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Diffstat (limited to 'nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_extra.h')
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diff --git a/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_extra.h b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_extra.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6709b7b --- /dev/null +++ b/nrfdemo/build/tfm/api_ns/interface/include/psa/crypto_extra.h @@ -0,0 +1,1495 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved. + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + * + */ +/** + * \file psa/crypto_extra.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: vendor extensions + * + * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must + * include psa/crypto.h. + * + * This file is reserved for vendor-specific definitions. + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H + +#include "crypto_types.h" +#include "crypto_compat.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** \addtogroup crypto_types + * @{ + */ + +/** DSA public key. + * + * The import and export format is the + * representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a big-endian byte + * string. The length of the byte string is the length of the base prime `p` + * in bytes. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4002) + +/** DSA key pair (private and public key). + * + * The import and export format is the + * representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte string. The + * length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes (leading zeroes + * are not stripped). + * + * Deterministic DSA key derivation with psa_generate_derived_key follows + * FIPS 186-4 §B.1.2: interpret the byte string as integer + * in big-endian order. Discard it if it is not in the range + * [0, *N* - 2] where *N* is the boundary of the private key domain + * (the prime *p* for Diffie-Hellman, the subprime *q* for DSA, + * or the order of the curve's base point for ECC). + * Add 1 to the resulting integer and use this as the private key *x*. + * + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7002) + +/** Whether a key type is a DSA key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA(type) \ + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +#define PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000400) +/** DSA signature with hashing. + * + * This is the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4, + * with a random per-message secret number (*k*). + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding DSA signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_DSA(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000500) +#define PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG +/** Deterministic DSA signature with hashing. + * + * This is the deterministic variant defined by RFC 6979 of + * the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4. + * + * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true). + * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH + * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy. + * + * \return The corresponding DSA signature algorithm. + * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported + * hash algorithm. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(hash_alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) \ + (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \ + PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA(alg) \ + (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) + + +/* We need to expand the sample definition of this macro from + * the API definition. */ +#undef PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN +#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) \ + PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) + +/* Workaround for build warnings when MBed TLS has enabled MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + * + * Mbed TLS is not compatible with TF-Ms PSA API headers. + * + * In order to prevent build warnings for the follow functions we add the + * prototypes for them here. + * If the application tries to link with these functions it will get a link-time + * error. This use-case is not supported by TF-M. + */ +void psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm( + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_algorithm_t alg2); +psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); + + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7400) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4400) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_CURVE_MASK ((psa_key_type_t) 0x00ff) + + /** SPAKE2+ key pair. Both the prover and verifier key. + * + * The size of a SPAKE2+ key is the size associated with the elliptic curve + * group. See the documentation of each elliptic curve family for details. + * To construct a SPAKE2+ key pair, it must be output from a key derivation + * operation. + * The corresponding public key can be exported using psa_export_public_key(). + * See also #PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY(). + * + * \param curve A value of type psa_ecc_family_t that identifies the elliptic + * curve family to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR(curve) \ + ((psa_key_type_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (curve))) + + /** SPAKE2+ public key. The verifier key. + * + * The size of an SPAKE2+ public key is the same as the corresponding private + * key. See #PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR() and the documentation of each + * elliptic curve family for details. + * To construct a SPAKE2+ public key, it must be imported. + * + * \param curve A value of type psa_ecc_family_t that identifies the elliptic + * curve family to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY(curve) \ + ((psa_key_type_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (curve))) + + /** Whether a key type is a SPAKE2+ key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P(type) \ + ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \ + ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_CURVE_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) + /** Whether a key type is a SPAKE2+ key pair. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_CURVE_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR_BASE) + /** Whether a key type is a SPAKE2+ public key. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_CURVE_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) + /** Extract the curve from a SPAKE2+ key type. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_GET_FAMILY(type) \ + ((psa_ecc_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P(type) ? \ + ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_CURVE_MASK) : \ + 0)) + +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7700) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4700) +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_GROUP_MASK ((psa_key_type_t) 0x00ff) + + /** SRP key pair. Both the client and server key. + * + * The size of a SRP key is the size associated with the Diffie-Hellman + * group. See the documentation of each Diffie-Hellman group for details. + * To construct a SRP key pair, the password hash must be imported. + * The corresponding public key (password verifier) can be exported using + * psa_export_public_key(). See also #PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY(). + * + * \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the + * Diffie-Hellman group to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_KEY_PAIR(group) \ + ((psa_key_type_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (group))) + + /** SRP public key. The server key (password verifier). + * + * The size of an SRP public key is the same as the corresponding private + * key. See #PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_KEY_PAIR() and the documentation of each + * Diffie-Hellman group for details. + * To construct a SRP public key, it must be imported. The key size + * in attributes must not be zero. + * + * \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the + * Diffie-Hellman group to be used. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY(group) \ + ((psa_key_type_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (group))) + + /** Whether a key type is a SRP key (pair or public-only). */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SRP(type) \ + ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \ + ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_GROUP_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) + /** Whether a key type is a SRP key pair. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SRP_KEY_PAIR(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_GROUP_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_KEY_PAIR_BASE) + /** Whether a key type is a SRP public key. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \ + (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_GROUP_MASK) == \ + PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE) + /** Extract the curve from a SRP key type. */ +#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_GET_FAMILY(type) \ + ((psa_ecc_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SRP(type) ? \ + ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_GROUP_MASK) : \ + 0)) + +#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000000) + +/** Whether the specified algorithm is a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t). + * + * \return 1 if \p alg is a password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) + * algorithm, 0 otherwise. + * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported + * algorithm identifier. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(alg) \ + (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE) + +/** The Password-authenticated key exchange by juggling (J-PAKE) algorithm. + * + * This is J-PAKE as defined by RFC 8236, instantiated with the following + * parameters: + * + * - The group can be either an elliptic curve or defined over a finite field. + * - Schnorr NIZK proof as defined by RFC 8235 and using the same group as the + * J-PAKE algorithm. + * - A cryptographic hash function. + * + * To select these parameters and set up the cipher suite, call these functions + * in any order: + * + * \code + * psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_JPAKE(hash)); + * psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(cipher_suite, + * PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(type, family, bits)); + * \endcode + * + * For more information on how to set a specific curve or field, refer to the + * documentation of the individual \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants. + * + * After initializing a J-PAKE operation, call + * + * \code + * psa_pake_setup(operation, key, cipher_suite); + * psa_pake_set_user(operation, ...); + * psa_pake_set_peer(operation, ...); + * \endcode + * + * The password is provided as a key. This can be the password text itself, + * in an agreed character encoding, or some value derived from the password + * as required by a higher level protocol. + * + * (The implementation converts the key material to a number as described in + * Section 2.3.8 of _SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography_ + * (https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf), before reducing it modulo \c q. Here + * \c q is order of the group defined by the primitive set in the cipher suite. + * The \c psa_pake_setup() function returns an error if the result of the + * reduction is 0.) + * + * The key exchange flow for J-PAKE is as follows: + * -# To get the first round data that needs to be sent to the peer, call + * \code + * // Get g1 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Get the ZKP public key for x1 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Get the ZKP proof for x1 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * // Get g2 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Get the ZKP public key for x2 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Get the ZKP proof for x2 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * \endcode + * -# To provide the first round data received from the peer to the operation, + * call + * \code + * // Set g3 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Set the ZKP public key for x3 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Set the ZKP proof for x3 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * // Set g4 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Set the ZKP public key for x4 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Set the ZKP proof for x4 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * \endcode + * -# To get the second round data that needs to be sent to the peer, call + * \code + * // Get A + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Get ZKP public key for x2*s + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Get ZKP proof for x2*s + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * \endcode + * -# To provide the second round data received from the peer to the operation, + * call + * \code + * // Set B + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // Set ZKP public key for x4*s + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...); + * // Set ZKP proof for x4*s + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...); + * \endcode + * -# To access the shared secret call + * \code + * // Get Ka=Kb=K + * psa_pake_get_shared_key() + * \endcode + * + * For more information consult the documentation of the individual + * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants. + * + * At this point there is a cryptographic guarantee that only the authenticated + * party who used the same password is able to compute the key. But there is no + * guarantee that the peer is the party it claims to be and was able to do so. + * + * That is, the authentication is only implicit (the peer is not authenticated + * at this point, and no action should be taken that assume that they are - like + * for example accessing restricted files). + * + * To make the authentication explicit there are various methods, see Section 5 + * of RFC 8236 for two examples. + * + */ +#define PSA_ALG_JPAKE_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000100) +#define PSA_ALG_JPAKE(hash_alg) (PSA_ALG_JPAKE_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_JPAKE(alg) (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_JPAKE_BASE) + + /** The SPAKE2+ algorithm. + * + * SPAKE2+ is the augmented password-authenticated key exchange protocol, + * defined by RFC9383. SPAKE2+ includes confirmation of the shared secret + * key that results from the key exchange. + * SPAKE2+ is required by Matter Specification, Version 1.2, as MATTER_PAKE. + * Matter uses an earlier draft of the SPAKE2+ protocol: "SPAKE2+, an + * Augmented PAKE (Draft 02)". + * Although the operation of the PAKE is similar for both of these variants, + * they have different key schedules for the derivation of the shared secret. + * + * When setting up a PAKE cipher suite to use the SPAKE2+ protocol defined + * in RFC9383: + * - For cipher-suites that use HMAC for key confirmation, use the + * PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_HMAC() algorithm, parameterized by the required hash + * algorithm. + * - For cipher-suites that use CMAC-AES-128 for key confirmation, use the + * PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_CMAC() algorithm, parameterized by the required hash + * algorithm. + * - Use a PAKE primitive for the required elliptic curve. + * + * For example, the following code creates a cipher suite to select SPAKE2+ + * using edwards25519 with the SHA-256 hash function: + * + * \code + * psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT; + * psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)); + * psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(&cipher_suite, + * PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, + * PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 255)); + * \endcode + * + * When setting up a PAKE cipher suite to use the SPAKE2+ protocol used by + * Matter: + * - Use the PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_MATTER algorithm. + * - Use the PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, + * PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256) + * PAKE primitive. + * + * The following code creates a cipher suite to select the Matter variant of + * SPAKE2+: + * + * \code + * psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT; + * psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(&cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_MATTER); + * psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(&cipher_suite, + * PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, + * PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256)); + * \endcode + * + * After initializing a SPAKE2+ operation, call + * + * \code + * psa_pake_setup(operation, password, cipher_suite); + * psa_pake_set_role(operation, ...); + * \endcode + * + * The password provided to the client side must be of type + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR. + * The password provided to the server side must be of type + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY. + * + * The role set by \c psa_pake_set_role() must be either + * \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT or \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER. + * + * Then provide any additional, optional parameters: + * + * \code + * psa_pake_set_user(operation, ...); + * psa_pake_set_peer(operation, ...); + * psa_pake_set_context(operation, ...); + * \endcode + * + * + * The key exchange flow for a SPAKE2+ client is as follows: + * \code + * // send shareP + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // receive shareV + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // receive confirmV + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...); + * // send confirmP + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...); + * // get K_shared + * psa_pake_get_shared_key(operation, ...); + * \endcode + * + * The key exchange flow for a SPAKE2+ server is as follows: + * \code + * // receive shareP + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // send shareV + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // send confirmV + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...); + * // receive confirmP + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...); + * // get K_shared + * psa_pake_get_shared_key(operation, ...); + * \endcode + * + * The shared secret that is produced by SPAKE2+ is pseudorandom. Although + * it can be used directly as an encryption key, it is recommended to use + * the shared secret as an input to a key derivation operation to produce + * additional cryptographic keys. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_HMAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000400) +#define PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_HMAC(hash_alg) (PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_CMAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000500) +#define PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_CMAC(hash_alg) (PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_CMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_MATTER ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0A000609) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P(alg) (((alg) & ~0x000003ff) == PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_HMAC_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_HMAC(alg) (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_HMAC_BASE) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_CMAC(alg) (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_CMAC_BASE) + + /** The Secure Remote Passwort key exchange (SRP) algorithm. + * + * This is SRP-6 as defined by RFC 2945 and RFC 5054, instantiated with the + * following parameters: + * + * - The group is defined over a finite field using a secure prime. + * - A cryptographic hash function. + * + * To select these parameters and set up the cipher suite, call these functions: + * + * \code + * psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT; + * psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_SRP_6(hash)); + * psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(&cipher_suite, + * PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(type, family, bits)); + * \endcode + * + * After initializing a SRP operation, call: + * + * \code + * psa_pake_setup(operation, password, cipher_suite); + * psa_pake_set_role(operation, ...); + * psa_pake_set_user(operation, ...); + * \endcode + * + * The password provided to the client side must be of type + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_KEY_PAIR. + * The password provided to the server side must be of type + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_SRP_PUBLIC_KEY. + * + * The role set by \c psa_pake_set_role() must be either + * \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT or \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER. + * + * For the SRP client key exchange call the following functions in any order: + * \code + * // get salt + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_SALT, ...); + * // get server key + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // write client key + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * \endcode + * + * For the SRP server key exchange call the following functions in any order: + * \code + * // get salt + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_SALT, ...); + * // get client key + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * // write server key + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...); + * \endcode + * + * For the client proof phase call the following functions in this order: + * \code + * // send M1 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...); + * // receive M2 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...); + * // Get secret + * psa_pake_get_shared_key() + * \endcode + * + * For the server proof phase call the following functions in this order: + * \code + * // receive M1 + * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...); + * // send M2 + * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...); + * // Get secret + * psa_pake_get_shared_key() + * \endcode + * + * The shared secret that is produced by SRP is pseudorandom. Although + * it can be used directly as an encryption key, it is recommended to use + * the shared secret as an input to a key derivation operation to produce + * additional cryptographic keys. + */ +#define PSA_ALG_SRP_6_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000300) +#define PSA_ALG_SRP_6(hash_alg) (PSA_ALG_SRP_6_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) +#define PSA_ALG_IS_SRP_6(alg) (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_SRP_6_BASE) + +/** @} */ + +/** \defgroup pake Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) + * + * This is a proposed PAKE interface for the PSA Crypto API. It is not part of + * the official PSA Crypto API yet. + * + * \note The content of this section is not part of the stable API and ABI + * of Mbed TLS and may change arbitrarily from version to version. + * Same holds for the corresponding macros #PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE and + * #PSA_ALG_JPAKE. + * @{ + */ + +/** A value to indicate no role in a PAKE algorithm. + * This value can be used in a call to psa_pake_set_role() for symmetric PAKE + * algorithms which do not assign roles. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x00) + +/** The first peer in a balanced PAKE. + * + * Although balanced PAKE algorithms are symmetric, some of them need an + * ordering of peers for the transcript calculations. If the algorithm does not + * need this, both #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST and #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND are + * accepted. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x01) + +/** The second peer in a balanced PAKE. + * + * Although balanced PAKE algorithms are symmetric, some of them need an + * ordering of peers for the transcript calculations. If the algorithm does not + * need this, either #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST or #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND are + * accepted. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x02) + +/** The client in an augmented PAKE. + * + * Augmented PAKE algorithms need to differentiate between client and server. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x11) + +/** The server in an augmented PAKE. + * + * Augmented PAKE algorithms need to differentiate between client and server. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x12) + +/** The PAKE primitive type indicating the use of elliptic curves. + * + * The values of the \c family and \c bits fields of the cipher suite identify a + * specific elliptic curve, using the same mapping that is used for ECC + * (::psa_ecc_family_t) keys. + * + * (Here \c family means the value returned by PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_FAMILY() and + * \c bits means the value returned by PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS().) + * + * Input and output during the operation can involve group elements and scalar + * values: + * -# The format for group elements is the same as for public keys on the + * specific curve would be. For more information, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * -# The format for scalars is the same as for private keys on the specific + * curve would be. For more information, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_key(). + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t) 0x01) + +/** The PAKE primitive type indicating the use of Diffie-Hellman groups. + * + * The values of the \c family and \c bits fields of the cipher suite identify + * a specific Diffie-Hellman group, using the same mapping that is used for + * Diffie-Hellman (::psa_dh_family_t) keys. + * + * (Here \c family means the value returned by PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_FAMILY() and + * \c bits means the value returned by PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS().) + * + * Input and output during the operation can involve group elements and scalar + * values: + * -# The format for group elements is the same as for public keys on the + * specific group would be. For more information, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * -# The format for scalars is the same as for private keys on the specific + * group would be. For more information, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_key(). + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t) 0x02) + +/** Construct a PAKE primitive from type, family and bit-size. + * + * \param pake_type The type of the primitive + * (value of type ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t). + * \param pake_family The family of the primitive + * (the type and interpretation of this parameter depends + * on \p pake_type, for more information consult the + * documentation of individual ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t + * constants). + * \param pake_bits The bit-size of the primitive + * (Value of type \c size_t. The interpretation + * of this parameter depends on \p pake_family, for more + * information consult the documentation of individual + * ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t constants). + * + * \return The constructed primitive value of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t. + * Return 0 if the requested primitive can't be encoded as + * ::psa_pake_primitive_t. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(pake_type, pake_family, pake_bits) \ + (((pake_bits & 0xFFFF) != pake_bits) ? 0 : \ + ((psa_pake_primitive_t) (((pake_type) << 24 | \ + (pake_family) << 16) | (pake_bits)))) + +#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(pake_primitive) \ + ((size_t)(pake_primitive & 0xFFFF)) + +#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_FAMILY(pake_primitive) \ + ((psa_pake_family_t)((pake_primitive >> 16) & 0xFF)) + +#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_TYPE(pake_primitive) \ + ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t)((pake_primitive >> 24) & 0xFF)) + +/** A key confirmation value that indicates a confirmed key in a PAKE cipher + * suite. + * + * This key confirmation value will result in the PAKE algorithm exchanging + * data to verify that the shared key is identical for both parties. This is + * the default key confirmation value in an initialized PAKE cipher suite + * object. + * Some algorithms do not include confirmation of the shared key. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_CONFIRMED_KEY 0 + +/** A key confirmation value that indicates an unconfirmed key in a PAKE cipher + * suite. + * + * This key confirmation value will result in the PAKE algorithm terminating + * prior to confirming that the resulting shared key is identical for both + * parties. + * Some algorithms do not support returning an unconfirmed shared key. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_UNCONFIRMED_KEY 1 + + /** The key share being sent to or received from the peer. + * + * The format for both input and output at this step is the same as for public + * keys on the group determined by the primitive (::psa_pake_primitive_t) would + * be. + * + * For more information on the format, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * + * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the + * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x01) + +/** A Schnorr NIZKP public key. + * + * This is the ephemeral public key in the Schnorr Non-Interactive + * Zero-Knowledge Proof (the value denoted by the letter 'V' in RFC 8235). + * + * The format for both input and output at this step is the same as for public + * keys on the group determined by the primitive (::psa_pake_primitive_t) would + * be. + * + * For more information on the format, consult the documentation of + * psa_export_public_key(). + * + * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the + * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x02) + +/** A Schnorr NIZKP proof. + * + * This is the proof in the Schnorr Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof (the + * value denoted by the letter 'r' in RFC 8235). + * + * Both for input and output, the value at this step is an integer less than + * the order of the group selected in the cipher suite. The format depends on + * the group as well: + * + * - For Montgomery curves, the encoding is little endian. + * - For everything else the encoding is big endian (see Section 2.3.8 of + * _SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography_ at https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf). + * + * In both cases leading zeroes are allowed as long as the length in bytes does + * not exceed the byte length of the group order. + * + * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the + * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x03) + +/** The key confirmation value. + * + * This value is used during the key confirmation phase of a PAKE protocol. + * The format of the value depends on the algorithm and cipher suite: + * + * For SPAKE2+ algorithms, the format for both input and output at this step is + * the same as the output of the MAC algorithm specified in the cipher suite. + * + * For PSA_ALG_SRP_6, the format for both input and output at this step is + * the same as the output of the Hash algorithm specified. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM ((psa_pake_step_t)0x04) + +/** The salt. + * + * The format for both input and output at this step is plain binary data. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_SALT ((psa_pake_step_t)0x05) + +/** Retrieve the PAKE algorithm from a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. + * + * \return The PAKE algorithm stored in the cipher suite structure. + */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); + +/** Declare the PAKE algorithm for the cipher suite. + * + * This function overwrites any PAKE algorithm + * previously set in \p cipher_suite. + * + * \param[out] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to write to. + * \param algorithm The PAKE algorithm to write. + * (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type ::psa_algorithm_t + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true.) + * If this is 0, the PAKE algorithm in + * \p cipher_suite becomes unspecified. + */ +static void psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm); + +/** Retrieve the primitive from a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query. + * + * \return The primitive stored in the cipher suite structure. + */ +static psa_pake_primitive_t psa_pake_cs_get_primitive( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); + +/** Declare the primitive for a PAKE cipher suite. + * + * This function overwrites any primitive previously set in \p cipher_suite. + * + * \param[out] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to write to. + * \param primitive The primitive to write. If this is 0, the + * primitive type in \p cipher_suite becomes + * unspecified. + */ +static void psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_pake_primitive_t primitive); + +/** The type of the state data structure for PAKE operations. + * + * Before calling any function on a PAKE operation object, the application + * must initialize it by any of the following means: + * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example: + * \code + * psa_pake_operation_t operation; + * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation)); + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example: + * \code + * psa_pake_operation_t operation = {0}; + * \endcode + * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT, + * for example: + * \code + * psa_pake_operation_t operation = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT; + * \endcode + * - Assign the result of the function psa_pake_operation_init() + * to the structure, for example: + * \code + * psa_pake_operation_t operation; + * operation = psa_pake_operation_init(); + * \endcode + * + * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not + * make any assumptions about the content of this structure. + * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */ +typedef struct psa_pake_operation_s psa_pake_operation_t; + +/** Return an initial value for a PAKE operation object. + */ +static psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_operation_init(void); + +/** Set the session information for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * The sequence of operations to set up a password-authenticated key exchange + * is as follows: + * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions + * listed here. + * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the + * documentation for #psa_pake_operation_t, e.g. + * #PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT. + * -# Call psa_pake_setup() to specify the password key and the cipher suite. + * -# Call \c psa_pake_set_xxx() functions on the operation to complete the + * setup. The exact sequence of \c psa_pake_set_xxx() functions that needs + * to be called depends on the algorithm in use. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * A typical sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key + * exchange: + * -# Call psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...) to get the + * key share that needs to be sent to the peer. + * -# Call psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...) to provide + * the key share that was received from the peer. + * -# Depending on the algorithm additional calls to psa_pake_output() and + * psa_pake_input() might be necessary. + * -# Call psa_pake_get_shared_key() for accessing the shared secret. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_pake_setup(), + * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_pake_abort(). The + * application may call psa_pake_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to psa_pake_setup(), the application must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A call to psa_pake_abort(). + * - A successful call to psa_pake_get_shared_key(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized but not set up yet. + * \param[in] password_key Identifier of the key holding the password or + * a value derived from the password. It must + * remain valid until the operation terminates. + * The valid key types depend on the PAKE algorithm, + * and participant role. + * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite to use. (A cipher suite fully + * characterizes a PAKE algorithm and determines + * the algorithm as well.) + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p password_key is not a valid key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE flag, or it does not + * permit the \p operation's algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The algorithm in \p cipher_suite is not a PAKE algorithm or encodes + * an invalid hash algorithm, or the PAKE primitive in \p cipher_suite + * is not compatible with the PAKE algorithm, or the key confirmation + * value in \p cipher_suite is not compatible with the PAKE algorithm + * and primitive, or the \p password_key is not compatible with + * \p cipher_suite. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The algorithm in \p cipher_suite is not a supported PAKE algorithm, + * or the PAKE primitive in \p cipher_suite is not supported or not + * compatible with the PAKE algorithm, or the key confirmation value + * in \p cipher_suite is not supported or not compatible with the PAKE + * algorithm and primitive, or the key type or key size of + * \p password_key is not supported with \p cipher_suite. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid, or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_setup(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t password_key, + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite); + +/** Set the application role for a password-authenticated key exchange. +* +* Not all PAKE algorithms need to differentiate the communicating entities. +* It is optional to call this function for PAKEs that don't require a role +* to be specified. For such PAKEs the application role parameter is ignored, +* or #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE can be passed as \c role. +* +* Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` +* values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) +* for more information. +* +* \param[in,out] operation The operation object to specify the +* application's role for. It must have been set up +* by psa_pake_setup() and not yet in use (neither +* psa_pake_output() nor psa_pake_input() has been +* called yet). It must be an operation for which +* the application's role hasn't been specified +* (psa_pake_set_role() hasn't been called yet). +* \param role A value of type ::psa_pake_role_t indicating the +* application's role in the PAKE algorithm +* that is being set up. For more information see +* the documentation of \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_XXX +* constants. +* +* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS +* Success. +* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT +* The \p role is not a valid PAKE role in the \p operation’s algorithm. +* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED +* The \p role for this algorithm is not supported or is not valid. +* \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription +* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription +* \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE +* The operation state is not valid, or +* the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). +* It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize +* results in this error code. +*/ +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_role(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_role_t role); + +/** Set the user ID for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Call this function to set the user ID. For PAKE algorithms that associate a + * user identifier with each side of the session you need to call + * psa_pake_set_peer() as well. For PAKE algorithms that associate a single + * user identifier with the session, call psa_pake_set_user() only. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the user ID for. It + * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and + * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor + * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must + * be on operation for which the user ID hasn't + * been set (psa_pake_set_user() hasn't been + * called yet). + * \param[in] user_id The user ID to authenticate with. + * \param user_id_len Size of the \p user_id buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p user_id is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm and cipher + * suite. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The value of \p user_id is not supported by the implementation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid, or + * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_user(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *user_id, + size_t user_id_len); + +/** Set the peer ID for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Call this function in addition to psa_pake_set_user() for PAKE algorithms + * that associate a user identifier with each side of the session. For PAKE + * algorithms that associate a single user identifier with the session, call + * psa_pake_set_user() only. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the peer ID for. It + * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and + * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor + * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must + * be on operation for which the peer ID hasn't + * been set (psa_pake_set_peer() hasn't been + * called yet). + * \param[in] peer_id The peer's ID to authenticate. + * \param peer_id_len Size of the \p peer_id buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p peer_id is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm and cipher + * suite. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The algorithm doesn't associate a second identity with the session. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * Calling psa_pake_set_peer() is invalid with the \p operation's + * algorithm, the operation state is not valid, or the library has not + * been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_peer(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *peer_id, + size_t peer_id_len); + +/** Set the context data for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Call this function for PAKE algorithms that accept additional context data + * as part of the protocol setup. + * + * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` + * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) + * for more information. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the context for. It + * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and + * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor + * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must + * be on operation for which the context hasn't + * been set (psa_pake_set_context() hasn't been + * called yet). + * \param[in] context The context. + * \param context_len Size of the \p context buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The \p context is not valid for the operation’s algorithm and cipher suite. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The \p context is not supported by the implementation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * Calling psa_pake_set_context() is invalid with the \p operation's + * algorithm, the operation state is not valid, or the library has not + * been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_context(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *context, + size_t context_len); + +/** Get output for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Depending on the algorithm being executed, you might need to call this + * function several times or you might not need to call this at all. + * + * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key + * exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of + * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type + * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more + * information. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param step The step of the algorithm for which the output + * is requested. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written in the + * format appropriate for this \p step. Refer to + * the documentation of the individual + * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants for more + * information. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. This must + * be at least #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c alg, \c + * primitive, \p output_step) where \c alg and + * \p primitive are the PAKE algorithm and primitive + * in the operation's cipher suite, and \p step is + * the output step. + * + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes of the returned + * output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p step is not supported with the operation's algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and fully set + * up, and this call must conform to the algorithm's requirements + * for ordering of input and output steps), or the library has not + * been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_output(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Provide input for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * Depending on the algorithm being executed, you might need to call this + * function several times or you might not need to call this at all. + * + * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key + * exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of + * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type + * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more + * information. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param step The step for which the input is provided. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input in the format + * appropriate for this \p step. Refer to the + * documentation of the individual + * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants for more + * information. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The verification fails for a #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF input step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or + * \p input_length is not compatible with the \p operation’s algorithm, + * or the \p input is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm, + * cipher suite or \p step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p step is not supported with the operation's algorithm, or + * \p step p is not supported with the \p operation's algorithm, or the + * \p input is not supported for the \p operation's algorithm, cipher + * suite or \p step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and fully set + * up, and this call must conform to the algorithm's requirements + * for ordering of input and output steps), or the library has not + * been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_input(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_step_t step, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Get shared secret from a PAKE. + * + * This is the final call in a PAKE operation, which retrieves the shared + * secret as a key. It is recommended that this key is used as an input to a + * key derivation operation to produce additional cryptographic keys. For + * some PAKE algorithms, the shared secret is also suitable for use as a key + * in cryptographic operations such as encryption. Refer to the documentation + * of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type + * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more + * information. + * + * Depending on the key confirmation requested in the cipher suite, + * psa_pake_get_shared_key() must be called either before or after the + * key-confirmation output and input steps for the PAKE algorithm. The key + * confirmation affects the guarantees that can be made about the shared key: + * + * Unconfirmed key + * If the cipher suite used to set up the operation requested an unconfirmed + * key, the application must call psa_pake_get_shared_key() after the + * key-exchange output and input steps are completed. The PAKE algorithm + * provides a cryptographic guarantee that only a peer who used the same + * password, and identity inputs, is able to compute the same key. However, + * there is no guarantee that the peer is the participant it claims to be, + * and was able to compute the same key. + * Since the peer is not authenticated, no action should be taken that assumes + * that the peer is who it claims to be. For example, do not access restricted + * files on the peer’s behalf until an explicit authentication has succeeded. + * Note: + * Some PAKE algorithms do not enable the output of the shared secret until it + * has been confirmed. + * + * Confirmed key + * If the cipher suite used to set up the operation requested a confirmed key, + * the application must call psa_pake_get_shared_key() after the key-exchange + * and key-confirmation output and input steps are completed. + * Following key confirmation, the PAKE algorithm provides a cryptographic + * guarantee that the peer used the same password and identity inputs, and has + * computed the identical shared secret key. + * Since the peer is not authenticated, no action should be taken that assumes + * that the peer is who it claims to be. For example, do not access restricted + * files on the peer’s behalf until an explicit authentication has succeeded. + * Note: + * Some PAKE algorithms do not include any key-confirmation steps. + * + * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key + * exchange depends on the algorithm in use. + * + * When this function returns successfully, \p operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, both \p operation + * and \c key_derivation operations enter an error state and must be aborted + * by calling psa_pake_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key. + * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created + * key. #PSA_KEY_ID_NULL on failure. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The implementation does not permit creating a key with the + * specified attributes due to some implementation-specific policy. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is + * already a persistent key with the given identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key type is not valid for output from this operation’s + * algorithm, or the key size is nonzero, or the key lifetime is + * invalid, the key identifier is not valid for the key lifetime, + * or the key usage flags include invalid values, or the key’s + * permitted-usage algorithm is invalid, or the key attributes, + * as a whole, are invalid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The key attributes, as a whole, are not supported for creation + * from a PAKE secret, either by the implementation in general or + * in the specified storage location. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The PAKE operation state is not valid (it must be ready to return + * the shared secret), or the library has not been previously + * initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_get_shared_key(psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key); + +/** Abort a PAKE operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the \c + * operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused + * for another operation by calling psa_pake_setup() again. + * + * This function may be called at any time after the operation + * object has been initialized as described in #psa_pake_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling psa_pake_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to psa_pake_abort() or psa_pake_get_shared_key() + * is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation to abort. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t psa_pake_abort(psa_pake_operation_t *operation); + +/**@}*/ + +/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_pake_output(). + * + * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed + * that psa_pake_output() will not fail due to an insufficient output buffer + * size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call. + * + * See also #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE + * + * \param alg A PAKE algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\p alg) is true). + * \param primitive A primitive of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param output_step A value of type ::psa_pake_step_t that is valid for the + * algorithm \p alg. + * \return A sufficient output buffer size for the specified + * PAKE algorithm, primitive, and output step. If the + * PAKE algorithm, primitive, or output step is not + * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, + * return 0. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, output_step) \ + (output_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ? \ + PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_TYPE(primitive) == PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH ? \ + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(primitive)) : \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(primitive)) : \ + output_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ? \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(primitive)) : \ + output_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF ? \ + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(primitive)) : \ + output_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM ? \ + PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_CMAC(alg) ? \ + PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128, PSA_ALG_CMAC) : \ + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg) : \ + 0u) + +/** A sufficient input buffer size for psa_pake_input(). + * + * The value returned by this macro is guaranteed to be large enough for any + * valid input to psa_pake_input() in an operation with the specified + * parameters. + * + * See also #PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE + * + * \param alg A PAKE algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\p alg) is true). + * \param primitive A primitive of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t that is + * compatible with algorithm \p alg. + * \param input_step A value of type ::psa_pake_step_t that is valid for the + * algorithm \p alg. + * \return A sufficient input buffer size for the specified + * input, cipher suite and algorithm. If the cipher suite, + * the input type or PAKE algorithm is not recognized, or + * the parameters are incompatible, return 0. + */ +#define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, input_step) \ + (input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ? \ + PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_TYPE(primitive) == PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH ? \ + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(primitive)) : \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(primitive)) : \ + input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ? \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(primitive)) : \ + input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF ? \ + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(primitive)) : \ + input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM ? \ + PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_CMAC(alg) ? \ + PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128, PSA_ALG_CMAC) : \ + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg) : \ + input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_SALT ? \ + 64u : \ + 0u) + +/** Output buffer size for psa_pake_output() for any of the supported PAKE + * algorithm and primitive suites and output step. + * + * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. + * + * The value of this macro must be at least as large as the largest value + * returned by PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE() + * + * See also #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p primitive, \p output_step). + */ +#ifdef PSA_WANT_ALG_SRP_6 +#define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) +#else +#define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) +#endif + +/** Input buffer size for psa_pake_input() for any of the supported PAKE + * algorithm and primitive suites and input step. + * + * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer. + * + * The value of this macro must be at least as large as the largest value + * returned by PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE() + * + * See also #PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p primitive, \p output_step). + */ +#ifdef PSA_WANT_ALG_SRP_6 +#define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) +#else +#define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) +#endif + +static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + return cipher_suite->algorithm; +} + +static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm( + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_algorithm_t algorithm) +{ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(algorithm)) { + cipher_suite->algorithm = 0; + } else { + cipher_suite->algorithm = algorithm; + } +} + +static inline psa_pake_primitive_t psa_pake_cs_get_primitive( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + return cipher_suite->primitive; +} + +static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_primitive( + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_pake_primitive_t primitive) +{ + cipher_suite->primitive = primitive; +} + +static inline uint32_t psa_pake_cs_get_key_confirmation( + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite) +{ + return cipher_suite->key_confirmation; +} + +static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_key_confirmation( + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite, + uint32_t key_confirmation) +{ + cipher_suite->key_confirmation = key_confirmation; +} + +/**@}*/ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H */ |