- *
- * \details This function initializes TF-M NS interface.
- *
- * \note    NSPE can use default implementation of this function or implement
- *          this function according to NS specific implementation and actual
- *          usage scenario.
- *
- * \return \ref OS_WRAPPER_SUCCESS on success or \ref OS_WRAPPER_ERROR on error
- */
-uint32_t tfm_ns_interface_init(void);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* __TFM_NS_INTERFACE_H__ */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_platform_api.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_platform_api.h
deleted file mode 100644
index e925503..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_platform_api.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2018-2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef __TFM_PLATFORM_API__
-#define __TFM_PLATFORM_API__
-
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <stdbool.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include "psa/client.h"
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/**
- * \brief TFM secure partition platform API version
- */
-#define TFM_PLATFORM_API_VERSION_MAJOR (0)
-#define TFM_PLATFORM_API_VERSION_MINOR (3)
-
-#define TFM_PLATFORM_API_ID_NV_READ       (1010)
-#define TFM_PLATFORM_API_ID_NV_INCREMENT  (1011)
-#define TFM_PLATFORM_API_ID_SYSTEM_RESET  (1012)
-#define TFM_PLATFORM_API_ID_IOCTL         (1013)
-
-/*!
- * \enum tfm_platform_err_t
- *
- * \brief Platform service error types
- *
- */
-enum tfm_platform_err_t {
-    TFM_PLATFORM_ERR_SUCCESS = 0,
-    TFM_PLATFORM_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR,
-    TFM_PLATFORM_ERR_INVALID_PARAM,
-    TFM_PLATFORM_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED,
-
-    /* Following entry is only to ensure the error code of int size */
-    TFM_PLATFORM_ERR_FORCE_INT_SIZE = INT_MAX
-};
-
-typedef int32_t tfm_platform_ioctl_req_t;
-
-/*!
- * \brief Resets the system.
- *
- * \return Returns values as specified by the \ref tfm_platform_err_t
- */
-enum tfm_platform_err_t tfm_platform_system_reset(void);
-
-/*!
- * \brief Performs a platform-specific service
- *
- * \param[in]  request      Request identifier (valid values vary
- *                          based on the platform)
- * \param[in]  input        Input buffer to the requested service (or NULL)
- * \param[in,out] output    Output buffer to the requested service (or NULL)
- *
- * \return Returns values as specified by the \ref tfm_platform_err_t
- */
-enum tfm_platform_err_t tfm_platform_ioctl(tfm_platform_ioctl_req_t request,
-                                           psa_invec *input,
-                                           psa_outvec *output);
-
-/*!
- * \brief Increments the given non-volatile (NV) counter by one
- *
- * \param[in]  counter_id  NV counter ID.
- *
- * \return  TFM_PLATFORM_ERR_SUCCESS if the value is read correctly. Otherwise,
- *          it returns TFM_PLATFORM_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR.
- */
-enum tfm_platform_err_t
-tfm_platform_nv_counter_increment(uint32_t counter_id);
-
-/*!
- * \brief Reads the given non-volatile (NV) counter
- *
- * \param[in]  counter_id  NV counter ID.
- * \param[in]  size        Size of the buffer to store NV counter value
- *                         in bytes.
- * \param[out] val         Pointer to store the current NV counter value.
- *
- * \return  TFM_PLATFORM_ERR_SUCCESS if the value is read correctly. Otherwise,
- *          it returns TFM_PLATFORM_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR.
- */
-enum tfm_platform_err_t
-tfm_platform_nv_counter_read(uint32_t counter_id,
-                             uint32_t size, uint8_t *val);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* __TFM_PLATFORM_API__ */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_psa_call_pack.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_psa_call_pack.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 7cf62f8..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_psa_call_pack.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2021-2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef __TFM_PSA_CALL_PACK_H__
-#define __TFM_PSA_CALL_PACK_H__
-
-#include "psa/client.h"
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/*
- *  31           30-28   27    26-24  23-20   19     18-16   15-0
- * +------------+-----+------+-------+-----+-------+-------+------+
- * | NS vector  |     | NS   | invec |     | NS    | outvec| type |
- * | descriptor | Res | invec| number| Res | outvec| number|      |
- * +------------+-----+------+-------+-----+-------+-------+------+
- *
- * Res: Reserved.
- */
-#define TYPE_MASK            0xFFFFUL
-
-#define IN_LEN_OFFSET        24
-#define IN_LEN_MASK          (0x7UL << IN_LEN_OFFSET)
-
-#define OUT_LEN_OFFSET       16
-#define OUT_LEN_MASK         (0x7UL << OUT_LEN_OFFSET)
-
-/*
- * NS_VEC_DESC_BIT is referenced by inline assembly, which does not
- * support composited bit operations. So NS_VEC_DESC_BIT must be
- * defined as a number.
- */
-#define NS_VEC_DESC_BIT      0x80000000UL
-
-#define NS_INVEC_OFFSET      27
-#define NS_INVEC_BIT         (1UL << NS_INVEC_OFFSET)
-#define NS_OUTVEC_OFFSET     19
-#define NS_OUTVEC_BIT        (1UL << NS_OUTVEC_OFFSET)
-
-#define PARAM_PACK(type, in_len, out_len)                            \
-          ((((uint32_t)(type)) & TYPE_MASK)                        | \
-           ((((uint32_t)(in_len)) << IN_LEN_OFFSET) & IN_LEN_MASK) | \
-           ((((uint32_t)(out_len)) << OUT_LEN_OFFSET) & OUT_LEN_MASK))
-
-#define PARAM_UNPACK_TYPE(ctrl_param)                                \
-          ((int32_t)(int16_t)((ctrl_param) & TYPE_MASK))
-
-#define PARAM_UNPACK_IN_LEN(ctrl_param)                              \
-          ((size_t)(((ctrl_param) & IN_LEN_MASK) >> IN_LEN_OFFSET))
-
-#define PARAM_UNPACK_OUT_LEN(ctrl_param)                             \
-          ((size_t)(((ctrl_param) & OUT_LEN_MASK) >> OUT_LEN_OFFSET))
-
-#define PARAM_SET_NS_VEC(ctrl_param)    ((ctrl_param) | NS_VEC_DESC_BIT)
-#define PARAM_IS_NS_VEC(ctrl_param)     ((ctrl_param) & NS_VEC_DESC_BIT)
-
-#define PARAM_SET_NS_INVEC(ctrl_param)  ((ctrl_param) | NS_INVEC_BIT)
-#define PARAM_IS_NS_INVEC(ctrl_param)   ((ctrl_param) & NS_INVEC_BIT)
-#define PARAM_SET_NS_OUTVEC(ctrl_param) ((ctrl_param) | NS_OUTVEC_BIT)
-#define PARAM_IS_NS_OUTVEC(ctrl_param)  ((ctrl_param) & NS_OUTVEC_BIT)
-
-#define PARAM_HAS_IOVEC(ctrl_param)                                  \
-          ((ctrl_param) != (uint32_t)PARAM_UNPACK_TYPE(ctrl_param))
-
-psa_status_t tfm_psa_call_pack(psa_handle_t handle,
-                               uint32_t ctrl_param,
-                               const psa_invec *in_vec,
-                               psa_outvec *out_vec);
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* __TFM_PSA_CALL_PACK_H__ */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_veneers.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_veneers.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 24c4036..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/tfm_veneers.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2017-2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef __TFM_VENEERS_H__
-#define __TFM_VENEERS_H__
-
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include "psa/client.h"
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-#endif
-
-/********************* Secure function declarations ***************************/
-
-/**
- * \brief Retrieve the version of the PSA Framework API that is implemented.
- *
- * \return The version of the PSA Framework.
- */
-uint32_t tfm_psa_framework_version_veneer(void);
-
-/**
- * \brief Return version of secure function provided by secure binary.
- *
- * \param[in] sid               ID of secure service.
- *
- * \return Version number of secure function.
- */
-uint32_t tfm_psa_version_veneer(uint32_t sid);
-
-/**
- * \brief Connect to secure function.
- *
- * \param[in] sid               ID of secure service.
- * \param[in] version           Version of SF requested by client.
- *
- * \return Returns handle to connection.
- */
-psa_handle_t tfm_psa_connect_veneer(uint32_t sid, uint32_t version);
-
-/**
- * \brief Call a secure function referenced by a connection handle.
- *
- * \param[in] handle            Handle to connection.
- * \param[in] ctrl_param        Parameters combined in uint32_t,
- *                              includes request type, in_num and out_num.
- * \param[in] in_vec            Array of input \ref psa_invec structures.
- * \param[in,out] out_vec       Array of output \ref psa_outvec structures.
- *
- * \return Returns \ref psa_status_t status code.
- */
-psa_status_t tfm_psa_call_veneer(psa_handle_t handle,
-                                 uint32_t ctrl_param,
-                                 const psa_invec *in_vec,
-                                 psa_outvec *out_vec);
-
-/**
- * \brief Close connection to secure function referenced by a connection handle.
- *
- * \param[in] handle            Handle to connection
- */
-void tfm_psa_close_veneer(psa_handle_t handle);
-
-/***************** End Secure function declarations ***************************/
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-#endif
-
-#endif /* __TFM_VENEERS_H__ */
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/lib/s_veneers.o b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/lib/s_veneers.o
deleted file mode 100644
index c4ae99b..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/lib/s_veneers.o
+++ /dev/null
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/src/os_wrapper/tfm_ns_interface_bare_metal.c b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/src/os_wrapper/tfm_ns_interface_bare_metal.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 01da8b8..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/src/os_wrapper/tfm_ns_interface_bare_metal.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2023 Cypress Semiconductor Corporation (an Infineon company)
- * or an affiliate of Cypress Semiconductor Corporation. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-
-/* This file provides implementation of TF-M NS os wrapper functions for the
- * bare metal use case.
- *
- * \note  This implementation does not provide multithread safety, so it
- *        shouldn't be used in RTOS environment.
- */
-
-#include "tfm_ns_interface.h"
-
-int32_t tfm_ns_interface_dispatch(veneer_fn fn,
-                                  uint32_t arg0, uint32_t arg1,
-                                  uint32_t arg2, uint32_t arg3)
-{
-    return fn(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3);
-}
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/src/os_wrapper/tfm_ns_interface_rtos.c b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/src/os_wrapper/tfm_ns_interface_rtos.c
deleted file mode 100644
index a1f7727..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/src/os_wrapper/tfm_ns_interface_rtos.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2017-2021, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- * Copyright (c) 2023 Cypress Semiconductor Corporation (an Infineon company)
- * or an affiliate of Cypress Semiconductor Corporation. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-
-/* This file provides implementation of TF-M NS os wrapper functions for the
- * RTOS use case. This implementation provides multithread safety, so it
- * can be used in RTOS environment.
- */
-
-#include <stdint.h>
-
-#include "os_wrapper/mutex.h"
-
-#include "tfm_ns_interface.h"
-
-/**
- * \brief the ns_lock ID
- */
-static void *ns_lock_handle = NULL;
-
-int32_t tfm_ns_interface_dispatch(veneer_fn fn,
-                                  uint32_t arg0, uint32_t arg1,
-                                  uint32_t arg2, uint32_t arg3)
-{
-    int32_t result;
-
-    /* TFM request protected by NS lock */
-    while (os_wrapper_mutex_acquire(ns_lock_handle, OS_WRAPPER_WAIT_FOREVER)
-            != OS_WRAPPER_SUCCESS) {
-    }
-
-    result = fn(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3);
-
-    while (os_wrapper_mutex_release(ns_lock_handle) != OS_WRAPPER_SUCCESS) {
-    }
-
-    return result;
-}
-
-uint32_t tfm_ns_interface_init(void)
-{
-    void *handle;
-
-    handle = os_wrapper_mutex_create();
-    if (!handle) {
-        return OS_WRAPPER_ERROR;
-    }
-
-    ns_lock_handle = handle;
-    return OS_WRAPPER_SUCCESS;
-}
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/src/tfm_crypto_api.c b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/src/tfm_crypto_api.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 4dc7ea8..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/src/tfm_crypto_api.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1849 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2018-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-
-#include "tfm_crypto_defs.h"
-#include "psa/crypto.h"
-#include "psa/client.h"
-#include "psa_manifest/sid.h"
-
-#define API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec)          \
-    psa_call(TFM_CRYPTO_HANDLE, PSA_IPC_CALL,  \
-             in_vec, IOVEC_LEN(in_vec),        \
-             out_vec, IOVEC_LEN(out_vec))
-#define API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec)         \
-    psa_call(TFM_CRYPTO_HANDLE, PSA_IPC_CALL,  \
-             in_vec, IOVEC_LEN(in_vec),        \
-             (psa_outvec *)NULL, 0)
-
-/*!
- * \def CONFIG_TFM_CRYPTO_API_RENAME
- *
- * \brief By setting this to 1, system integrators can rename the symbols of the
- *        PSA Crypto APIs available in the TF-M interface. It allows flexibility
- *        for some integration setups where multiple providers of the PSA Crypto
- *        APIs are available at link time. Normally this configuration option
- *        should not be enabled when building the Secure interface because the
- *        secure partitions will just use the standard function names. By default
- *        it prepends the "tfm_crypto__" prefix.
- *
- * \note  This config option is not available through the TF-M configuration as
- *        it's for NS applications and system integrators to enable.
- */
-
-/*!
- * \def TFM_CRYPTO_API(ret, fun)
- *
- * \brief Define the function signature of a TF-M Crypto API with return
- *        type \a ret and PSA Crypto API function name \a fun
- *
- * \param ret return type associated to the API
- * \param fun API name (e.g. a PSA Crypto API function name)
- *
- * \returns Function signature
- */
-
-#if CONFIG_TFM_CRYPTO_API_RENAME == 1
-#define TFM_CRYPTO_API(ret, fun) ret tfm_crypto__##fun
-#else
-#define TFM_CRYPTO_API(ret, fun) ret fun
-#endif /* CONFIG_TFM_CRYPTO_API_RENAME */
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_crypto_init)(void)
-{
-    /* Service init is performed during TFM boot up,
-     * so application level initialisation is empty
-     */
-    return PSA_SUCCESS;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_open_key)(psa_key_id_t id,
-                                           psa_key_id_t *key)
-{
-    const struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_OPEN_KEY_SID,
-        .key_id = id,
-    };
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = key, .len = sizeof(psa_key_id_t)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_close_key)(psa_key_id_t key)
-{
-    const struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_CLOSE_KEY_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-    };
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_import_key)(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                                             const uint8_t *data,
-                                             size_t data_length,
-                                             psa_key_id_t *key)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_IMPORT_KEY_SID,
-    };
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = attributes, .len = sizeof(psa_key_attributes_t)},
-        {.base = data, .len = data_length}
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = key, .len = sizeof(psa_key_id_t)}
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_destroy_key)(psa_key_id_t key)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_DESTROY_KEY_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-    };
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_get_key_attributes)(psa_key_id_t key,
-                                                     psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_GET_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-    };
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = attributes, .len = sizeof(psa_key_attributes_t)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(void, psa_reset_key_attributes)(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_RESET_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_SID,
-    };
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = attributes, .len = sizeof(psa_key_attributes_t)},
-    };
-
-    (void)API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-    return;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_export_key)(psa_key_id_t key,
-                                             uint8_t *data,
-                                             size_t data_size,
-                                             size_t *data_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_EXPORT_KEY_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-    };
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = data, .len = data_size}
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-
-    *data_length = out_vec[0].len;
-
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_export_public_key)(psa_key_id_t key,
-                                                    uint8_t *data,
-                                                    size_t data_size,
-                                                    size_t *data_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = data, .len = data_size}
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-
-    *data_length = out_vec[0].len;
-
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_purge_key)(psa_key_id_t key)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_PURGE_KEY_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-    };
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_copy_key)(psa_key_id_t source_key,
-                                           const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                                           psa_key_id_t *target_key)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_COPY_KEY_SID,
-        .key_id = source_key,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = attributes, .len = sizeof(psa_key_attributes_t)},
-    };
-
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = target_key, .len = sizeof(psa_key_id_t)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_cipher_generate_iv)(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
-                                                     unsigned char *iv,
-                                                     size_t iv_size,
-                                                     size_t *iv_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_CIPHER_GENERATE_IV_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = iv, .len = iv_size},
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-
-    *iv_length = out_vec[0].len;
-
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_cipher_set_iv)(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
-                                                const unsigned char *iv,
-                                                size_t iv_length)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_CIPHER_SET_IV_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = iv, .len = iv_length},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_cipher_encrypt_setup)(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
-                                                       psa_key_id_t key,
-                                                       psa_algorithm_t alg)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_SETUP_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .alg = alg,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_cipher_decrypt_setup)(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
-                                                       psa_key_id_t key,
-                                                       psa_algorithm_t alg)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_CIPHER_DECRYPT_SETUP_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .alg = alg,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_cipher_update)(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
-                                                const uint8_t *input,
-                                                size_t input_length,
-                                                unsigned char *output,
-                                                size_t output_size,
-                                                size_t *output_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_CIPHER_UPDATE_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = input, .len = input_length},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = output, .len = output_size}
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-
-    *output_length = out_vec[0].len;
-
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_cipher_abort)(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_CIPHER_ABORT_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_cipher_finish)(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
-                                                uint8_t *output,
-                                                size_t output_size,
-                                                size_t *output_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_CIPHER_FINISH_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-        {.base = output, .len = output_size},
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-
-    *output_length = out_vec[1].len;
-
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_hash_setup)(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
-                                             psa_algorithm_t alg)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_HASH_SETUP_SID,
-        .alg = alg,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_hash_update)(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
-                                              const uint8_t *input,
-                                              size_t input_length)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_HASH_UPDATE_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = input, .len = input_length},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_hash_finish)(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
-                                              uint8_t *hash,
-                                              size_t hash_size,
-                                              size_t *hash_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_HASH_FINISH_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-        {.base = hash, .len = hash_size},
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-
-    *hash_length = out_vec[1].len;
-
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_hash_verify)(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
-                                              const uint8_t *hash,
-                                              size_t hash_length)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_HASH_VERIFY_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = hash, .len = hash_length},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_hash_abort)(psa_hash_operation_t *operation)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_HASH_ABORT_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_hash_clone)(const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation,
-                                             psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_HASH_CLONE_SID,
-        .op_handle = source_operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    if (target_operation && (target_operation->handle != 0)) {
-        return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
-    }
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = &(target_operation->handle),
-         .len = sizeof(target_operation->handle)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(target_operation->handle),
-         .len = sizeof(target_operation->handle)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_hash_compute)(psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                               const uint8_t *input,
-                                               size_t input_length,
-                                               uint8_t *hash,
-                                               size_t hash_size,
-                                               size_t *hash_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_HASH_COMPUTE_SID,
-        .alg = alg,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = input, .len = input_length},
-    };
-
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = hash, .len = hash_size}
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-
-    *hash_length = out_vec[0].len;
-
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_hash_compare)(psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                               const uint8_t *input,
-                                               size_t input_length,
-                                               const uint8_t *hash,
-                                               size_t hash_length)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_HASH_COMPARE_SID,
-        .alg = alg,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = input, .len = input_length},
-        {.base = hash, .len = hash_length},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_mac_sign_setup)(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
-                                                 psa_key_id_t key,
-                                                 psa_algorithm_t alg)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_MAC_SIGN_SETUP_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .alg = alg,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_mac_verify_setup)(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
-                                                   psa_key_id_t key,
-                                                   psa_algorithm_t alg)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_MAC_VERIFY_SETUP_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .alg = alg,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_mac_update)(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
-                                             const uint8_t *input,
-                                             size_t input_length)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_MAC_UPDATE_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = input, .len = input_length},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_mac_sign_finish)(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
-                                                  uint8_t *mac,
-                                                  size_t mac_size,
-                                                  size_t *mac_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_MAC_SIGN_FINISH_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-        {.base = mac, .len = mac_size},
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-
-    *mac_length = out_vec[1].len;
-
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_mac_verify_finish)(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
-                                                    const uint8_t *mac,
-                                                    size_t mac_length)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_MAC_VERIFY_FINISH_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = mac, .len = mac_length},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_mac_abort)(psa_mac_operation_t *operation)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_MAC_ABORT_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_aead_encrypt)(psa_key_id_t key,
-                                               psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                               const uint8_t *nonce,
-                                               size_t nonce_length,
-                                               const uint8_t *additional_data,
-                                               size_t additional_data_length,
-                                               const uint8_t *plaintext,
-                                               size_t plaintext_length,
-                                               uint8_t *ciphertext,
-                                               size_t ciphertext_size,
-                                               size_t *ciphertext_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_ENCRYPT_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .alg = alg,
-        .aead_in = {.nonce = {0}, .nonce_length = 0}
-    };
-
-    /* Sanitize the optional input */
-    if ((additional_data == NULL) && (additional_data_length != 0)) {
-        return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-    }
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = NULL, .len = 0},
-        {.base = plaintext, .len = plaintext_length},
-        {.base = additional_data, .len = additional_data_length},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = ciphertext, .len = ciphertext_size},
-    };
-
-    if (nonce_length > TFM_CRYPTO_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH) {
-        return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-    }
-
-    if (nonce != NULL) {
-        for (size_t idx = 0; idx < nonce_length; idx++) {
-            iov.aead_in.nonce[idx] = nonce[idx];
-        }
-        iov.aead_in.nonce_length = nonce_length;
-    }
-
-    in_vec[0].base = &iov;
-    in_vec[0].len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec);
-
-    size_t in_len = IOVEC_LEN(in_vec);
-
-    if (additional_data == NULL) {
-        in_len--;
-    }
-    status = psa_call(TFM_CRYPTO_HANDLE, PSA_IPC_CALL, in_vec, in_len,
-                      out_vec, IOVEC_LEN(out_vec));
-
-    *ciphertext_length = out_vec[0].len;
-
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_aead_decrypt)(psa_key_id_t key,
-                                               psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                               const uint8_t *nonce,
-                                               size_t nonce_length,
-                                               const uint8_t *additional_data,
-                                               size_t additional_data_length,
-                                               const uint8_t *ciphertext,
-                                               size_t ciphertext_length,
-                                               uint8_t *plaintext,
-                                               size_t plaintext_size,
-                                               size_t *plaintext_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_DECRYPT_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .alg = alg,
-        .aead_in = {.nonce = {0}, .nonce_length = 0}
-    };
-
-    /* Sanitize the optional input */
-    if ((additional_data == NULL) && (additional_data_length != 0)) {
-        return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-    }
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = NULL, .len = 0},
-        {.base = ciphertext, .len = ciphertext_length},
-        {.base = additional_data, .len = additional_data_length},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = plaintext, .len = plaintext_size},
-    };
-
-    if (nonce_length > TFM_CRYPTO_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH) {
-        return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-    }
-
-    if (nonce != NULL) {
-        for (size_t idx = 0; idx < nonce_length; idx++) {
-            iov.aead_in.nonce[idx] = nonce[idx];
-        }
-        iov.aead_in.nonce_length = nonce_length;
-    }
-
-    in_vec[0].base = &iov;
-    in_vec[0].len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec);
-
-    size_t in_len = IOVEC_LEN(in_vec);
-
-    if (additional_data == NULL) {
-        in_len--;
-    }
-    status = psa_call(TFM_CRYPTO_HANDLE, PSA_IPC_CALL, in_vec, in_len,
-                      out_vec, IOVEC_LEN(out_vec));
-
-    *plaintext_length = out_vec[0].len;
-
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_aead_encrypt_setup)(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
-                                                     psa_key_id_t key,
-                                                     psa_algorithm_t alg)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_ENCRYPT_SETUP_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .alg = alg,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)}
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)}
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_aead_decrypt_setup)(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
-                                                     psa_key_id_t key,
-                                                     psa_algorithm_t alg)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_DECRYPT_SETUP_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .alg = alg,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)}
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)}
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_aead_generate_nonce)(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
-                                                      uint8_t *nonce,
-                                                      size_t nonce_size,
-                                                      size_t *nonce_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_GENERATE_NONCE_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = nonce, .len = nonce_size}
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-
-    *nonce_length = out_vec[0].len;
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_aead_set_nonce)(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
-                                                 const uint8_t *nonce,
-                                                 size_t nonce_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_SET_NONCE_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = nonce, .len = nonce_length}
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_aead_set_lengths)(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
-                                                   size_t ad_length,
-                                                   size_t plaintext_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_SET_LENGTHS_SID,
-        .ad_length = ad_length,
-        .plaintext_length = plaintext_length,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_aead_update_ad)(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
-                                                 const uint8_t *input,
-                                                 size_t input_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_UPDATE_AD_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    /* Sanitize the optional input */
-    if ((input == NULL) && (input_length != 0)) {
-        return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-    }
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = input, .len = input_length}
-    };
-
-    size_t in_len = IOVEC_LEN(in_vec);
-
-    if (input == NULL) {
-        in_len--;
-    }
-    status = psa_call(TFM_CRYPTO_HANDLE, PSA_IPC_CALL, in_vec, in_len,
-                      NULL, 0);
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_aead_update)(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
-                                              const uint8_t *input,
-                                              size_t input_length,
-                                              uint8_t *output,
-                                              size_t output_size,
-                                              size_t *output_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_UPDATE_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    /* Sanitize the optional input */
-    if ((input == NULL) && (input_length != 0)) {
-        return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-    }
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = input, .len = input_length}
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = output, .len = output_size},
-    };
-
-    size_t in_len = IOVEC_LEN(in_vec);
-
-    if (input == NULL) {
-        in_len--;
-    }
-    status = psa_call(TFM_CRYPTO_HANDLE, PSA_IPC_CALL, in_vec, in_len,
-                      out_vec, IOVEC_LEN(out_vec));
-
-    *output_length = out_vec[0].len;
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_aead_finish)(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
-                                              uint8_t *ciphertext,
-                                              size_t ciphertext_size,
-                                              size_t *ciphertext_length,
-                                              uint8_t *tag,
-                                              size_t tag_size,
-                                              size_t *tag_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_FINISH_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    /* Sanitize the optional output */
-    if ((ciphertext == NULL) && (ciphertext_size != 0)) {
-        return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-    }
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-        {.base = tag, .len = tag_size},
-        {.base = ciphertext, .len = ciphertext_size}
-    };
-
-    size_t out_len = IOVEC_LEN(out_vec);
-
-    if (ciphertext == NULL || ciphertext_size == 0) {
-        out_len--;
-    }
-    if ((out_len == 3) && (ciphertext_length == NULL)) {
-        return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-    }
-
-    status = psa_call(TFM_CRYPTO_HANDLE, PSA_IPC_CALL,
-                      in_vec, IOVEC_LEN(in_vec),
-                      out_vec, out_len);
-
-    if (out_len == 3) {
-        *ciphertext_length = out_vec[2].len;
-    } else {
-        *ciphertext_length = 0;
-    }
-
-    *tag_length = out_vec[1].len;
-
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_aead_verify)(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
-                                              uint8_t *plaintext,
-                                              size_t plaintext_size,
-                                              size_t *plaintext_length,
-                                              const uint8_t *tag,
-                                              size_t tag_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_VERIFY_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    /* Sanitize the optional output */
-    if ((plaintext == NULL) && (plaintext_size != 0)) {
-        return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-    }
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = tag, .len = tag_length}
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-        {.base = plaintext, .len = plaintext_size}
-    };
-
-    size_t out_len = IOVEC_LEN(out_vec);
-
-    if (plaintext == NULL || plaintext_size == 0) {
-        out_len--;
-    }
-    if ((out_len == 2) && (plaintext_length == NULL)) {
-        return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-    }
-
-    status = psa_call(TFM_CRYPTO_HANDLE, PSA_IPC_CALL,
-                      in_vec, IOVEC_LEN(in_vec),
-                      out_vec, out_len);
-
-    if (out_len == 2) {
-        *plaintext_length = out_vec[1].len;
-    } else {
-        *plaintext_length = 0;
-    }
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_aead_abort)(psa_aead_operation_t *operation)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_AEAD_ABORT_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_sign_message)(psa_key_id_t key,
-                                               psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                               const uint8_t *input,
-                                               size_t input_length,
-                                               uint8_t *signature,
-                                               size_t signature_size,
-                                               size_t *signature_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_ASYMMETRIC_SIGN_MESSAGE_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .alg = alg,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = input, .len = input_length},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = signature, .len = signature_size},
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-
-    *signature_length = out_vec[0].len;
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_verify_message)(psa_key_id_t key,
-                                                 psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                                 const uint8_t *input,
-                                                 size_t input_length,
-                                                 const uint8_t *signature,
-                                                 size_t signature_length)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_ASYMMETRIC_VERIFY_MESSAGE_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .alg = alg
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = input, .len = input_length},
-        {.base = signature, .len = signature_length}
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_sign_hash)(psa_key_id_t key,
-                                            psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                            const uint8_t *hash,
-                                            size_t hash_length,
-                                            uint8_t *signature,
-                                            size_t signature_size,
-                                            size_t *signature_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_ASYMMETRIC_SIGN_HASH_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .alg = alg,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = hash, .len = hash_length},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = signature, .len = signature_size},
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-
-    *signature_length = out_vec[0].len;
-
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_verify_hash)(psa_key_id_t key,
-                                              psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                              const uint8_t *hash,
-                                              size_t hash_length,
-                                              const uint8_t *signature,
-                                              size_t signature_length)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_ASYMMETRIC_VERIFY_HASH_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .alg = alg
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = hash, .len = hash_length},
-        {.base = signature, .len = signature_length}
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_asymmetric_encrypt)(psa_key_id_t key,
-                                                     psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                                     const uint8_t *input,
-                                                     size_t input_length,
-                                                     const uint8_t *salt,
-                                                     size_t salt_length,
-                                                     uint8_t *output,
-                                                     size_t output_size,
-                                                     size_t *output_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .alg = alg
-    };
-
-    /* Sanitize the optional input */
-    if ((salt == NULL) && (salt_length != 0)) {
-        return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-    }
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = input, .len = input_length},
-        {.base = salt, .len = salt_length}
-    };
-
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = output, .len = output_size},
-    };
-
-    size_t in_len = IOVEC_LEN(in_vec);
-
-    if (salt == NULL) {
-        in_len--;
-    }
-    status = psa_call(TFM_CRYPTO_HANDLE, PSA_IPC_CALL, in_vec, in_len,
-                      out_vec, IOVEC_LEN(out_vec));
-
-    *output_length = out_vec[0].len;
-
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_asymmetric_decrypt)(psa_key_id_t key,
-                                                     psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                                     const uint8_t *input,
-                                                     size_t input_length,
-                                                     const uint8_t *salt,
-                                                     size_t salt_length,
-                                                     uint8_t *output,
-                                                     size_t output_size,
-                                                     size_t *output_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .alg = alg
-    };
-
-    /* Sanitize the optional input */
-    if ((salt == NULL) && (salt_length != 0)) {
-        return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-    }
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = input, .len = input_length},
-        {.base = salt, .len = salt_length}
-    };
-
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = output, .len = output_size},
-    };
-
-    size_t in_len = IOVEC_LEN(in_vec);
-
-    if (salt == NULL) {
-        in_len--;
-    }
-    status = psa_call(TFM_CRYPTO_HANDLE, PSA_IPC_CALL, in_vec, in_len,
-                      out_vec, IOVEC_LEN(out_vec));
-
-    *output_length = out_vec[0].len;
-
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_key_derivation_get_capacity)(
-                                const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-                                size_t *capacity)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_GET_CAPACITY_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = capacity, .len = sizeof(size_t)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_key_derivation_output_bytes)(
-                                      psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-                                      uint8_t *output,
-                                      size_t output_length)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_OUTPUT_BYTES_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = output, .len = output_length},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_key_derivation_input_key)(
-                                      psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-                                      psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
-                                      psa_key_id_t key)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_KEY_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .step = step,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_key_derivation_abort)(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_ABORT_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_key_derivation_key_agreement)(
-                                      psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-                                      psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
-                                      psa_key_id_t private_key,
-                                      const uint8_t *peer_key,
-                                      size_t peer_key_length)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_KEY_AGREEMENT_SID,
-        .key_id = private_key,
-        .step = step,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = peer_key, .len = peer_key_length},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_generate_random)(uint8_t *output,
-                                                  size_t output_size)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_GENERATE_RANDOM_SID,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = output, .len = output_size},
-    };
-
-    if (output_size == 0) {
-        return PSA_SUCCESS;
-    }
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_generate_key)(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                                               psa_key_id_t *key)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_GENERATE_KEY_SID,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = attributes, .len = sizeof(psa_key_attributes_t)},
-    };
-
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = key, .len = sizeof(psa_key_id_t)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_mac_compute)(psa_key_id_t key,
-                                              psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                              const uint8_t *input,
-                                              size_t input_length,
-                                              uint8_t *mac,
-                                              size_t mac_size,
-                                              size_t *mac_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_MAC_COMPUTE_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .alg = alg,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = input, .len = input_length},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = mac, .len = mac_size},
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-
-    *mac_length = out_vec[0].len;
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_mac_verify)(psa_key_id_t key,
-                                             psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                             const uint8_t *input,
-                                             size_t input_length,
-                                             const uint8_t *mac,
-                                             const size_t mac_length)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_MAC_VERIFY_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .alg = alg,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = input, .len = input_length},
-        {.base = mac, .len = mac_length},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_cipher_encrypt)(psa_key_id_t key,
-                                                 psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                                 const uint8_t *input,
-                                                 size_t input_length,
-                                                 uint8_t *output,
-                                                 size_t output_size,
-                                                 size_t *output_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .alg = alg,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = input, .len = input_length},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = output, .len = output_size}
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-
-    *output_length = out_vec[0].len;
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_cipher_decrypt)(psa_key_id_t key,
-                                                 psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                                 const uint8_t *input,
-                                                 size_t input_length,
-                                                 uint8_t *output,
-                                                 size_t output_size,
-                                                 size_t *output_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_CIPHER_DECRYPT_SID,
-        .key_id = key,
-        .alg = alg,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = input, .len = input_length},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = output, .len = output_size}
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-
-    *output_length = out_vec[0].len;
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_raw_key_agreement)(psa_algorithm_t alg,
-                                                    psa_key_id_t private_key,
-                                                    const uint8_t *peer_key,
-                                                    size_t peer_key_length,
-                                                    uint8_t *output,
-                                                    size_t output_size,
-                                                    size_t *output_length)
-{
-    psa_status_t status;
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_SID,
-        .alg = alg,
-        .key_id = private_key
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = peer_key, .len = peer_key_length},
-    };
-
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = output, .len = output_size},
-    };
-
-    status = API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-
-    *output_length = out_vec[0].len;
-
-    return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_key_derivation_setup)(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-                                                       psa_algorithm_t alg)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_SETUP_SID,
-        .alg = alg,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_key_derivation_set_capacity)(
-                                      psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-                                      size_t capacity)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_SET_CAPACITY_SID,
-        .capacity = capacity,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_key_derivation_input_bytes)(
-                                      psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-                                      psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
-                                      const uint8_t *data,
-                                      size_t data_length)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_BYTES_SID,
-        .step = step,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = data, .len = data_length},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_key_derivation_output_key)(
-                                      const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
-                                      psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-                                      psa_key_id_t *key)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_OUTPUT_KEY_SID,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-        {.base = attributes, .len = sizeof(psa_key_attributes_t)},
-    };
-
-    psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-        {.base = key, .len = sizeof(psa_key_id_t)}
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_pake_setup)
-(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, psa_key_id_t password_key,
- const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) {
-  struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {.function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_PAKE_SETUP_SID,
-                                      .op_handle = operation->handle,
-                                      .key_id = password_key};
-
-  psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-      {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-      {.base = cipher_suite, .len = sizeof(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t)},
-  };
-
-  psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-      {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-  };
-
-  return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_pake_set_role)
-(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, psa_pake_role_t role) {
-  struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-      .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_PAKE_SET_ROLE_SID,
-      .op_handle = operation->handle,
-      .role = role,
-  };
-
-  psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-      {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-  };
-
-  return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_pake_set_user)
-(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *user_id, size_t user_id_len) {
-  struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-      .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_PAKE_SET_USER_SID,
-      .op_handle = operation->handle,
-  };
-
-  psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-      {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-      {.base = user_id, .len = user_id_len},
-  };
-
-  return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_pake_set_peer)
-(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *peer_id, size_t peer_id_len) {
-  struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-      .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_PAKE_SET_PEER_SID,
-      .op_handle = operation->handle,
-  };
-
-  psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-      {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-      {.base = peer_id, .len = peer_id_len},
-  };
-
-  return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_pake_set_context)
-(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, const uint8_t *context, size_t context_len) {
-  struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-      .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_PAKE_SET_CONTEXT_SID,
-      .op_handle = operation->handle,
-  };
-
-  psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-      {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-      {.base = context, .len = context_len},
-  };
-
-  return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_pake_output)
-(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, psa_pake_step_t step, uint8_t *output,
- size_t output_size, size_t *output_length) {
-  psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
-  struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-      .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_PAKE_OUTPUT_SID,
-      .op_handle = operation->handle,
-      .step = step,
-  };
-
-  psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-      {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-  };
-
-  psa_outvec out_vec[] = {{.base = output, .len = output_size}};
-
-  status = API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-
-  *output_length = out_vec[0].len;
-
-  return status;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_pake_input)
-(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, psa_pake_step_t step, const uint8_t *input,
- size_t input_length) {
-  struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-      .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_PAKE_INPUT_SID,
-      .op_handle = operation->handle,
-      .step = step,
-  };
-
-  psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-      {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-      {.base = input, .len = input_length},
-  };
-
-  return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_pake_get_shared_key)
-(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
- mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) {
-  struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-      .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_PAKE_GET_SHARED_KEY_SID,
-      .op_handle = operation->handle,
-  };
-
-  psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-      {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-      {.base = attributes, .len = sizeof(psa_key_attributes_t)},
-  };
-
-  psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-      {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-      {.base = key, .len = sizeof(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t)}};
-
-  return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_pake_abort)(psa_pake_operation_t *operation) {
-  struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-      .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_PAKE_ABORT_SID,
-      .op_handle = operation->handle,
-  };
-
-  psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-      {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-  };
-  psa_outvec out_vec[] = {
-      {.base = &(operation->handle), .len = sizeof(uint32_t)},
-  };
-
-  return API_DISPATCH(in_vec, out_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_key_derivation_input_integer)(
-                                      psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-                                      psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
-                                      uint64_t value)
-{
-    struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
-        .function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INTEGER_SID,
-        .step = step,
-        .value = value,
-        .op_handle = operation->handle,
-    };
-
-    psa_invec in_vec[] = {
-        {.base = &iov, .len = sizeof(struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec)},
-    };
-
-    return API_DISPATCH_NO_OUTVEC(in_vec);
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes)(
-                                      psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-                                      const uint8_t *expected_output,
-                                      size_t output_length)
-{
-    /* To be implemented when the PSA backend supports it */
-    return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-}
-
-TFM_CRYPTO_API(psa_status_t, psa_key_derivation_verify_key)(
-                                      psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
-                                      psa_key_id_t expected)
-{
-    /* To be implemented when the PSA backend supports it */
-    return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-}
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/src/tfm_ioctl_core_ns_api.c b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/src/tfm_ioctl_core_ns_api.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 2370988..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/src/tfm_ioctl_core_ns_api.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2021 Nordic Semiconductor ASA
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- */
-
-#include "nrf.h"
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include <tfm_platform_api.h>
-#include <tfm_ioctl_core_api.h>
-
-enum tfm_platform_err_t tfm_platform_mem_read(void *destination, uint32_t addr,
-					      size_t len, uint32_t *result)
-{
-	enum tfm_platform_err_t ret;
-	psa_invec in_vec;
-	psa_outvec out_vec;
-	struct tfm_read_service_args_t args;
-	struct tfm_read_service_out_t out;
-
-	in_vec.base = (const void *)&args;
-	in_vec.len = sizeof(args);
-
-	out_vec.base = (void *)&out;
-	out_vec.len = sizeof(out);
-
-	args.destination = destination;
-	args.addr = addr;
-	args.len = len;
-
-	ret = tfm_platform_ioctl(TFM_PLATFORM_IOCTL_READ_SERVICE, &in_vec,
-				 &out_vec);
-
-	*result = out.result;
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-enum tfm_platform_err_t tfm_platform_gpio_pin_mcu_select(uint32_t pin_number, uint32_t mcu,
-							 uint32_t *result)
-{
-#if defined(GPIO_PIN_CNF_MCUSEL_Msk)
-	enum tfm_platform_err_t ret;
-	psa_invec in_vec;
-	psa_outvec out_vec;
-	struct tfm_gpio_service_args args;
-	struct tfm_gpio_service_out out;
-
-	args.type = TFM_GPIO_SERVICE_TYPE_PIN_MCU_SELECT;
-	args.mcu_select.pin_number = pin_number;
-	args.mcu_select.mcu = mcu;
-
-	in_vec.base = (const void *)&args;
-	in_vec.len = sizeof(args);
-
-	out_vec.base = (void *)&out;
-	out_vec.len = sizeof(out);
-
-	ret = tfm_platform_ioctl(TFM_PLATFORM_IOCTL_GPIO_SERVICE, &in_vec,
-				 &out_vec);
-
-	*result = out.result;
-
-	return ret;
-#else
-	return TFM_PLATFORM_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-#endif
-}
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/src/tfm_platform_api.c b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/src/tfm_platform_api.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 4fc564b..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/src/tfm_platform_api.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2019-2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdbool.h>
-#include "tfm_platform_api.h"
-#include "psa/client.h"
-#include "psa_manifest/sid.h"
-
-enum tfm_platform_err_t tfm_platform_system_reset(void)
-{
-    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CONNECTION_REFUSED;
-
-    status = psa_call(TFM_PLATFORM_SERVICE_HANDLE,
-                      TFM_PLATFORM_API_ID_SYSTEM_RESET,
-                      NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
-
-    if (status < PSA_SUCCESS) {
-        return TFM_PLATFORM_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
-    } else {
-        return (enum tfm_platform_err_t)status;
-    }
-
-}
-
-enum tfm_platform_err_t
-tfm_platform_ioctl(tfm_platform_ioctl_req_t request,
-                   psa_invec *input, psa_outvec *output)
-{
-    tfm_platform_ioctl_req_t req = request;
-    struct psa_invec in_vec[2] = { {0} };
-    size_t inlen, outlen;
-    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CONNECTION_REFUSED;
-
-    in_vec[0].base = &req;
-    in_vec[0].len = sizeof(req);
-    if (input != NULL) {
-        in_vec[1].base = input->base;
-        in_vec[1].len = input->len;
-        inlen = 2;
-    } else {
-        inlen = 1;
-    }
-
-    if (output != NULL) {
-        outlen = 1;
-    } else {
-        outlen = 0;
-    }
-
-    status = psa_call(TFM_PLATFORM_SERVICE_HANDLE,
-                      TFM_PLATFORM_API_ID_IOCTL,
-                      in_vec, inlen,
-                      output, outlen);
-
-    if (status < PSA_SUCCESS) {
-        return TFM_PLATFORM_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
-    } else {
-        return (enum tfm_platform_err_t)status;
-    }
-}
-
-enum tfm_platform_err_t
-tfm_platform_nv_counter_increment(uint32_t counter_id)
-{
-    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CONNECTION_REFUSED;
-    struct psa_invec in_vec[1];
-
-    in_vec[0].base = &counter_id;
-    in_vec[0].len = sizeof(counter_id);
-
-    status = psa_call(TFM_PLATFORM_SERVICE_HANDLE,
-                      TFM_PLATFORM_API_ID_NV_INCREMENT,
-                      in_vec, 1, (psa_outvec *)NULL, 0);
-
-    if (status < PSA_SUCCESS) {
-        return TFM_PLATFORM_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
-    } else {
-        return (enum tfm_platform_err_t)status;
-    }
-}
-
-enum tfm_platform_err_t
-tfm_platform_nv_counter_read(uint32_t counter_id,
-                             uint32_t size, uint8_t *val)
-{
-    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CONNECTION_REFUSED;
-    struct psa_invec in_vec[1];
-    struct psa_outvec out_vec[1];
-
-    in_vec[0].base = &counter_id;
-    in_vec[0].len = sizeof(counter_id);
-
-    out_vec[0].base = val;
-    out_vec[0].len = size;
-
-    status = psa_call(TFM_PLATFORM_SERVICE_HANDLE,
-                      TFM_PLATFORM_API_ID_NV_READ,
-                      in_vec, 1, out_vec, 1);
-
-    if (status < PSA_SUCCESS) {
-        return TFM_PLATFORM_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
-    } else {
-        return (enum tfm_platform_err_t)status;
-    }
-}
diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/src/tfm_tz_psa_ns_api.c b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/src/tfm_tz_psa_ns_api.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 1f9fbe4..0000000
--- a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/src/tfm_tz_psa_ns_api.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2018-2022, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
- *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
- *
- */
-
-#include "psa/client.h"
-#include "tfm_ns_interface.h"
-#include "tfm_psa_call_pack.h"
-
-/**** API functions ****/
-
-uint32_t psa_framework_version(void)
-{
-    return tfm_ns_interface_dispatch(
-                                (veneer_fn)tfm_psa_framework_version_veneer,
-                                0,
-                                0,
-                                0,
-                                0);
-}
-
-uint32_t psa_version(uint32_t sid)
-{
-    return tfm_ns_interface_dispatch(
-                                (veneer_fn)tfm_psa_version_veneer,
-                                sid,
-                                0,
-                                0,
-                                0);
-}
-
-psa_status_t psa_call(psa_handle_t handle, int32_t type,
-                      const psa_invec *in_vec,
-                      size_t in_len,
-                      psa_outvec *out_vec,
-                      size_t out_len)
-{
-    if ((type    > PSA_CALL_TYPE_MAX) ||
-        (type    < PSA_CALL_TYPE_MIN) ||
-        (in_len  > PSA_MAX_IOVEC)     ||
-        (out_len > PSA_MAX_IOVEC)) {
-        return PSA_ERROR_PROGRAMMER_ERROR;
-    }
-
-    return tfm_ns_interface_dispatch(
-                                (veneer_fn)tfm_psa_call_veneer,
-                                (uint32_t)handle,
-                                PARAM_PACK(type, in_len, out_len),
-                                (uint32_t)in_vec,
-                                (uint32_t)out_vec);
-}
-
-psa_handle_t psa_connect(uint32_t sid, uint32_t version)
-{
-    return tfm_ns_interface_dispatch((veneer_fn)tfm_psa_connect_veneer, sid, version, 0, 0);
-}
-
-void psa_close(psa_handle_t handle)
-{
-    (void)tfm_ns_interface_dispatch((veneer_fn)tfm_psa_close_veneer, (uint32_t)handle, 0, 0, 0);
-}