nrfdemo

1 files changed, 145 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/platform/common/nrf_provisioning.c b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/platform/common/nrf_provisioning.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ce7792
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/platform/common/nrf_provisioning.c
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2022 Nordic Semiconductor ASA
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-Nordic-5-Clause
+ */
+
+#include "tfm_plat_provisioning.h"
+#include "tfm_plat_otp.h"
+#include "tfm_platform_system.h"
+#include "tfm_attest_hal.h"
+#include "hw_unique_key.h"
+#include "nrfx_nvmc.h"
+#include <nrfx.h>
+#include <nrf_cc3xx_platform.h>
+#include <nrf_cc3xx_platform_identity_key.h>
+#include "nrf_provisioning.h"
+#include <identity_key.h>
+#include <tfm_spm_log.h>
+
+static enum tfm_plat_err_t disable_debugging(void)
+{
+	/* Configure the UICR such that upon the next reset, APPROTECT will be enabled */
+	bool approt_writable;
+
+	approt_writable = nrfx_nvmc_word_writable_check((uint32_t)&NRF_UICR_S->APPROTECT,
+							UICR_APPROTECT_PALL_Protected);
+	approt_writable &= nrfx_nvmc_word_writable_check((uint32_t)&NRF_UICR_S->SECUREAPPROTECT,
+							 UICR_SECUREAPPROTECT_PALL_Protected);
+
+	if (approt_writable) {
+		nrfx_nvmc_word_write((uint32_t)&NRF_UICR_S->APPROTECT,
+				     UICR_APPROTECT_PALL_Protected);
+		nrfx_nvmc_word_write((uint32_t)&NRF_UICR_S->SECUREAPPROTECT,
+				     UICR_SECUREAPPROTECT_PALL_Protected);
+	} else {
+		return TFM_PLAT_ERR_SYSTEM_ERR;
+	}
+
+	return TFM_PLAT_ERR_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+int tfm_plat_provisioning_is_required(void)
+{
+	enum tfm_security_lifecycle_t lcs;
+
+	lcs = tfm_attest_hal_get_security_lifecycle();
+
+	return lcs == TFM_SLC_PSA_ROT_PROVISIONING;
+}
+
+enum tfm_plat_err_t tfm_plat_provisioning_perform(void)
+{
+	enum tfm_security_lifecycle_t lcs;
+
+	lcs = tfm_attest_hal_get_security_lifecycle();
+
+	/*
+	 * Provisioning in NRF defines has two steps, the first step is to execute
+	 * the provisioning_image sample. When this sample is executed it will
+	 * always set the lifecycle state to PROVISIONING. This is a requirement for
+	 * the TF-M provisioning to be completed so we don't accept any other
+	 * lifecycle state here.
+	 */
+
+	/* The Hardware Unique Keys should be already written */
+	if (!hw_unique_key_are_any_written()) {
+		SPMLOG_ERRMSG("This device has not been provisioned with Hardware Unique Keys.");
+		return TFM_PLAT_ERR_SYSTEM_ERR;
+	}
+
+#ifdef TFM_PARTITION_INITIAL_ATTESTATION
+	/* The Initial Attestation key should be already written */
+	if (!identity_key_is_written()) {
+		SPMLOG_ERRMSG(
+			"This device has not been provisioned with an Initial Attestation Key.");
+		return TFM_PLAT_ERR_SYSTEM_ERR;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't need to make sure that the validation key is written here since we assume
+	 * that secure boot is already enabled at this stage
+	 */
+
+	/* Disable debugging in UICR */
+	if (disable_debugging() != TFM_PLAT_ERR_SUCCESS) {
+		return TFM_PLAT_ERR_SYSTEM_ERR;
+	}
+
+	/* Transition to the SECURED lifecycle state */
+	if (tfm_attest_update_security_lifecycle_otp(TFM_SLC_SECURED) != 0) {
+		return TFM_PLAT_ERR_SYSTEM_ERR;
+	}
+
+	lcs = tfm_attest_hal_get_security_lifecycle();
+	if (lcs != TFM_SLC_SECURED) {
+		return TFM_PLAT_ERR_SYSTEM_ERR;
+	}
+
+	/* Perform a mandatory reset since we switch to an attestable LCS state */
+	tfm_platform_hal_system_reset();
+
+	/*
+	 * We should never return from this function, a reset should be triggered
+	 * before we reach this point. Returning an error to signal that something
+	 * is wrong if we reached here.
+	 */
+	return TFM_PLAT_ERR_SYSTEM_ERR;
+}
+
+static bool dummy_key_is_present(void)
+{
+#ifdef TFM_PARTITION_INITIAL_ATTESTATION
+	uint8_t key[IDENTITY_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
+	int err;
+
+	err = identity_key_read(key);
+	if (err < 0) {
+		/* Unable to read out the key. Then it is likely not present. */
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/* The first 8 bytes of the dummy key */
+	uint8_t first_8_bytes[8] = {0xA9, 0xB4, 0x54, 0xB2, 0x6D, 0x6F, 0x90, 0xA4};
+
+	/* Check if any bytes differ */
+	for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+		if (key[i] != first_8_bytes[i]) {
+			return false;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* The first 8 bytes matched the dummy key, so it is most likely the dummy key */
+	return true;
+#else
+	return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+void tfm_plat_provisioning_check_for_dummy_keys(void)
+{
+	if (dummy_key_is_present()) {
+		SPMLOG_ERRMSG("This device was provisioned with dummy keys and is NOT secure.");
+	}
+}